Nazi Germany and the Vatican, July, 1933-January, 1935 / by Peters, Richard Alvin.
71-27,638
PETERS, Richard Alvin, 1930-
NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, JULY, 1933—  
JANUARY, 1935.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1971 
History, modern
University Microfilms. A XEROX Com pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan
©  Copyright by 
Richard Alvin Peters
1971
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, 
JULY, 1933 - JANUARY, 1935
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 




RICHARD ALVIN PETERS 
Norman, Oklahoma
1971
NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, 
JULY, 1933 - JANUARY, 1935
APPROVED BY




As a result of Rolf Hochhuth's play, The Deputy, 
in recent years the world has focused a great deal of 
attention on the relations between the Vatican and the 
Third Reich. In particular, The Deputy has stimulated 
interest in Pope Pius XII, and his position concerning 
the fate of the Jews during the Second World War. The 
resulting controversy has brought forth a barrage of 
books, most of which have taken extremely partisan stands 
on this subject. The vast majority of these publications, 
however, emphasize the role of the Pope rather than the 
Reich government, and deal only with the War years. By 
contrast, except for the Reich Concordat of 1933i his­
torians have not researched carefully the period which 
begins immediately after the Concordat and concludes in 
1939, the year which saw both the outbreak of the War and 
the election of Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli as Pope. This 
is somewhat surprising, especially since Pius XII played 
an extremely important role in Reich-Vatican relations 
during this period as the Cardinal Secretary of State 
under Pope Pius XI. It is the intention here to fill part 
of this void, i.e., the first two years of the Hitler regime,
iii
The major portion of this study is based upon the 
documents of the German Foreign Ministry, the majority 
of -which were obtained at the Foreign Office Library in 
London and remain unpublished. In addition, the published 
Documents on German Foreign Policy have been a great value. 
Obviously, the Vatican archives are necessary to complete 
this study but they are unavailable for this period. While 
the lack of these documents is unfortunate, it is not as 
serious as it first appears for two reasons. First, the 
notes which the Vatican sent to the Reich government are 
found in the German as well as the Vatican archives. Sec­
ondly, scholars have examined the correspondence between 
Vatican authorities and the members of the German Episco­
pate, which is located in the diocesan archives in Germany. 
Thus, there is a considerable body of knowledge available 
concerning the Vatican's position toward the religious 
situation in Germany apart from those found in the Foreign 
Ministry archives. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that 
without access to the Vatican archives there is much that 
we cannot know, especially concerning the events on the 
"inside" of the Vatican and the formation of Vatican policy 
toward Germany. We would like to know more, for example, 
about the relationship between Cardinal Pacelli and Pope 
Pius XI, and to what extent they agreed or disagreed on 
Vatican policy. If it is true, as all observers seem to 
concur, that Pope Pius XI administered Vatican affairs in
iv
an authoritarian manner, then why did he at the same time 
allow Cardinal Pacelli to assume so much responsibility 
in German affairs? There are also questions concerning 
the role played by other Vatican authorities, but it is 
impossible to assess their role without the Vatican 
archives. Thus, when it comes to explaining "why" the 
Vatican pursued a specific policy this study is limited.
It does attempt to explain what is traditional in Vatican 
diplomacy and the position the Vatican could be expected 
to take based upon Catholic doctrine. Occasionally, when 
warranted by logic and the evidence in the German docu­
ments, a few suppositions are offered concerning the 
motives behind Vatican policy, but they are not intended 
to be definitive. On the other hand, in regard to the 
formation of German policy toward the Vatican, this study 
is more complete. Even here there are occasional gaps in 
the archives, but on the whole the German record is well 
documented for the period covered.
At the outset I would like to make it clear that 
I have made no effort to prove or disprove any particular 
point of view. In respect to both the Nazis and the Vati­
can, I feel compelled to neither censure nor exonerate, 
but only to draw conclusions from the evidence uncovered.
I admittedly share the abhorrence of the Hitler regime 
which is characteristic of nearly all Americans, but I 
have still attempted to be charitable to the Nazis if
the occasion seemed to call for it. Although this study 
presents no single "thesis," it does ask and attempt to 
resolve a number of questions. Some of these questions 
are: (l) the extent of Hitler's involvement in Reich-
Vatican relations during this period and to what end;
(2) the role of the German Foreign Ministry and its rela­
tion to the Reich Ministry of Interior in forming policy 
toward the Vatican; (3) the effectiveness of the Reich 
Concordat as a legal weapon in protecting Catholic rights; 
and (4) the significance of the Communist threat in pro­
viding a common basis for German-Vatican collaboration. 
Finally, because of the controversy which has surrounded 
Cardinal Pacelli, an effort is made to determine his role 
in Reich-Vatican relations while he served as Cardinal 
Secretary of State. For example, the claims of German 
officials that Pacelli was a more compromising and an 
easier man to work with than Pius XI will be examined as 
closely as possible. This is especially important be­
cause Pacelli has since been severely criticized for 
failing to speak out while the Nazis methodically mur­
dered several million Jews. The question is, did Pacelli 
reveal attitudes or pursue policies as Secretary of State 
that would help us to understand better his puzzling 
silence on the Jewish question as Pope?
I have devoted considerable space to the background, 
which must be understood before one can appreciate the
vi
complexities of Reich-Vatican relations. Thus, Chapter I 
introduces the principal characters in both the German 
Foreign Ministry and the Vatican, while Chapters II and 
III survey the relations between the Nazis and German 
Catholics up to the conclusion of the Concordat. I have 
also found it necessary to integrate into the story of 
Reich-Vatican relations some of the high points of the 
Church conflict inside Germany. This is itself a lengthy 
and complex subject, and an effort has been made to keep 
the space devoted to these internal events to a minimum.
It is nevertheless far too intimately intertwined in 
Germany's relations with the Holy See to be omitted, be­
cause the treatment of Catholics inside Germany directly 
affected the attitude of Vatican authorities toward the 
Nazis. Fortunately, Guenter Lewy has provided a serious 
study of this subject in The Catholic Church and Nazi 
Germany, which has helped immensely.
Although this is essentially a diplomatic study, 
it is unusual in the sense that its scope is broader than 
the majority of such studies. It is concerned not only 
with political issues, but also with religious and racial 
questions, and the ageless problem of Church versus State. 
During the twenties and early thirties, the Catholic 
Church had to determine its position toward a movement 
whose leaders were known to hold views hostile toward 
Christianity. This was not an easy assignment, and it is
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not surprising that the Church authorities sometimes 
appeared confused and inconsistent in determining the 
proper course to pursue. Unfortunately, there was no 
confusion on the part or Adolf Hitler, who from the very 
beginning set out to destroy the independence and author­
ity of the Catholic Church in Germany. To accomplish 
this goal he sometimes used the diplomatic approach, as 
when the Reich government negotiated the Concordat with 
the Vatican. At other times he relied upon intimidation 
and terror. But regardless of the political tactics used 
for the occasion. Hitler's goal remained unaltered.
In preparing this study, I am grateful to a number 
of individuals who in various ways have provided valuable 
assistance. Among those whom I would like to acknowledge 
are Mr. K. Hiscocks of the Foreign Office Library in 
London, Mrs. U s e  R. Wolff and her staff at the Wiener 
Library in London, and Mrs. Auguste Cooper and Miss Anne 
Lynch, both of Edmond, Oklahoma. Finally, I would like 
to thank the members of my committee for their time and 
consideration, and especially Dr. Gordon D. Drummond, who 
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NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN,
JULY, 1933 - JANUARY, 1935
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Part I; Nazi Foreign Policy and 
the German Foreign Ministry 
Before undertaking the study of Germany's rela­
tions with the Vatican in the early years of the Third 
Reich, some attention should be given to the personnel 
and structure of the German Foreign Ministry as it was 
composed in 1933- This vast organization not only 
served as the focal point for Reich-Vatican relations, 
but its members also drew up the majority of the docu­
ments used in this study. In addition, it will be neces­
sary to examine certain personalities and organizations 
outside the Foreign Ministry, as they too played an im­
portant role in the foreign affairs of Nazi Germany.
At the outset it should be clearly understood that 
the basic formulas of Nazi foreign policy were the product 
of men who did not technically belong to the Foreign Min­
istry. This is especially important when considering the
1
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role of the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. While Hitler 
did not have the same degree of authority in 1933 that he 
acquired in later years, he was still able to set the - 
course of Nazi foreign policy.^ At the same time the 
archives of the German Foreign Ministry only rarely yield 
a note signed personally by Hitler. The explanation for 
this is simple: Hitler frequently passed his instructions
on to his subordinates verbally and without committing 
them to writing. Thus, the persons most frequently men­
tioned in this study are the lesser dignitaries of the 
Third Reich, particularly the officials of the Foreign 
Office who assiduously endeavored to maintain friendly 
relations with the Holy See. This was an important as­
signment, and an exceedingly difficult one in view of 
the radical position of the Nazi Party on race and reli­
gion, but it did tend to limit the Foreign Ministry's 
role to the execution of policy and the reconciliation 
of differences between the Reich and the Vatican. The 
formation of basic policy remained in the hands of Hitler 
and others outside the Foreign Ministry.
While some historians claim Hitler added little or
2nothing new to the foreign policy of his predecessors.
^DeWitt C. Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs, XXV (October, 1946), 130.
^See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second 
World War, A Premier Book (2nd ed.; Greenwich, Conn.: 
Fawcett Publications, Inc., I96I), pp. 70-71*
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it is nevertheless clear that as outlined in Mein Kampf 
his objectives were decidedly aggressive. But unlike the 
aggression of the Wilhelmian era, Hitler's aims were 
directed exclusively toward the acquisition of continen­
tal possessions, not colonies. He emphatically declares 
in Mein Kampf that the "only possibility for carrying out 
a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of
3new land in Europe itself." Hitler did not believe
territorial expansion was the ultimate goal, however; it
would instead serve to insure the German race its means
of existence. To be meaningful, expansion must aim at the
uniting of all Germans in Europe with the Reich, and it
should provide Lebensraum, or "living space" for these
Germans. As to the direction of German expansion Hitler
was perfectly clear--the new Reich must march eastward,
kin the tradition of the Teutonic Knights of old. In a 
practical sense. Hitler's Germany would expand at the 
expense of Russia and the smaller states of eastern 
Europe. In order to carry out this march eastward,
Germany would have to protect itself from a rear attack. 
For this reason Hitler insisted upon reaching an agreement 
with England, which he believed could be achieved at the 
price of renouncing world trade, colonies, and sea power.^
3Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. by Ralph Manheim 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 139-
^Ibid., p. 140. ^Ibid.
k
Hitler would also seek the friendship of Italy, whose 
natural self-interests were not essentially opposed to 
the interests of Germany.^ In France, Hitler saw the 
"inexorable mortal enemy of the German people" whose 
ultimate goal in foreign policy would always be the 
dismemberment of Germany. For this reason a showdown 
with France was inevitable, and only the destruction of 
French military power would enable Germany to expand in
7eastern Europe. Once Germany had marched eastward, the
inhabitants of the conquered countries would be uprooted
to provide Lebensraum for the German people. This in
turn would result in the creation of an entirely "new
order" in Europe, one specifically designed to serve the
ointerests of the superior Germanic race.
In the light of this ambitious program, it is 
understandable why Hitler felt he could not safely rely 
on the German Foreign Ministry to carry out his plans, 
at least not as it existed in 1933. The professional 
diplomats who made up the Foreign Office at this time 
had received their training in the Wilhelmian and Weimar
6 *7Ibid., pp. 620-21, 625. 'Ibid., pp. 619-20, 665.
gSummaries of Hitler's foreign policy objectives 
may be found in E. M. Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy 
and Military Plans (New York: Citadel Press, I963), chaps.
i and ii; John Bengtson, Nazi War Aims : The Plans for the
Thousand Year Reich (Rock Island, 111.: Augustana College
Library, I962), pp. 16-22; and Pierre Renouvin, World War 
II and its Origins: International Relations, 1929-1945,
trans. by Rêmy Inglis Hall (New York, Evanston, and London; 
Harper & Row, I969), pp. I6-I8.
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eras, which had emphasized legal studies and the doctorate 
for promotion to high positions. While the diplomats were 
highly dedicated to their profession, Hitler found them 
far too "bookish" and too bound by tradition for his 
tastes. They also fell into a category of bureaucrats, 
experts, and professionals which Hitler both disliked 
and distrusted. Finally, a large percentage of the career 
diplomats came from the nobility, and Hitler did not con-
9sider this class to be fully reliable. As a result of 
these factors. Hitler regarded the officials of the For­
eign Ministry with utter contempt, and he sometimes ex­
pressed this contempt in extremely derogatory language.
On one occasion he referred to the Foreign Office as a 
"veritable 'intellectual garbage dump,' composed of the 
refuse of incompetent rejects from other walks of life."^^ 
At Nuremberg the personal secretary of Joachim von
9Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse; A Study of 
German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley andLos 
Angeles: University of California Press, 195^), pp. 5 and
20 (Hereinafter referred to as Wilhelmstrasse.). Hitler's 
suspicions were not entirely without foundation, because a 
small minority of diplomats in the Foreign Office not only 
wished to see the Nazi government overthrown but later 
joined the Resistance movement. See E. A. Bayne, "Resist­
ance in the German Foreign Office," Human Events, III 
(April 3, 1946), 1-8; Mother Mary Alice Gallin, German 
Resistance to Hitler: Ethical and Religious Factors
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1961), pp. 73-79; and Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy 
Against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis : The
University of Minnesota Press, I968), pp. 16-25*
^^Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, p. 31 * See also Paul 
Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, ed. by R. H. C. Steed (New 
York: Macmillan Company, I951), p. 13.
6
Ribbentrop testified that Hitler regarded the Foreign
Office as a "body of ossified red-tape civil servants,
more or less untouched by National S o c i a l i s m . T h e
view of other high Nazi officials toward the professional
12diplomats was no more charitable than Hitler's.
Despite the contempt which Hitler felt toward the 
professional diplomats, he made no effort to introduce 
radical changes in the Foreign Ministry during the early 
years of the Nazi regime. On the contrary, he retained 
the diplomats of the Weimar era almost to the man, even 
though the Nazi revolution brought immediate and signifi­
cant changes in nearly every other branch of the govern- 
13ment. There are several explanations for this. In the 
first place, for Hitler to have removed Konstantin von 
Neurath as Foreign Minister in 1933 would have been po­
litically unwise if not impossible. The reason is simple;
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tri­
bunal, Nürnberg, l4 November - 1 October, 1946 (46 vols.; 
Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947-49), X,
189 (Hereinafter referred to as TMWC.). Testimony by 
Margaret Blank.
12For some of Gttring's comments on diplomats see 
Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 25 and 30.
13Paul Seabury, "Ribbentrop and the German Foreign 
Office," Political Science Quarterly, LXVI (December, 193I), 
533-35* See also Herbert von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo,
London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy (Norman,
Oklahoma : University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), p. IO8 ;
and Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, 
I919-I939 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1953), p. 419.
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Neurath had close ties with President Paul von Hindenburg. 
According to Hitler's Press Chief, Otto Dietrich, Hinden­
burg actually "obliged Hitler, before appointing him, to
l4retain von Neurath as Minister of Foreign Affairs." 
Secondly, there were few among the Nazi leaders who pos­
sessed the languages and other qualifications essential 
to a diplomat. With a very few exceptions, the high 
party officials had not traveled widely abroad. Even 
Hitler, except for his military service in France during 
the War, had never been outside Austria and Germany, and 
Goebbels, Roehm, and Himmler had no foreign experience. 
During the early days of the Nazi regime. Hitler did on 
occasion assign diplomatic missions to prominent Nazi 
leaders despite their lack of qualifications, but the 
results were disastrous. As a classic example, in May 
of 1933 Hitler dispatched Alfred Rosenberg to London as 
his "personal representative" for the purpose of engend­
ering British sympathy toward the new Nazi government. 
Rosenberg's actions completely alienated the British 
public. He laid a ceremonial wreath decorated with 
swastika ribbons at the Cenotaph, lectured reporters on 
the glories of National Socialism, and failed in his 
efforts to see the Prime M in i st e r . S h o r t l y  after his
l4Otto Dietrich, The Hitler 1 Knew, trans. by 
Richard & Clara Winston (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1955), p. 26. See also TMWC, XVI, 6OO; XVII, IO8 .
^^The Times (London), May 12, 1933, P- l4; and 
Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 36-37*
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departure, which was two days ahead of schedule, the
London Times assailed Rosenberg for his lack of knowledge
of the English language, temperament, and country.
Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front, made an even
worse impression as the German representative to the
Geneva International Labor Conference held in June of
the same year. He behaved in a boorish manner, consumed
an excessive amount of alcohol, and provoked the South
17American delegates by comparing them to monkeys. Other 
Nazi leaders also failed as diplomats, but these two ex­
amples show why Hitler found it necessary to rely heavily 
upon professional diplomats during the early years of the 
Nazi regime, despite his distrust of the Foreign Office. 
Finally, it should be remembered that in 1933 the German 
government badly needed to acquire international prestige 
and the good will of the other powers. Hitler could
The Times (London), May 1 3 , 1933, p. 15» One of 
the very few diplomats removed from the Foreign Office by 
the Nazis was Paul Schwarz, the German consul in New York. 
Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 29-30. Schwarz, who soon 
publicly disaffiliated himself from the Nazi regime, has 
suggested the Foreign Office actually encouraged Rosen­
berg's visit to London in order to demonstrate to Hitler 
the disastrous consequences of employing party boors in 
diplomatic work. Paul Schwarz, This Man Ribbentrop: His
Life and Times (New York; Julian Messner, Inc., 1943),
pp. 87-88.
17See Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten: Die
Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden und Krieg: Erlebnisse, Begeg-
nungen und Eindrücke, 1928-1945 (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950), 55", Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse,
pp. 26-27; and the New York Times, June l4, 1933, P» 2, 
and June 20, 1933, 51
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achieve this goal most effectively along conservative
lines, i.e., through the established channels of the
Foreign Office whose members were often already well-
known in foreign capitals. In this way Hitler could
proceed with the urgent task of consolidating his power
within Germany, a task he had to accomplish before he
dared to embark upon a foreign policy radically different
18from that of the past.
To carry out his foreign policy. Hitler inherited 
a Foreign Ministry which had itself recently been reor­
ganized in an effort to "democratize" and to improve the 
efficiency of the organization. While these reforms 
failed to alter the essentially aristocratic and conserva­
tive structure of the Foreign Ministry, they did bring
19about significant changes in its organizational structure. 
The number of major departments (Abteilungen) jumped from 
three to six, while political and economic affairs were 
combined and organized along geographical lines. A depart­
ment chief (Ministerialdirektor) directed the activities 
of each of these departments, assisted by a deputy director
1ACraig and Gilbert, p. 409; and Seabury, Wilhelm­
strasse , p. 31.
19For an account of the "Schüler" reforms and their 
results see Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 9-24. See also 
George 0. Kent, and others, comp, and ed., Catalogue of 
Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Ar­
chives, I92O-I945 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution,
1962- ), I , ix-x.
10
20(Ministerialdirigent). The departments were further
broken down into subdivisions, again usually according 
to geographical areas. To illustrate, Department II, 
headed by Gerhard Kdpke, assumed responsibility for 
western, southern, and southeastern Europe, the War 
Guilt question, and the Vatican. The structure of the 
other departments was similar, and few changes took 
place until a second reorganization of the Foreign Min­
istry in 1936.^^
The man who headed up the Foreign Office in 1933, 
Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) Baron Kon­
stantin von Neurath, is not an easy man to evaluate. 
Nearing sixty at the time, Neurath entered the Foreign 
Office shortly after the War. As a conseivative aris­
tocrat coming from a long line of state officials, 
Neurath was in many ways an ideal man to boost the
20Seabury uses the term "division" rather than 
department and lists the number as eight instead of six, 
Wilhelmstrasse, pp. I6-I7. On the other hand, the organi­
zation plan printed in the Documents on German Foreign 
Policy divides the Foreign Ministry into six major "de­
partments." While Seabury does not name the separate 
divisions, apparently he included some of the minor de­
partments, such as those concerned with protocol and the 
press. See U.S., Department of State, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, ed. Jointly by the American, 
British, and French Governments (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1949- ), Series C, 1933-1937, I ,
Appendix I, 933-39, and III, 1132, footnote 5 (Hereinafter 
referred to as DGFP.); see also Kent, p. x.
21For organizational charts of the Foreign Ministry 
after the reorganization of 1936 see Kent, Chart II (at 
the end of the volume), and DGFP, Series D, I, II87-98.
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prestige of the new Nazi regime and to convince other
governments that German foreign policy would remain
moderate and tranquil. He was generally respected and
well-liked by both his colleagues and foreign diplomats.
Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany
from 1937 to 1939» describes Neurath as an "astute and
22experienced Swabian" whom he liked "immensely." Karl
StrOlin, the Lord Mayor of Stuttgart, portrays Neurath
as a humane, conscientious, and straightforward person
2 3who was "very much respected." Too often, however, 
these flattering comments would be followed by derogatory 
remarks. For example, André François-Poncet, the French 
ambassador to Germany during the thirties, describes 
Neurath as good-humored, affable, and levelheaded, but 
also as a man whose virtues were marred by "serious de­
fects." He was crafty and "something of a liar"; he was
a weak character who lacked moral courage and who would
2^"yield to pressure"; and he was "lazy." Sir Anthony
22 Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission;
Berlin, 1937-1939 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 19^0),
pp. 43-44. ------
^^TMNC, X, 50. 
oh ,Andre François-Poncet, The Fateful Years:
Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin, 1931-1938, trans. 
by Jacques LeClercq (New York: Hareourt, Brace and Co.,
1949), p. 29. Herbert von Dirksen, a prominent German 
ambassador of the period apparently concurs with the French 
ambassador's opinion that Neurath was lazy for he writes 
his "passion for hunting prevailed over his passion for 
work"; Dirksen, p. I70.
12
Eden was of a similar opinion; he found Neurath agreeable
25and knowledgeable but "putty in Hitler's hands." It is 
this last charge, that Neurath failed to stand up to 
Hitler, which is the most serious. It may well be, as 
Neurath claimed at Nuremberg, that he "despised the 
methods of the Party" and had no sympathy for National 
Socialist i d e a s . I f  so, it is understandable, because 
neither Neurath's background nor temperament made him a 
likely candidate for admission to Hitler's round-table.
He consequently never gained the confidence of Hitler or 
the powerful men in the higher echelons of the Nazi Party. 
Hitler liked men who would act quickly and decisively, and 
who were willing to gamble their careers on intuitively
27
25 Sir Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden,
Earl of Avon, Vol. I: Facing the Dictators (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company! 19o2), pi 68.
, XVI, 601; X, 53* According to Sir Horace 
Rumbold, the British ambassador to Germany, during the 
early days of the Nazi regime Neurath thought rather 
highly of Hitler. Early in 1933 Neurath informed Rumbold 
that Hitler was proving to be reasonable, and on several 
occasions the new Chancellor had spontaneously asked for 
his advice. Neurath added that he had agreed to remain 
with the new government only on the condition that the 
Nazis give him a "free hand" and carry out no experiments 
in foreign policy. Sir Horace Rumbold to Sir John Simon, 
February 4, 1933, Great Britain, Documents on British For­
eign Policy, 1919-1939, ed. by E. L. Woodward and Rohan 
Butler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946- ),
Second Series, Vol. IV, No. 235, PP- 4o6-8 (Hereinafter 
referred to as DBFP.).
^^TMWC, XVII, 208-9 (testimony by Gerhard Kflpke); 
and Ernst von WeizsMcker, Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsflcker, 
trans. by John Andrews (Chicago; Henry Regnery Company, 
1951), p. 110.
13
conceived plans which could be counted on to arouse vig­
orous opposition from the professionals. Neurath was none 
of these. Gerhard Kdpke said as much at Nuremberg:
Neurath's political attitude on the whole was, in 
accordance with his whole character and his years of 
experience in politics, inclined toward compromise, 
waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by ultima­
tums and attempts at solution by violence did not 
suit Von Neurath's temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by nature.28
Thus, considering the type of leadership Neurath provided, 
it is not surprising that the entire Foreign Ministry 
gradually found its legitimate functions usurped by Hitler 
and other agencies. In many instances Neurath was not 
even informed of pending political actions. His role was 
to add respectability to the Hitler government and to 
serve as a bridge between the old Germany and the new.
In this way Neurath played an important role in the his­
tory of the Third Reich, but he was never in a position
29to shape the course of Nazi foreign policy.
Next to the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary 
(StaatssekretHr) occupied the most important office in 
the German Foreign Ministry. Until his death in 1936,
28^°TMVfC, XVII, 109-10.
OQCraig and Gilbert, p. 409; and Eugene Davidson,
The Trial of the Germans : An Account of the Twenty-two
Defendants Before the International Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(New York: Macmillan Company, I966 ) , p"I 174. It should
be kept in mind that the Foreign Office officials who 
testified at Nuremberg almost certainly underplayed their 
role in foreign affairs in order to escape punishment.
See Leonidas E. Hill, "The Wilhelmstrasse in the Nazi Era," 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXXII (December, I967), 
546-70.
i4
the State Secretary under Hitler was Bernard von Bülow,
a nephew of the former Chancellor to William II. More
so than the others in the Foreign Office, Bülow was both
30respected and well-liked. Franz von Papen, at the
time Hitler's Vice-Chancellor, describes him as "highly
31intelligent and competent." The French ambassador is 
equally complimentary; he describes Bülow as devoted to 
duty, discreet, and "thoroughly familiar" with those
32matters which fell within his area of responsibility. 
Like Neurath, he desired to participate in the regenera­
tion of Germany but had little enthusiasm for National 
Socialism. As a matter of fact, Eyck believes Bülow 
wished to retain the office of State Secretary in order
to keep the Foreign Ministry free of National Socialist 
33influence. However this may be, Bülow failed to grasp 
quickly the strength of the Nazi movement, and by 1932
3°See TMWC, XVII, 109; and Martha Dodd, Through 
Embassy Eyes (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company,
1939), p. 249.
31Franz von Papen, Memoirs, trans. by Brian Connell 
(New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1953), p. 175*
^^François-Poncet, pp. 30, 182-83.
^^Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic 
(2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1963), II, 304. Eyck's opinion is supported by Këpke, 
who informed the Nuremberg Tribunal the Nazis had made 
repeated attempts to remove Bülow. TMWC, XVII, IO9.
Also, Ambassador Dirksen writes that the "thinly veiled 
anti-Nazi sentiments" of Bülow were "common knowledge." 
Dirksen, p. I69.
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he fully expected to see the imminent disintegration of
the Nazi Party. Even after the Nazis had captured the
government, Bülow thought it inconceivable that Hitler
would ignore the advice of the Foreign Office in matters
35where he lacked experience.
Unquestionably, Neurath and Bülow were the two
most influential men in the Foreign Office, and their
names often appear on the documents exchanged between
the Reich and the Vatican. More frequently, however,
these documents bear the signature of lesser officials,
such as the head of Department II, Ministerialdirektor
Gerhard Kdpke. According to François-Poncet, Kdpke had
"one of the best brains in the department," and Dirksen
describes him as "genial, witty, and intelligent." In
the same department the responsibility for Vatican affairs
fell to Counselor Fritz Menshausen. While his signature
appears on numerous documents relative to this study, un-
37fortunately little is kuown about the man. Much the 
same thing can be said about Ambassador Diego von Bergen,
34Rudolf Rahn, Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichnungen 
und Erinnerungen (Düsseldorf : Diederichs Verlag, 1949),
p. 95; and Dirksen, p. I70.
^^Craig and Gilbert, p. 408.
36François-Poncet, p. Il4; and Dirksen, p. 42.
^^Saul FriedlSnder, Pius XII and the Third Reich;
A Documentation, trans. from the French and German by 
Charles Fullman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, I966), p. xxii
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a long-time professional diplomat who represented Germany
o oat the Holy See. Sir Alec Randall, secretary to the
British Legation at the Vatican, describes Bergen as a
"very determined Lutheran" but who was nevertheless well-
39received at the Vatican. Although the Nazi mentality 
did not appeal to him, like most of the career diplomats 
he seemed to adjust quickly to the Hitler regime. He did 
have a thorough knowledge of the problems of the Vatican, 
and, judging from the number of notes bearing his signa­
ture, he was a conscientious and indefatigable worker. 
Eugen Klee, the chargé d'affaires, directed the German 
Embassy in the event of Bergen's absence.
Despite its importance, the Foreign Office was by 
no means the only branch of the government to figure 
prominently in Reich-Vatican relations. As will be shown 
subsequently, there existed such a close relationship be­
tween German-Vatican relations and the conflict between 
the Catholic Church and the State inside Germany that 
other areas of the government were inevitably involved.
The most important of these and by far the most frequently
38A brief account of von Bergen's diplomatic serv­
ice may be found in Franciscus Hanus, Die preussische 
Vatikangesandtschaft, 1747-1920 (Munich: Pohl & Co.,
1954), chap. xviii ("Diego v. Bergen, 1919-1943")*
39Sir Alec Randall, Vatican Assignment (London: 
William Heinemann, Ltd. , I956 ) , p"I 19.
40FriedlMnder, p. xix.
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involved, was the Reich Ministry of Interior. In many 
cases, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior 
worked together closely in constructing the notes dis­
patched to the Vatican, with the latter often preparing
4lthe initial draft. The Reich Minister of Interior, 
Wilhelm Frick, held one of the three cabinet posts which 
went to the Nazis in 1933* Unlike the conservative mem­
bers of the Foreign Ministry, Frick had long been one of
Hitler's most devoted followers and his loyalty was un- 
Loquestionable. Similarly, Ministerialdirektor Rudolf 
Buttmann had belonged to the Nazi Party since 1925* As 
the head of the Cultural Policy Department of the Min­
istry of Interior, Buttmann plays an important role in
43Reich-Vatican relations during the course of this study.
The Foreign Ministry faced competition from sources 
other than the Ministry of Interior, however, because 
Hitler distrusted the professional diplomats to such an 
extent he took steps to circumvent them whenever possible. 
Frequently, he made special assignments to "outsiders," 
i.e., to persons who were not members of the Foreign Of­
fice but whom he could depend upon to carry out the
41See below, p. 206.
42The material available on Frick is vast, but as 
a starting point see Davidson, pp. 260-82.
4iEliot Barculo Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The
Nazi Revolution, 1933-35 (Garden City, New York: Double-
day & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 338.
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particular task assigned to them. As an example, in the 
spring of 1933 Hitler assigned the important mission of 
negotiating a concordat with the Holy See to his Vice- 
Chancellor, Franz von Papen. Although Hitler did not 
place full confidence in the aristocratic Papen, he 
still preferred his services to that of the Foreign 
Ministry, which was simply by-passed in the initial 
stages of the negotiations.
Whenever possible. Hitler preferred to conduct 
his foreign policy through high party officials whose 
political orthodoxy was beyond question. Consequently, 
early in the history of National Socialism Hitler began 
to establish rival organizations to the Foreign Ministry 
which he hoped would lessen his dependence upon the pro­
fessional diplomats. The nucleus of a party foreign 
office was established as early as 1930, and is usually 
referred to as the AO (Auslandsorganisâtion der NSDAP). 
While the AO grew to considerable proportions, its sphere 
of activities did not generally go beyond the problems
46concerning German citizens abroad. A more important
44During the negotiations Hitler dispatched Güring 
to Rome to participate in the talks, apparently to make 
certain the interests of the Nazi Party were not betrayed. 
Oswald Dutch (pseud.), The Errant Diplomat: The Life of
Franz von Papen (London! Edward Arnold, 19^0), p! 182.
^^Papen, p. 280.
46Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 32-33•
19
rival organization to the established Foreign Ministry
was the APA, or Foreign Policy Office of the National
Socialist Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP).
Largely conceived and headed by Alfred Rosenberg, this
organization was formed on April 1, 1933i to serve as
an advisory body to Hitler on foreign policy matters.
At the time this move prompted speculation abroad that
Rosenberg's activities might infringe upon the authority
47of Baron von Neurath and the Foreign Ministry. This
is understandable as Rosenberg was Hitler's leading
racist thinker and many of his ideas had found their
48way into Mein Kampf. Although his activities in de­
veloping and expounding Nazi ideology are common knowl- 
49edge, his aspirations in the field of foreign policy 
are not so well-known. During the early years of the 
Nazi movement, Rosenberg managed to establish himself 
as Hitler's advisor on foreign policy. Since he also 
became editor of the Vfllkischer Beobachter in 1923, 
Rosenberg's position in the party was strong, and he 
exerted considerable influence during this period.
See the New York Times, April 2, 1933i P- 28; 
and The Times (London), April 3, 1933, P* 13*
48Alfred Rosenberg, Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg: 
With Commentaries by Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck, 
trans. by Eric Posselt (Chicago and New York: Ziff-
Davis Publishing Co., 1949), p. 199.
49See below, pp. 57“58«
^^Martin Broszat, Der Nationalsozialismus: 
Weltanschauung Programm und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart : 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 19^1 ) , pT!! lé.
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After the establishment of the APA, Rosenberg was per­
mitted to act as the spokesman for Nazi views of foreign 
policy, and he appeared to be a likely successor to Neurath 
as Foreign Minister. A number of party members who con­
sidered themselves authorities in international affairs 
even sought employment in the APA, undoubtedly expecting 
it to eventually replace the official Foreign Ministry.
But such was not the case, for in 1933 Rosenberg bungled
his mission to London so badly his prestige in party cir-
52cles sank rapidly. While the APA did manage to survive
the thirties, its funds were severely curtailed and the
X
54
5 3scope of its activities limited. In essence. Hitler ex­
cluded Rosenberg from important foreign policy decisions
With Rosenberg out of the picture, the way was clear 
for the ascendence of a new party "expert" on foreign af­
fairs. Joachim von Ribbentrop, one of Rosenberg's most 
bitter enemies, soon filled this spot. It is virtually
Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, pp. 33-35- For a fuller 
account of Rosenberg and his APA activities see U.S., Of­
fice of Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Crimin­
ality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (8 vols, and 2 sup­
plements, A and B; Washington, B.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1946-48), Vol. Ill, No. 003-PS, pp. 10-19 (Herein­
after referred to as NCA.). See also, TMWC, V, 51-52.
^^Hill, pp. 553-54.
5 3Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, p. 37-
54Güring and Neurath tended to downgrade Rosenberg's 
influence in foreign policy matters, even in 1933- In view 
of the general contempt for Rosenberg, however, this is not 
surprising. See TMWC, IX, 378; XVII, 98.
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impossible to write anything but a derogatory portrait
of Ribbentrop because he was universally detested. At
Nuremberg, Ribbentrop's fellow defendants revealed nothing
55but contempt for both the man and his abilities. Von 
Papen describes him as industrious but "devoid of intelli­
gence"; Erich Kordt found him snobbish; and after one in­
terview Under-Secretary of State Summer Welles declared,
"I have rarely seen a man I disliked more."^^ Everywhere 
the remarks used to describe Ribbentrop were the same-- 
arrogant, tactless, humorless, and incompetent. Never­
theless, Ribbentrop's authority rose steadily, and by
1934 he did not hesitate to interfere with the legitimate
57functions of the Foreign Office. His qualifications in 
the field of diplomacy were virtually nonexistent, but he 
did have the ability to impress Hitler. He obeyed blindly, 
repeated whatever the Fuehrer wished to hear, and provided 
Hitler with a needed initiation into the cosmopolitan so­
ciety of Berlin at his fashionable Dahlem villa. The fact 
that he had never been a professional diplomat worked to his
c oadvantage, because Hitler considered him more reliable.
^^See G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, Signet Books 
(New York: New American Library, 194?), pp. 204-13.
^^Papen, p. 373; Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit 
(Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1948),
p. 94; and, U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations 
of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, dTc .
Government Printing Office, I86I- 1940, I , 4l.
^^Craig and Gilbert, p. 4l9-
^^Seabury, "Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Of­
fice," pp. 536-37; and Poole, p. 133»
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Since Hitler wished to undercut the authority of
the Foreign Ministry, he soon permitted Ribbentrop to
establish an agency of his own. Known as the "Ribbentrop
Bureau" (Büro Ribbentrop), its beginnings in the early part
of 1933 were quite modest. At this time it consisted only
of a small staff of amateur diplomats and aspiring party
members, who set up their headquarters directly across the
street from the Foreign Office. Presumably, its scope was
limited to collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence,
but it soon became obvious Ribbentrop intended to encroach
59upon the activities of the Foreign Ministry as well.
Aided by funds from Hitler's personal treasury, the activ­
ities of the Bureau expanded rapidly. After the appoint­
ment of Ribbentrop as "Special Commissioner for Disarmament 
Questions" in the spring of 193^, Hitler ordered that all 
diplomatic correspondence be routed to Ribbentrop except 
those dispatches specifically marked for Bülow or Neurath. 
With this exception, Ribbentrop actually received incoming 
diplomatic messages before the Foreign Office. Further­
more, Hitler gave Ribbentrop permission to reply, while in 
no way accountable to N e u r a t h . T h e  Ribbentrop Bureau 
also undermined the authority of the Foreign Ministry by 
providing Hitler with information on corrupt officials.
pp. 79-80.
^^Craig and Gilbert, p. 422.
^^Ibid., p. 422; and Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten,
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the bribing of journalists, and other matters which the 
Foreign Ministry was unable to obtain. Usually, before 
Hitler discussed a critical foreign policy matter with 
Neurath, the Bureau would submit a prepared statement 
pertaining to all factors in the case. In this way, 
when consulting his official advisors on foreign policy. 
Hitler could show them he was well-informed.^^ As time 
passed. Hitler indicated his approval of the Bureau by 
delegating Ribbentrop to carry out his most important 
diplomatic assignments. In Hitler's own words, Ribben­
trop was the "only person to tell him the truth about 
foreign countries.
As a net result of the Bureau, the Foreign Min­
istry found itself increasingly by-passed when it came 
to executing some of the more significant aspects of 
German foreign policy. At times Foreign Office officials 
were actually embarrassed because they did not know the
extent of Ribbentrop's activities and therefore could not
61reply to the questions of foreign governments. Even
^^Schwarz, pp. 90-101.
^^Quoted in Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, p. 88.
6 ̂ Craig and Gilbert, p. 425» As an example, when 
Ribbentrop was conducting the negotiations for the Anti- 
Comintern Pact Ambassador Dirksen discovered while on 
leave in Germany that "nobody in the Foreign Office knew 
anything about the matter," even though he had learned of 
the pact while in Japan. Dirksen, p. 1?0. See also 
Donald C. Watt, "The German Diplomats and the Nazi Leaders, 
1933-1939i" Journal of Central European Affairs, XV (July, 
1955), 149-50.
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before he became Foreign Minister in 1938i Ribbentrop 
often handled the most important and most secret aspects
64of German diplomacy. This in no way implies that 
Ribbentrop "directed" Germany's foreign policy, for 
however much Hitler may have valued Ribbentrop's ideas 
he did not always follow them.^^ Hitler continued to 
guide the course of German foreign policy, and if he 
encouraged rival organizations in order to enhance his 
role as the arbiter of party squabbles, this applied 
only to the "execution" of Nazi foreign policy and never 
its formation. Despite all Ribbentrop's efforts, the 
Foreign Ministry remained up to the very end an aristo­
cratic body which was never fully coordinated into the 
Nazi s y s t e m . T h a t  the members of the Foreign Ministry 
lacked the authority of the pre-Hitler years cannot be 
doubted, but neither were they as powerless and ignorant
as some of those who stood trial after the Second World 
6 7War claimed. Whether Ribbentrop ever interfered with 
the Foreign Office and its conduct of Reich-Vatican
^^Dietrich, pp. 113-16.
^^Schwarz, p. 92. Even after Ribbentrop became 
Foreign Minister, Seabury describes his position as "weak 
and insecure, and almost exclusively dependent upon the 
whims of Hitler." Seabury, "Ribbentrop and the German 
Foreign Office," p. 554.




relations is virtually impossible to say. There is no 
evidence in the German documents or in the memoirs of 
German political leaders that he did, but these accounts 
may not have taken into consideration what passed verbally, 
especially between Ribbentrop and Hitler. During the first 
few years of the Hitler regime, however, this seems un­
likely for two reasons: (l) the Bureau was new and only
beginning to expand its activities; (2) the ambitious 
Ribbentrop sought involvement in Hitler's most daring 
plans, and once the Concordat had been concluded Reich- 
Vatican relations tended to be somewhat less spectacular 
than other developments in German foreign policy. In any 
case, it is obvious the entire structure of Nazi foreign 
policy was nothing less than chaotic. With such an over­
lapping of functions and so many rival organizations one 
can only wonder how the Germans ever acquired their repu­
tation for "efficiency."
Part II: The Vatican
In its modern form papal diplomacy dates back to 
the eighteenth century, when non-Catholic states were first 
represented at the Holy See. Stimulated by the increasing 
number of Protestants who were drawn to Rome by the art 
treasures and by the rising tide of religious toleration 
characteristic of this century, the contact between the 
Holy See and the Protestant states increased rapidly.
While these early meetings between the Popes and the
26
Protestant princes were private and unavowed, the mere 
fact the Popes had received heretics and schismatics was 
sufficient to shock the Catholic powers. Nevertheless, 
precedents had been established and the traffic continued. 
Until the time of the French Revolution, however, the 
Vatican refused to recognize the public and official 
standing of any representative of a Protestant nation.
Not until a few years after the Revolution did the Holy 
See find itself constrained to accept for the first time 
the credentials of an envoy whose government did not of­
ficially acknowledge the religious authority of the Pope.^^ 
The reason so many Protestant nations have sought 
to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See lies 
not in the Pope's temporal possessions, which were never 
large when compared to the major powers, but in their 
recognition of the Pope as the spiritual ruler of millions 
of subjects the world over. Only because of this did the 
Emperor Napoleon once instruct his envoy to "deal with the 
Pope as if he had two hundred thousand men at his com-
69mand." Since the time of Napoleon the possessions of 
the Pope have been further reduced, and today the Vatican 
State consists of no more than I80 acres scattered in and
6 8Robert A. Graham, Vatican Diplomacy; A Study of 
Church and State on the International Plane (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 37-38.
^^Quoted in Graham, p. 2 k .
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70near Rome. Nevertheless, this territory is important 
to the Pope, because temporal governments regard the pos­
session of territory as a prerequisite for international 
recognition. Thus, in essence the Pope requires territory 
in order that temporal governments may "recognize" his 
sovereignty, even though the Vatican officially holds to
the position that the Pope's sovereignty is derived from
71his position as the head of the Catholic Church.
As Vatican diplomacy evolved into its twentieth 
century form, it has developed certain characteristics 
which are now considered to be typical of its technique. 
First, the Vatican always strives to obtain a juridical 
relationship with a state for both itself and for the 
Catholic Church within that state. Usually, it trys to 
conclude a concordat with the government, which is a 
formal and legal agreement approximating an international 
treaty. If it is unable to conclude a concordat it will 
try for a temporary agreement, or modus vivendi, and if 
this is unsuccessful it will be satisfied with some kind 
of informal arrangement. But in any case the Vatican al­
ways seeks contact with the government, regardless of 
whether it is Catholic, Protestant, or even non-Christian.
^^Robert Neville, The World of the Vatican (New 
York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 27-28.
71D. A. Binchy, "The Vatican and International 
Diplomacy," International Affairs, XXII (January, 1946), 
48.
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It will maintain this contact, not only where it dis­
approves of the ideology of a particular regime but even 
when it has publicly denounced the regime. The Vatican 
will also refuse to take the initiative in breaking off 
relations with a government by such measures as the de­
nunciation of a concordat or the withdrawal of its nuncio. 
It will protest if necessary, but prefers to throw the 
responsibility for a diplomatic break on the other party. 
This way, when relations are resumed, the Vatican can
still insist that the provisions of the previous concordat
72serve as the basis for new negotiations.
The officials who represent the Vatican in the 
countries of the world are known as nuncios, and they are 
always ecclesiastics. By tradition the nuncio enjoys the 
deanship of the diplomatic corp of the country he resides 
in, regardless of the date he arrived. This role is en­
tirely honorary and carries no special powers, but does
permit the nuncio to act as the spokesman for the diplo-
73matic corp on ceremonial and other occasions. Although 
important, the nuncios are overshadowed by others in the 
Vatican who set the course of policy and coordinate all 
diplomatic activities. The highest authority, of course, 
is the Pope, who must ultimately assume the responsibility 
for the Vatican's policy toward secular governments. In 
the formation and execution of policy, he is assisted by
72Ibid., pp. 49-50. ^^Graham, p. 24.
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the officials of the "Secretariat of State," which in many 
ways compares to the State Department or Foreign Ministry 
of a modern state.
The modern Secretariat of State dates back to I908, 
when Pope Pius X carried out a reorganization of the Curia. 
At the head of the Secretariat is the Cardinal Secretary 
of State, who is charged with the conduct of the Vatican’s 
relations with civil governments. More than just a for­
eign minister, he enjoys the full confidence of the Supreme 
Pontiff and remains his most intimate collaborator, even 
to the extent of living in the Apostolic Palace. Fre­
quently he represents the Pope on official occasions and 
repays the visits of heads of state. After the Pope him­
self the Cardinal Secretary of State is easily the most 
conspicuous and most familiar personage at the Vatican. 
Often his office is difficult and thankless, however, as 
he is a convenient target for those who disagree with the
course of papal policy but do not wish to attack the Pope 
74himself.
Considered as a whole the Papal Secretariat not 
only handles relations with other States but also serves 
as the Pope’s executive office. Any business likely to 
have diplomatic repercussions and not obviously assignable 
to other Vatican governmental bodies very likely ends up
^^Ibid., pp. 127-28; and Neville, pp. 55-56.
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7*5in the Secretariat. It is divided into three sections, 
all of which fall under the authority of the Cardinal 
Secretary of State. The first section, and the most im­
portant, is designated the "Section for Extraordinary 
Ecclesiastical Affairs." This section concerns itself 
with questions brought up by the nuncios or the foreign 
diplomats accredited to the Holy See, prepares the texts 
of important documents, and is involved in all ecclesi­
astical questions which can interfere with relations be­
tween the Holy See and other countries. The "Section for 
Ordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs" handles the more routine 
business of the Secretariat, such as the distribution of 
charity and the preparation of a daily resume of the world 
press for the Pope and Cardinal Secretary of State. It 
also analyzes reports sent in from the various nunciatures, 
prepares official notifications of appointments to papal 
offices, and recommends the prelates most suited to repre­
sent the Holy See abroad. Finally, the "Section for Apos­
tolic Briefs" takes care of the secondary functions, such 
as the transmittal of letters of felicitation to distin­
guished men and the polishing of papal documents prepared
76by the other two sections.
W. A. Purdy, The Church on the Move; The Charac­
ters and Policies of pTus XII and John XXIII (New York:
John Day Company, I966 ) , pT I96.
76Graham, pp. 142-43; and Corrado Pallenberg, Inside 
the Vatican (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., I96O), pp.
125-27.
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In this study the two Individuals most responsible
for the formation of Vatican policy are His Holiness,
Pope Pius XI, and his Cardinal Secretary of State, Eugenio
Pacelli. While the temperament of these two men was quite
different, they shared the same basic outlook, especially
the belief that Communism represented the greatest threat
to the Church in the twentieth century.
Achille Ratti, the future Pope Pius XI, was born
about ten miles north of Milan of lower middle-class
origin. Early in life he became deeply attached to the
nearby Alps, and as a young priest he acquired a reputa-
77tion for his skill in mountain climbing. An outstand­
ing student, Ratti spent the formative years of his 
priesthood among books and manuscripts rather than in 
pastoral duties. After he had served several years in 
the Ambrosian Library of Milan, Pius X summoned him to 
the Vatican Library. In 1913 Ratti became Prefect of the
Vatican Library, a natural advancement for one so devoted
7 8to scholars ip and books. In 1919 Pope Benedict XV 
appointed Monsignor Ratti papal nuncio to the newly- 
created state of Poland, a most difficult assignment in 
view of the political turmoil in this area. Ratti was in
^^See William Teeling, Pope Pius XI and World Af­
fairs (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1937), pp. 40-51.
7 8D. A. Binchy, Church and State in Fascist Italy 
(London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1941), p. 74; and François Charles-Roux, Huit Ans au 
Vatican, 1932-1940 (Paris: Flammarion, 1947), pp. 12, 17»
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Warsaw when the Bolsheviks approached the outskirts of
79the city in 1920, and this experience certainly con­
tributed to the development of his strong anti-Communist 
convictions. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Arch­
bishop of Milan and in 1922 elected Pope.
As Pope, Pius XI quickly threw himself into the 
task of concluding concordats with the European states, 
many of them newly established. Between 1925 and 1933 
the Vatican successfully concluded concordats with 
Bavaria, Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, Czechoslavakia, 
Portugal, Italy, Austria, and Germany. Such vigorous 
political activity was certain to bring criticism as 
well as applause, since a number of these concordats 
were concluded with totalitarian governments. One of 
these was Italy, whose Fascist government under Benito 
Mussolini succeeded in coming to terms with the Vatican
in the Lateran Treaty of 1929. While the Pope had no
80love for Mussolini, an avowed atheist, he realized 
the sixty-year-old quarrel with the Italian State was a 
grave source of weakness to the Church. A common ground 
for collaboration was found in the fact both Pius and the
79See Teeling, pp. 71-73? and Francis Sugrue,
Popes in the Modern World (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Company, I96I), pp. 173-74.
ftoE. E. Y. Hales, The Catholic Church in the Modern 
World: A Survey from the French Revolution to the Present,
Image Books (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1958), p. 266.
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Duce vigorously opposed Communism and were determined it
would not capture Italy. For these reasons, the Pope
found himself an ally of Mussolini, and he remained a
consistent ally throughout the thirties, despite the
81conquest of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War. Again, 
largely because he believed a strong Germany would be an 
effective bulwark against the spread of Communism, Pius 
concluded a concordat with the new Hitler government. 
Consequently, Pius XI soon earned a reputation for being 
pro-Fascist, and some critics have maintained he inten-
82tionally aided the Nazis in attaining power. But while 
the authoritarian Pope was unsympathetic toward liberal 
and democratic forms of government, neither did he have 
a high regard for Fascism, especially toward the end of 
his reign. Pius XI collaborated with Mussolini and Hitler 
because of his fear of Communism and because these rulers 
were in power, but not because he was attracted to the 
ideology upon which their regimes were based. Further­
more, in accordance with traditional Vatican policy this 
collaboration did not prevent the Pope from criticizing 
and even denouncing the Fascist governments of Italy and 
Germany on occasions. As will be seen in the course of
Q 1John P. McKnight, The Papacy; A New Appraisal 
(New York and Toronto : Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1952),
p. 288.
82Joseph McCabe, The Papacy in Politics To-Day: 
Vatican Plots in Spain and Other Countries (London; 
Watts & Co., 1937)1 p. 81.
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this study, the Nazis actually considered Pius XI much 
more difficult to deal with than Cardinal Secretary of 
State Pacelli, despite the Pope’s alleged pro-Fascist 
sympathies. In part this may be attributed to the fact 
Pius became increasingly anti-German toward the end of
O ohis reign, and partially to his independent and impul­
sive nature. Unlike Pacelli, whose speeches were delib­
erate and carefully planned, Pius XI improvised, and in 
the process he frequently made blunt statements which 
were quite critical of National Socialism. "If the 
temperamental Pope Pius XI had lived a little longer," 
Weizsdcker writes in his Memoirs, "relations between the 
Reich and the Church would probably have been broken
84off." This may not be correct as the Vatican is not 
inclined to break relations with a state, but the Pope’s 
unpopularity with the Nazis is an indisputable fact. The 
same may be said of Mussolini, who unknowingly paid an 
eloquent tribute to the Pope upon receiving the news of 
his death with the remark, "at last . . . the obstinate
fellow’s dead."^^
The Pope’s Cardinal Secretary of State and the 
future Pius XII is an even more controversial figure, and
^^Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Ger­
many (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 19^4) , p"ü 220.
QLWeizsMcker, p. 282.
Quoted in Moody, p. 20. Pius XI died on Febru­
ary 10, 1939.
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the vast amount of literature which exists on his life 
and career tends to be either excessively eulogistic or 
disparaging. Certain aspects of Pacelli's career, such 
as his silence on the treatment of the Jews during World 
War II, seem destined for eternal dispute. This study, 
however, is concerned only with Pacelli's role as the 
Cardinal Secretary of State and not as Pope. It is a 
particularly important role in Pacelli's case because 
the Pope permitted him great latitude in the handling 
of German affairs.
Pacelli was born in Rome in I876, descended from 
an old Vatican family. As a matter of fact it was 
Pacelli's grandfather who founded the Vatican's news­
paper, the Osservatore Romano. Pacelli's early career 
was unlike most ecclesiastics in one respect: he never
became a parish priest and never filled a bishopric. 
Instead he entered the Secretariat of State and began 
learning the ways of Vatican diplomacy at an early age.
In 1917 he was appointed nuncio to Bavaria, where he 
demonstrated his tact and ability in carrying out the 
negotiations for a possible papal mediation between the 
central powers and the allies. He soon earned the repu­
tation of being a "veritable prince of diplomats--a model 
of what was discreet, trustworthy, and diplomatically
87surefooted." Monsignor Pacelli was living in Munich
^^Pallenberg, p. 20. ^^Deutsch, p. IO8.
88
36
during the Spartacist revolution, and he never forgot 
•what he observed and experienced. On one occasion an 
armed mob of Spartacists actually invaded the Munich 
Nunciature and pointed their rifles at Pacelli, who 
shrewdly replied: "It's never wise to kill a diplomat."
In 1920 Pacelli was appointed nuncio to Berlin, but he 
remained in Munich until the conclusion of the Bavarian 
Concordat in I925. In 1929 he negotiated the Prussian 
Concordat and was made a Cardinal, and the following 
year he succeeded Cardinal Pietro Gasparri as the Vatican 
Secretary of State. He returned to Rome with a deep ad­
miration for Germany and well-informed on every aspect of 
German life. He is reputed to have been one of the first
89statesmen in Europe to read Mein Kampf in its entirety.
Despite the controversy that surrounds many aspects 
of Pacelli's career, his keen mind is an indisputable fact. 
Even Hochhuth, his most bitter critic, admits he was "un­
doubtedly one of the most intelligent men of the first half
90of this century." Like the Pope, Pacelli loved books and 
the scholarly life. He was an excellent linguist, and 
spoke German as easily as his native Italian. In addition.
88Quoted in Pallenberg, p. 25.
89William M. Harrigan, "Nazi Germany and the Holy 
See, 1933-1936: The Historical Background of Mit brennender
Sorge," Catholic Historical Review, XLVII (Julyl I96I ) , 109*
90Rolf Hochhuth, The Deputy, trans. by Richard and 
Clara Winston (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964), p. 349»
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he spoke good French, acceptable English, and fair Spanish
91and Portuguese. He had a fantastic memory and frequently
92learned his carefully prepared speeches by heart. In
these respects he resembled the Pope, but his temperament
was quite different. Whereas Pius XI at least outwardly
seemed to enjoy a fight, Pacelli was mild and somewhat 
9 3timid. Also, where the Pope tended to act impulsively, 
Pacelli was known as a cool and critical thinker who had 
a strong aversion for exaggeration and who made decisions 
only after careful deliberation. Perhaps this is one 
reason why Pacelli so often attempted to restrain the ir­
ritable Pope, and why German officials preferred him to 
Pius XI.
While the Pope and Cardinal Pacelli were unques­
tionably the two most important individuals responsible 
for the formation and execution of Vatican policy toward 
Germany, a number of other Vatican officials rendered val­
uable assistance. One of these was Monsignor Guiseppe 
Pizzardo, the Papal Under-Secretary of State. Pizzardo
has been described as a gentle and pious individual who
95was deeply devoted to the Pope. Like Cardinal Pacelli,
^^Neville, p. 6l. ^^Pallenberg, p. 34.
^^Moody, pp. 20-21. ^^Deutsch, pp. 108-9.
^^Randall, p. 64. See also Thomas B. Morgan, A 
Reporter at the Papal Court : A Narrative of the Reign of
Pope Pius XI (New York and Toronto : Longmans, Green and
Co., 1938), p. 3.
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he had a strong attachment for Germany, especially Ba- 
96varia. In this study he plays an active role in Reich- 
Vatican relations, even to the extent of assuming the 
duties of the Cardinal Secretary of State during Pacelli's 
absence. Mention should also be made of the Vatican's two 
nuncios in Germany, Monsignor Cesare Orsenigo in Berlin 
and Monsignor Alberto Vassallo di Torregrossa in Munich.
The role of the latter was limited to Bavaria and then 
eliminated altogether when the Nunciature in Munich was 
dissolved in 1934. Orsenigo, however, figures much more 
prominently, and he often acts as the intermediary between 
the Vatican and the Reich government. While he undoubtedly 
had a difficult position, he was strongly inclined to com­
promise with the Nazis, and as a result he eventually
earned a reputation for being "soft" on National Social- 
97ism. Finally, two close associates of Cardinal Pacelli 
should be mentioned--both Germans. One is Father Robert 
Lieber, who served as the principal personal aide and con­
fidant of Pacelli from 1924 until the letter's death in 
1958. Lieber was never a personal secretary as he is often 
described and held no formal office, but he did see Pacelli 
regularly and is generally regarded as having had some
96̂ Georg Franz-Willing, Die bayerische Vatikan­




q8influence. Another close associate, Ludwig Kaas, headed
the German Center Party from 1928 until April of 1933,
when he left Germany and took up quarters in Rome. A
blunt spoken man of great intelligence, Kaas was one of
99Pacelli's closest friends. He knew German politics 
thoroughly, and Pacelli often consulted him for advice.
^^Ibid., pp. 114-15; and Neville, p. 63-
99 Pallen b e r g ,  p. 246.
CHAPTER II
GERMAN CATHOLICISM VERSUS NATIONAL 
SOCIALISM IN THE WEIMAR ERA
Part I: The Position of the Nazi Party
Toward the Catholic Church 
In the early twenties, when the National Socialist 
movement first began its struggle to obtain control of 
the German government, it became increasingly apparent 
that many party members held views that were basically 
hostile toward the churches and Christianity in general.
At the same time considerable confusion existed, because 
the views expressed by Hitler often seemed to contradict 
the anti-Christian sentiments of his subordinate leaders. 
Quite naturally, this caused concern among the leaders of 
the Catholic Church, who wished to know the precise posi­
tion of the party on religion in order to determine their 
own position toward the party. In order to understand the 
conflict between the Catholic Church and the Hitler gov­
ernment after 19331 and the inseparably linked subject of 
Reich-Vatican relations, it is necessary to first examine 
the position of the Church and the National Socialist Party 
in relation to one another during the Weimar era.
4o
4l
There can be no better place to begin this discus­
sion than by examining the religious attitudes of Adolf 
Hitler. On this subject, however, it must be clearly 
understood that a wide discrepancy often existed between 
Hitler's "private" remarks on religion and his remarks 
intended for the general public. When speaking privately, 
his comments were consistently hostile toward Christianity, 
although he did profess to believe in the existence of a 
Supreme Being.^ Hitler saw in National Socialism a "new 
faith," and he believed that once in power the Nazis would
overcome Christianity and establish a "German" church,
2minus the Pope and the Bible. According to Hitler, Chris­
tianity was an invention of "sick brains," and he attributed 
the purity and serenity of the ancient world to the fact it 
knew nothing of the two great scourges, the "pox and Chris-
3tianity." Hitler made the Catholic Church his special
target, despite his Catholic background and early interest
4in becoming a monk. The Catholic Church was "hollow and
^Dietrich, p. 153*
^Kurt G. W. Ludecke, I Knew Hitler (New York: 
Scribner's Sons, 1938)> P« 250. In the Nazi sense, a 
"German" church was a single united church consisting of 
both Protestants and Catholics, free from the influence 
of Rome, and strongly imbued with the mysticism of blood 
and race.
^Adolf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941- 
1944, Signet Books (New York: New American Library, 1953),
pp. 98, 159.
4Apparently this was only a passing phase as Hitler 
became skeptical about the Church while still quite young. 
Even when confirmed. Hitler scowled and behaved unpleasantly
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rotten," he once declared; "one push" and the entire 
structure would collapse. Catholic priests who opposed 
the Nazi movement would have to be branded as "ordinary 
criminals," and the "mask of honesty" torn from their 
faces.̂
However radical Hitler's personal religious be­
liefs may have been, he was far too skillful a political 
leader to express them publicly. Hitler realized that 
the "forms" of Christianity must be maintained, at least 
until the Nazi revolution was completed. Consequently, 
he not only refused to leave the Catholic Church, but 
made frequent use of the words "Almighty" and "Providence" 
in his public speeches. Similarly, Hitler's views on 
religion as expressed in Mein Kampf were generally favor­
able, despite the pagan undertones of the book. At the 
time he was anxious to unite all Germans behind the Nazi 
movement, and therefore did not wish to be considered 
anti-Christian. Thus, he warned the party leaders to 
avoid incurring the hostility of the established reli­
gions and recommended they adopt a tolerant attitude
throughout the service. He may have derived some of his 
skepticism from his father, who had long been suspicious 
of the Church. Bradley F. Smith, Adolf Hitler: His Family,
Childhood and Youth (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution and Peace, I967), PP- 6I, 85, 94-95* 
Perhaps, as Prittie suggests. Hitler also disliked the 
Church because he was himself a relapsed Catholic. Terence 
Prittie, Germans Against Hitler (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1964), p. ?0.
^Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 52-53•
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toward the Christian Churches. "In the ranks of the move­
ment," Hitler wrote, "the most devout Protestant could sit 
beside the most devout Catholic, without coming into the 
slightest conflict with his religious convictions."^ But 
such statements should not mislead one into believing 
Hitler's ultimate plans for the Christian churches were 
in any way mild or conciliatory. Even if Fascism came to 
terms with the Church, Hitler once declared, this would 
not prevent him from "tearing up Christianity root and
7branch, and annihilating it in Germany." He did not 
intend to do this by declaring open war against the 
churches, however, as some of the party extremists advo-
gcated. Instead, Hitler thought it much wiser to let 
Christianity die a "natural death," which he believed 
would surely come about as the "advances of science"
9wore away the dogma of Christianity.
Officially, the National Socialist Party expressed 
its position toward religion in the Twenty-five point pro­
gram adopted by the party in 1920. According to Point
Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. $64. See also Harry Edward 
Westermeyer, "The Religious Policies of the Third Reich, 
1933-1937" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Uni­
versity, 1946), p. 30.
'Rauschning, p. 49.
oThis would include such top Nazi officials as 
Goebbels, Heydrich, Himmler, Bormann, and Rosenberg, all 
of whom were extremists on religious matters. See Papen, 
pp. 281-82; WeizsMcker, p. 281; and TMUC, IV, 58-6O.
^Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations, pp. 83-84.
44
Twenty-four, "the Party as such represents the standpoint 
of positive Christianity without binding itself to any 
one particular confession.Obviously, little signifi­
cance can be attached to the statement unless it is known 
what is meant by the term "positive Christianity." This 
is no easy task, for although Rosenberg developed the 
term he never clearly defined it. Essentially, by posi­
tive Christianity the Nazis meant the cleansing of tradi­
tional Christianity and the acceptance of only those ele­
ments which conformed to National Socialist theory and 
practice. To give an example, the Nazis would accept the 
Bible but only after it had been completely purged of its 
Jewish teachings. In framing Point Twenty-four, Hitler 
and his comrades wished to go on record as being Christian 
but partial to no particular denomination. They would 
tolerate Christianity so long as it marched in step with 
the philosophy of National So c i a l i s m . S i n c e  this posi­
tion broadened the basis of party support, it undoubtedly 
served the Nazis well in the early days of the movement.
It must be remembered, however, that Hitler regarded all
The entire party program is printed in Konrad 
Heiden, A History of National Socialism (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), pp. 15-1&.
^^For a discussion of positive Christianity see 
Nathaniel Micklem, National Socialism and the Roman Cath­
olic Church (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1939)1 chap. v ; and Joseph N. Moody, ed., Church 
and Society: Catholic Social Thought and Political Thought
and Movements, 1789-1950 (New York: Arts, Inc., 1953)1
chap. V.
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programs as a means to an end, and he was certain to drop
12all or any part of a program which proved embarrassing.
In the light of this Machiavellian philosophy, it 
follows that as Chancellor Hitler would attempt to come 
to terms with the Christian churches. His desire to 
reach an agreement with the Catholic Church was realized 
with the conclusion of the Concordat of 19331 of which 
more will be said later. In consideration of the Nazi 
position on religion, a settlement with the Holy See 
must be considered a major achievement for the Hitler 
government. It is even more of an achievement when the 
philosophy of National Socialism is considered, as it 
was fundamentally opposed to the teaching of the Cath­
olic Church.
As is well known, the Nazi Weltanschauung was
13based upon ideological forces deeply rooted in the past.
As embodied in National Socialism, these forces contained 
strong elements of irrationalism, and certainly repre­
sented no systematic doctrine which can be readily analyzed.
12Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (rev.
ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 68.
11The literature on the German intellectual inherit­
ance is extensive. See George L. Mosse, The Crisis of 
German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich,
Universal Library (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 19^4);
Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 194l); Carl Mayer, "On the
Intellectual Origin of National Socialism," Social Research, 
IX (May, 1942), 225-47; and Andrew G. Whiteside, "The Nature 
and Origins of National Socialism," Journal of Central Euro­
pean Affairs, XVII (April, 1957), 48-73-
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Indeed, it has even been argued that the Nazis really had 
no program, that the essence of the movement was a dynamic 
nihilism driven by a thirst for power and action which
l4knew no end. While this is certainly a most important 
aspect of National Socialism, the movement still contained 
the basic elements of an ideology, however lacking in orig­
inality. Essentially, National Socialism consisted of a 
fusion of nationalism, socialism, and racism. The core 
of Nazi doctrine was racism, which may be considered the 
most constant and permanent element of the entire movement. 
According to Nazi theory, the human races were innately 
unequal, and birth alone determined a man's fitness to be­
long to a community. Among the races of the world the 
Aryan race was superior, and all creative phases of human 
endeavor were the product of this race. Unfortunately the 
Aryan race had intermarried with inferior races, and its 
blood was no longer pure. While the most "racially pure" 
of the Aryans were the Nordic Germans, found between the 
Elbe and Weser rivers, even they had contaminated their 
once pure blood by intermarriage with races of inferior 
quality. It was one of the primary goals of the Nazis to 
renew and regenerate the blood of the Nordics, who would 
provide an elite leadership for the rule of Germany. Among 
the inferior races of the world, the Jewish race stood out.
l4See Hermann Rauschning, The Revolution of Nihilism: 
Warning to the West (New York: Alliance Book Corporation,
1939) .
47
because it alone destroyed culture. Unlike the self- 
sacrificing Aryan, the Jew could never build a community; 
he could survive only as a parasite who fed upon and 
eventually destroyed healthy communities. The Nazis saw 
in the Jew a mythical figure who embodied all that was 
evil--a devil who provided a convenient scapegoat for 
everything that went wrong. The Jew was the traitor, the 
Marxist, the international capitalist, the pacifist, and 
the partner of the clergy. The Jew lacked true emotions, 
a sense of morality, and above all, he debased the purity 
of the German race. In the Aryan sense, the Jew was not 
even human. Echoing a crude Darwinism, the Nazis believed 
that in the ruthless struggle of life the weak and biolog­
ically inferior races would have to perish. This physical 
purge of inferior races applied especially to the Jews, 
and the Nazis regarded it as their duty to smash all ob­
stacles that stood in the way of the achievement of this
goal.
Although the idea of race occupied a preponderant 
position in National Socialist ideology, the Nazis also 
reserved an important role for the State. This followed
William J. Bossenbrook, The German Mind (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, I96I) , pp. 423-28; George L.
Mo s s e, The Culture of Western Europe: The Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1961) , chap. xxi; Pinson, pp. 488-91; and James H. McRandle, 
The Track of the Wolf; Essays on National Socialism and its 
Leader, Adolf Hitler (Evanston, Illinois : Northwestern Uni­
versity Press, 1965), pp. 128-31.
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logically from the Nazi emphasis upon force and power, 
and the belief that the stronger always had the right to 
carry out his will. Hitler saw in the State an instrument 
of power, and he therefore assigned to it absolute author­
ity. While its interests were always subordinated to the 
needs of race, the Nazis still exalted the State because 
it promoted discipline, unity, strength, and action.
The State also protected the Volk, just as it responded
17to the living, growing will of the Volk. The individual 
had no separate existence apart from the total collective 
personality, or Volk, of which he was a member. At all 
times the individual must be prepared to sacrifice himself 
to community interests, which were always paramount. The 
people had the right to select their own leader, but once 
chosen they would have to submit to his authority. While 
the Führerprinzip (leadership principle) rested upon un­
limited authority, it was maintained by mutual loyalty
Alan Bullock, "The Theory of Nazism: Hitler's
Basic Ideas," in Hitler and Nazi Germany, ed. by 
Robert G. L. Waite (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, I965), pp. 61-62.
17The word "Volk" cannot accurately be translated 
as "folk," or "people." It implies the organic union of 
a racially determined community in a collective personal­
ity which embraces past, present, and future generations. 
It is both eternal and immutable, and places the individ­
ual in a blood relationship to the other members of the 
community rather than in a legal relationship. McRandle, 
p. 136; and Leon W. Fuller, "Education in Germany under 
the National Socialist Regime," The Department of State 
Bulletin, XI (October 22, October 29, and November 3,
1944), ^l4 (this citation--October issue).
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and did not represent a system.of brutal force. The leader 
was envisioned as democratic rather than as an absolute 
monarch; he ruled because he excelled, especially as a 
prophet. The leader incarnated the unity and spirit of 
the people, and only through him could the people express 
their will in its pure and uncorrupted form. For the sake 
of unity, the Nazi Weltanschauung required a complete co­
ordination (Gleichschaltung) of all aspects of German life, 
including thought and religion. The necessities of race 
and Volk, as interpreted by the Nazi Party, determined 
the acts and thoughts of every person in Germany. Any 
binding loyalty to a religion or outside political party 
was incompatible with the Nazi Weltanschauung.
Clearly, Nazi ideology and Catholic doctrine con­
flicted sharply, despite the fact that both were based 
upon authoritarian principles. The essential source of 
the conflict stemmed from the fact that both the Nazis and 
the Catholic Church were competing for the same thing--the 
soul of man. By its very nature National Socialism was 
intolerant and uncompromising; it represented a totalitar­
ian ideology which sought to capture the loyalty of every 
German and to give direction to all activities within the 
Reich. While the Catholic Church taught the virtue of 
patriotism and loyalty to the State, it also taught the 
virtue of obedience to God, who transcended the State and 
nation and sought to impose standards by which even these
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should be judged. The Nazis could not accept this 
anymore than the Church could accept the cult of race 
and blood as a substitute for the love of God. Fur­
thermore, the Nazi conception of a superior race, 
walled off and dominant over all other races, directly 
contradicted the teachings of the Church, which taught 
the equality and brotherhood of all men. Similarly, 
the Nazi rejection of the individual as having a 
distinct personality apart from the collective com­
munity contradicted the Christian emphasis upon the 
significance of the individual man. The Church also 
found unacceptable the fact that the Nazis recognized 
no absolute values, except those incorporated in so­
cieties, such as race, blood, soil, and Volk. The 
Nazi stand on positive Christianity, which meant the 
denial of the primacy of the Pope, the rejection of 
the Old Testament, and the acceptance of only se­
lected parts of the New Testament, unequivocally con­
tradicted Catholic doctrine. A basis for conflict 
could also be found in the Nazi extolation of power 
and war, its willingness to apply Machiavellian tac­
tics to accomplish its goals, and its conception of 
Christianity as an essentially imported idea which 
was foreign to primeval Germans. Finally, the Nazis 
possessed a passion for unity, and in their view the 
Christian churches exerted an influence which obstructed
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the achievement of true German unity. Only a new
18Weltanschauung could accomplish this important mission.
It would seem the differences between Nazi ideology 
and Church doctrine were sufficiently wide to make any 
"legitimate" reconciliation of the two creeds impossible. 
Despite these differences, during the early months of 
1933 the Church completely reversed its position by with­
drawing its opposition to the Nazi Party and openly sup­
porting the new Hitler government. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear this capitulation was both unwise 
and unfortunate, and it certainly does not constitute one 
of the more glorious chapters in the history of the Church, 
But what is clear now was not so obvious at the time. If 
these events are to be understood, it is necessary to ap­
preciate fully the momentous decisions Catholics faced 
when assessing their position toward National Socialism. 
This can be done only after examining the background of 
Catholicism in Germany, particularly during the difficult 
days of the Weimar Republic.
Part II: The Catholic Response to
National Socialism 
In part at least, the problems which burdened 
German Catholics in determining their position toward the
1 QWaldemar Gurian, Hitler and the Christians, trans 
by E, F. Peeler (New York: Sneed and Ward, 1936), p . 50 ;
and Paul F. Douglass, God Among the Germans (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935), PP* 27-29»
52
Nazis can be traced to the Kulturkampf of the 1870's. In 
attacking the Catholic Church, Bismarck was in part moti­
vated by his irritation with the Catholic Center Party, 
which aroused his fighting instincts on a variety of 
issues. Not only did the Center Party maintain close re­
lations with a radical and intensely anti-Prussian group 
of Bavarian patriots, but it also cooperated closely with 
the Poles and the Alsatian deputies in the Reichstag. 
Perhaps even more important, Bismarck believed a strong 
independent Catholic Church, backed by the international 
power of the Vatican, would seriously hinder the devel­
opment of a thoroughly unified Germany. Therefore, in 
order to weaken the power of the Church, he hurled the 
charge of "ultramontanism" at the German Catholics and 
initiated a series of discriminatory anti-Catholic laws. 
The results disappointed Bismarck, because thé Catholics 
resisted so vigorously he had to repeal most of the 
legislation within the decade. Furthermore, the struggle 
made Catholics more aware of the need for a strong party 
to protect their interests, and the Catholic Center Party
19emerged more powerfully organized than before. In 
spite of their victory over Bismarck, German Catholics 
suffered a psychological jolt during the Kulturkampf 
which would affect them for years to come. As a result
Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, l840- 
1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 200-61 ; and
Pinson, p. I89.
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of the repeated charge they were bound more closely to
the Pope than to the State, the Kulturkampf left German
20Catholics with a national inferiority complex. This
implication, that Catholics were somehow not as patriotic
as other Germans, must have been particularly disturbing
when it is considered that patriotism and obedience to
the State are traditional Catholic virtues which the
21Church has always fostered. In response to the charge 
of disloyalty German Catholics became extremely sensi­
tive, and more determined to prove the fervor of their 
patriotism. Since Catholics continued to be sensitive 
on this issue well into the post-war era, they became 
all the more vulnerable to the highly nationalistic
Hitler movement, with its emphasis upon duty and obe-
22dience to the State.
In the period between Bismarck and Hitler, rela­
tions between the Catholic Church and the German govern­
ment revolved largely around the Center Party. With a 
fairly stable representation of around 100 deputies, the 
Center played a prominent role in politics as the keeper 
of the balance of power in the Reichstag. Generally,
20
21
Holborn, p. 664; and Lewy, pp. I5-I6 .
"E. E. Y. Hales, The Catholic Church in the 
Modern World: A Survey from the French Revolution to
the Presenti Image Books (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., I958), p. 214.
22L e w y , p . 16.
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the Center Party tended to follow conservative policies,
for it persisted in identifying liberalism with atheism.
When faced with the practical issue of voting with the
liberals or the conservatives, it generally preferred 
23the latter. Unfortunately for the Center Party, the
belief spread that the Catholic Church was too closely
involved in politics, and that it used its political
power to the advantage of certain cliques rather than
for the good of the people. This opinion was not only
held by Protestants and anti-clerics, but also by large
numbers of Catholics, many of whom openly criticized
24the activities of the Center Party.
During the Weimar era. Catholics had the same
grievances as the majority of Germans. They were
frustrated and bitter over the Treaty of Versailles,
the economic hardships of the times, and the political
turmoil of the period. Consequently, the attitude of
many Catholics toward the Weimar regime was so indecisive
and inconsistent they pondered whether or not it should
25be defended at all. During this same period German 
Catholics faced an additional problem--that of determin­
ing their attitude toward National Socialism. Until
^^Pinson, p. 193- ^^Gurian, p. 34.
^^John Eriksen, "The Political Implications of 
Church Leadership Resistance to the National Socialist 
Party, 1930-1933" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Minnesota, 1957)i p. 59»
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1930,^^ this problem was made more difficult by the am­
bivalent position of the Church leadership, which offered 
few guidelines for Catholic laymen to follow. As a re­
sult, both the Catholic laity and the Catholic clergy 
manifested considerable bewilderment in determining their 
stand toward the Nazis in the hectic Weimar days. While 
the same may be said of many other Germans, this problem 
most seriously disturbed Catholics.
Like all Germans, Catholics wished to see a re­
generated Germany under strong leadership. This espe­
cially applied to the members of the Catholic hierarchy, 
most of whom believed strong leadership could best be 
achieved by a revived monarchy. Averaging slightly above 
sixty in age, the political outlook of the bishops had 
been formed in imperial Germany. Many were the sons of 
noble families, and had distinguished themselves as 
theologians or administrators. They were decidedly con­
servative, and generally considered the heresies of lib­
eralism, communism, and democracy as the greatest threat
to society. As convinced monarchists, they tended to
27look critically upon the Weimar regime. On the other 
hand, neither did they greet the rise of Hitler with en­
thusiasm. While the bishops undoubtedly found Hitler's
^^See below, pp. 58-59»
27Lewy, p. 12; and J. S. Conway, The Nazi Persecu­
tion of the Churches, 1933-45 (New York: Basic Books,
Inc - , I96Ô) , pT 31
56
promise of a regenerated Germany appealing, they could 
not accept Nazi ideology, much of which directly con­
tradicted the teachings of the Church. Nevertheless, 
the growing strength of the Hitler movement confronted 
the Catholic hierarchy with a serious dilemma. To sup­
port Hitler meant supporting a movement hostile to 
Church doctrine; to oppose him meant placing themselves 
in opposition to a movement characterized by strong 
nationalism, which in all probability would reopen thw 
old charge of disloyalty inherited from the Kulturkampf.
If this point is understood, then the confused patterns 
of thought manifested by many Catholic clergymen during 
Weimar and the early days of Hitler are more readily 
comprehended.
During the early days of the Nazi movement. Catho­
lics generally remained aloof from the party. Although 
the absence of an official stand on the part of the German 
Episcopate made it possible for Catholics to join the 
party, very few chose to do so. Only a small number, such
as Hitler’s personal friend, the Abbot Alban Schachleiter,
29actively participated in the movement. Gradually, as 
the anti-clerical views of some of the party leaders
2 AFor a good examination of Catholic attitudes 
toward National Socialism prior to 1933 see Eriksen, et 
passim; and Lewy, chap. i.
29Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer; Hitler's Rise to 
Power, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1944), p. 632; and Lewy, p. 7.
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became better known, and as the possibility of a National 
Socialist government mounted, it became increasingly im­
portant for the bishops to make an official pronouncement 
on the position of the Church toward National Socialism. 
This became particularly true after the elections of Sep­
tember l4, 1930, which saw the number of Nazi delegates 
in the Reichstag jump from 12 to 10?• No longer could 
the Church regard National Socialism as an ephemeral and 
radical movement which it need not consider seriously.
The year 1930 was also significant in another way; 
it saw the publication of Alfred Rosenberg's Myth of the 
Twentieth Century (Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts). In 
consideration of Rosenberg's position as Hitler's unoffi­
cial interpreter of Nazi ideology and editor of the 
Vfllkischer Beobachter, his interpretation of "positive 
Christianity" as expressed in the Myth could not help but 
alarm Church leaders. They were especially disturbed 
over Rosenberg's distortion of the New Testament. Accord­
ing to the Myth, Christ was not born of Jewish stock, was 
not the Son of God, and, in the Jewish sense, never claimed 
to be the Messiah. The real founder of Christianity was 
the Apostle Paul, whose so-called "conversion" was nothing 
but the clever trick of a political Jew. The responsibil­
ity for the bastardizing and Judaizing of Christianity 
should be attributed to Paul, and those books of the Bible 
which revealed his influence would have to be struck out.
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This way the Bible could portray the true character of
Christ, i.e., as a warrior, orator, rebel, and the
powerful preacher who drove the Jewish money-changers
from the Temple. In Rosenberg's opinion, the Bible
should emphasize these characteristics of Jesus rather
than the attributed qualities of love, humility, and
forgiveness, which were impossible to reconcile with
30the German virtues of courage, loyalty, and honor.
Stimulated by the publication of the Myth and 
the amazing success of the Nazis at the polls, in the 
autumn of 1930 the Catholic hierarchy began to make 
official pronouncements on National Socialism. The 
first came about as the result of a sermon delivered 
by a priest in the village of Kirchhausen. In his 
sermon Father Weber informed his parishioners that (l) 
all Catholics were forbidden to join the National Social­
ist Party; (2) members of the Nazi Party were refused 
permission to attend funerals or other Church services 
in group formations, and (3) no Catholic who was also a 
member of the party could receive the sacraments. Think­
ing these remarks peculiar, on September 2? the Nazi 
Gauleiter of Hesse wrote the Diocessan Chancery Office
Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts 
(175-I76th ed.; Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1941), pp.
74-75, 6o4. For an analysis of this abstruse book see 
Albert R. Chandler, Rosenberg's Nazi Myth (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 194$); and Westermeyer, pp. 
31-38.
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in Mainz requesting an explanation. In particular, he
wished to know if these statements had been made with
the approval of the Bishop of Mainz, as Father Weber 
31claimed. On September 30, the Vicar-General, Dr.
Rupert Mayer, confirmed the fact Father Weber had based
his remarks on instructions issued by the Diocessan
Chancery. The Chancery had taken this step because
"the program of the National Socialist Party contained
tenets which were incompatible with Catholic doctrines
and principles," and he specifically referred to Point 
32Twenty-four. The Nazi press immediately attacked the
Bishop of Mainz, Ludwig Maria Hugo, for this position,
33but the Bishop stood by his Vicar-General.
Other bishops in Germany soon followed the ex­
ample set by the Bishop of Mainz. In a widely publi­
cized statement issued at the close of the year, Adolf 
Cardinal Bertram of Breslau warned Catholics against 
the concept of positive Christianity. He also criti­
cized the one-sided glorification of the Nordic race
34and the contempt for divine revelation as a grave error.
31The letter of inquiry by Gauleiter Erich Berger 
is printed in Hans Müller, ed., Katholische Kirche und 
Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente, 1930-1935 (Munich :
Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 19^3), No. 1, p. 13.
^^Ibid., No. 2, p. 13. An English translation of 
Dr. Mayer's reply may be found in John Brown Mason, Hitler's 
First Foes; A Study in Religion and Politics (Minneapolis ; 
Burgess Publishing Co., 1936), appendix ii.
^^Lewy, p. 9. ^^Ibid., p. 8.
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On February 12 of the next year, the eight bishops of 
Bavaria issued a joint pastoral letter in which they 
forbade Catholic priests to "have any part" in the 
Hitler movement, cautioned the faithful that the cul­
tural policies of the Nazis were "at odds with Catholic
doctrine," and prohibited members of the Nazi Party from
35attending Church services in formation. In March the 
six bishops of the ecclesiastical province of Cologne 
issued a statement comparing the errors of National So­
cialism to those of the Action Française, which Pope 
Pius XI had condemned. They also expressed regret that 
the Nazi leaders had not heeded the warnings issued 
earlier by Cardinal Bertram and the Bavarian bishops. 
Just prior to the Reichstag elections held in July of 
1932, the Prussian bishops issued a pastoral letter 
which would be difficult to interpret in any way other
35An English translation of the pastoral letter 
is printed in James Donohoe, Hitler's Conservative Oppo­
nents in Bavaria, 1930-1935: A Study of Catholic, Mon­
archist, and Separatist anti-Nazi Activities (Leiden:
Ë1 J% Brill, 1961) , pp. 32-34. See also Robert d'Harcourt. 
The German Catholics, trans. by Reginald J. Dingle (London: 
Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1939), P . 65.
Lewy, pp. 9, 13' In August, when the bishops 
gathered for their annual conference at Fulda, they also 
considered a resolution which stated the Nazi Party stood 
in "clearest conflict" with the "fundamental truths of 
Christianity." Lewy suggests the resolution failed to 
pass because it equated the Nazi Party with the Social­
ists, Communists, and freethinkers, thereby going beyond 
the consensus of opinion formed by the bishops toward 
National Socialism.
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than as advice to vote against the Nazis, even though the
37party was not mentioned by name.^'
In addition to the bishops, the two Catholic par-
o Oties, the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party,
also revealed a hostile attitude toward the Nazis. As a
matter of fact, the Center leaders had come to view with
alarm the development of right-wing tendencies in German 
39Catholicism. The Center Party clearly revealed its 
opposition to National Socialism during the presidential 
elections held in the spring of 1932, when Hitler ran 
against incumbent Paul von Hindenburg. Center leaders 
Heinrich Bruening and Ludwig Kaas both campaigned actively 
for the re-election of Hindenburg as Reich President,
^^Printed in Müller, No. l4, p. 4l.
38The Bavarian Catholics, who had strong conser­
vative and monarchist sentiments, split off from the 
Center Party in 1920 and formed the Bavarian People's 
Party. As an independent party the Bavarian Catholics 
pursued slightly more conservative policies and a course 
favoring Bavarian particularism. On most national issues, 
however, the party continued to cooperate with the parent 
Center Party. Walter H. Kaufmann, Monarchism in the 
Weimar Republic (New York: Bookman Associates, 1953),
p"I 80; and A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler 
(London: Macmillan and Co.l Ltd., 19^8), pT 87•
On the average only about 60 per cent of the 
Catholics voted for the Center Party during Weimar, which 
was a considerable drop from the days of the Kulturkampf. 
The other 40 per cent tended to support the parties on 
the left rather than the right. Karl Dietrich Bracher,
Die Auflflsung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum
Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie (2nd ed.; 
Stuttgart and Düsseldorf: Ring-Verlag, I957), p. 91.
^^Conway, p. 8.
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often reminding the voters that the former Field Marshall 
was a proven hero whose victory at the polls would be a
kovictory for Germany. Although Hindenburg defeated Hitler 
in the second election with a majority of 53 per cent to
36.8 per cent for Hitler, the election results revealed 
some interesting features. For example, a distinctly 
higher percentage of women cast their votes for Hindenburg 
as compared to men. More interesting is the fact that 
Hitler, a nominal Catholic, received his strongest support 
in predominantly Protestant areas, whereas the Protestant 
Hindenburg found his heaviest support in Catholic areas.
The Reichstag elections of 1932 revealed this same trend. 
When the Nazis dramatically increased the number of their 
Reichstag seats from IO7 to 230 in the July election, they 
received the heaviest percentage of votes from Protestant 
. rather than Catholic regions. In the November elections 
this voting trend continued, but with a significant de­
cline in the total votes cast for the Nazis. As a result
the number of Reichstag seats held by the Nazis dropped
^2from 230 to 196, their first setback in years.
l̂ 0Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds.. Das Ende 
der Parteien 1933 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, I960), pp.
303-4 .
41Good accounts of the Reich presidential election 
of 1932 may be found in Bracher, pp. 474-80; and Wheaton, 
pp. 117-20. Wheaton includes tables showing the percent­
age of votes for Hitler and Hindenburg in a number of pre­
dominantly Catholic and Protestant electoral districts.
42For a detailed analysis of electoral developments 
between 1928 and 1932 see Bracher, pp. 648-56 and 65O,
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The reluctance of Catholics to vote for Nazi
candidates in the final days of Weimar was manifested
in the relative stability of the two Catholic parties.
Despite the Nazi success at the polls in 1932, the
Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party together
continued to retain their average of around 15 per cent
of the national vote. As a matter of fact, in the July
elections the Center Party actually gained eight seats,
43although it lost five in November. These results show 
clearly that prior to 1933 Nazi efforts to breach the 
Catholic parties were ineffective. Catholic leaders 
naturally found grounds for optimism in the success of 
the Catholic parties, and one Center Party organ jubi­
lantly interpreted the November election as the beginning
of the end for the NSDAP, whose troops were deserting
44"Adolf the Great." It does appear that the Hitler 
movement passed the zenith of its popularity in the 
summer of 1932, and that many Germans were beginning to 
recoil from Nazi extremism. Nevertheless, with 196
footnote 15. Bracher states that some Catholic districts 
in lower Bavaria did not even give the Nazis 10 per cent 
of the vote in any of the 1932 elections.
4iMatthias and Morsey, pp. 31 1̂ 329» Much of the 
Nazi success came at the expense of the German State 
Party, the German People's Party, and the German Nation­
alists. A table showing the election results between 
1928 and 1932 may be found in Bracher, p. 646.
44Matthias and Morsey, p. 3291 footnote 29*
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seats the Nazis were still the largest party in the 
Reichstag, and this left little room for rejoicing.
As the fateful year of 1933 approached, it seems 
clear that both the German hierarchy and the Catholic 
parties were united in their opposition to National So­
cialism, and there was growing agreement among Church 
leaders that the Nazis would have to undertake a major 
revision of their religious and cultural goals before 
the party program would be acceptable to the Church.
At this time the Church leadership certainly did not 
appear to be duped by Nazi promises of good intentions 
or blind to the real dangers inherent in National So­
cialism. Both the Catholic leaders and the Catholic 
press believed the Church and the Nazis would be unable
to reconcile their differences, despite the contrary
45claims of Nazi leaders. Hence, in the event Hitler 
did become Chancellor, it would seem the Catholic Church 
would have been prepared to make every effort to prevent 
the consolidation of power by the Nazis. Unfortunately, 
in the early months of 1933 the Church leadership decided 
upon a new course--a course designed to make peace and 
come to terms with the National Socialist government.
45 Eriksen, p. 203.
CHAPTER III
JANUARY 30 - JULY 20, 1933: CAPITULATION
AND REAPPROACHMENT
On January 30, 1933, President Hindenburg re­
luctantly appointed Hitler Reich Chancellor, and 
almost immediately the German people began to feel 
the effect of a "government-backed" Nazi terror. On 
February 4 the new government issued the "Decree for 
the Protection of the German People," which author­
ized officials to prohibit public meetings and sharply 
curtail freedom of the press. On February 19 Gëring 
suppressed Germania and other Catholic newspapers in 
Prussia for criticizing the Hitler government. On 
the following day, eighteen non-Nazi newspapers were 
suppressed, and the pace increased during the re­
maining part of February. Arrests were common, es­
pecially among Hitler's left-wing opponents, and 
the hundreds of storm troopers who roared through 
the streets rounding up their victims often resorted 
to violence in the process. The burning of the Reich­
stag on February 27 merely served as a convenient
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pretext for the permanent suspension of additional 
personal liberties.^
Hitler was too clever to depend solely on the 
use of political terror to achieve his objectives, 
however; he realized this would tend to make martyrs.
As a result he relied heavily upon propaganda, a sub­
ject which had long fascinated him. In Mein Kampf 
Hitler devoted two chapters to the subject of propa­
ganda, and according to the English historian, Z. A. B.
Zeman, achieved a "level of clarity unequalled in other
2parts of the book." Aiming his propaganda at the 
masses, whom he regarded as malleable and corruptible. 
Hitler liked to concentrate on as few points as pos­
sible and present them in terms of black and white.
He would then blend these points with emotional appeal, 
repeat them constantly, and add a large dose of intimi-
3dation and terror. When the Nazis applied these tac­
tics to the struggle against the Catholic Church, it 
resulted in a barrage of words and promises, all de­
signed to moderate or avert Catholic resentment and
Wheaton, pp. 209, 212, 220, 222; and William L. 
Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History
of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, I960),
p. 94.
2Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p . 41
3Ibid., p. 6. See also Liam O'Connor, "The Psy­
chology of Persecution," Commonweal, XXXIV (September 5,
1941), 469-72.
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to make the official interpretation acceptable, at
least to the uncritical.
On January 30 and 31 the leaders of the Center
Party held talks with Hitler in hopes of being included
in Hitler's cabinet. Nothing came of the talks as
Hitler refused the terms presented by chairman Ludwig
Kaas, but they did reveal a willingness of the Center's
leadership to settle their differences with the Nazis
4and to work with the new government. On February 1, 
in his first radio address to the German people as 
Chancellor, Hitler declared the new Reich government 
regarded Christianity as the foundation of "national 
morality," and the family the basis of "national life."^ 
The conciliatory tone of Hitler's speech was obviously 
calculated to divide and weaken the opposition of the 
churches, and there is reason to believe it had the 
desired effect. During February the Catholic press 
curtailed its criticism of National Socialism while 
stepping up its criticism of Communism and the failures 
of Weimar. When the Reichstag building went up in
kRudolf Morsey, "Hitlers Verhandlungen mit der 
Zentrumsführung an 31 « Januar 1933»" Vierteljahrshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte, IX (April, I96I), 102-94; and 
Matthias and Morsey, pp. 339-44.
^Adolf Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler,
April 1922-August I939I ed. by Norman H. Baynes ^2 vols.; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 1, 369-70. For
the German text see Adolf Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, 
1932-1945, ed. by Max Domarus (2 vols. in 4 ; Munich : 
Süddeutscher Verlag, I965), I , 191-95*
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flames on February 2?» it generally accepted the Nazi 
version that the fire was a signal to set off a Communist 
uprising.^ Clearly, the first signs of a break in what 
had been an almost solid front of Catholic opposition to 
National Socialism were beginning to appear.
On March 5, the Reich government had scheduled 
elections to the Reichstag. Unlike the elections of the 
previous November, this time the Nazis controlled the 
government, and they took full advantage of their newly 
acquired power. All opposition parties soon felt the
7pressure of Nazi terror and propaganda. In these cir­
cumstances the Catholic leaders found it advisable to 
be somewhat more discreet in their criticism of National 
Socialism than in previous elections. With a few excep­
tions , the instructions on the elections issued by the
bishops to their parishioners were non-committal and 
qevasive. The Center Party also softened its criticism 
of the Nazis as it strived to acknowledge what was good 
in National Socialism, while focusing its attack against 
Marxism, liberalism, and atheism. Unfortunately for the 
Center, the Nazis were not inclined to reward their
^Eriksen, pp. 331, 33^.
^See Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and 
Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung; 
Studien zur Errichtung des totalitflren Herrschaftssystems 
in Deutschland 1933/3% (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, I960), pp. 90-91•
q
See Lewy, pp. 20-29.
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opponents for good behavior. Beginning about the middle 
of February, they vigorously concentrated their terror on 
the Center Party in a variety of ways. Centrist meetings, 
speeches, and newspapers were arbitrarily prohibited, and 
many civil servants belonging to the Center Party suddenly 
received dismissal notices. The party had not endured so 
severe a test since the Kulturkampf, and Center leaders 
became convinced that the government intended to abolish 
the party altogether. Although former Chancellor Heinrich 
Bruening and other Center leaders appeared determined to 
fight for the continued existence of the party, the major­
ity were setting a course which would soon result in the
9Center's unconditional surrender to the Hitler government.
On March 5 the elections took place as scheduled, 
and the returns showed that the Center Party had actually 
increased its representation in the Reichstag from seventy 
to seventy-three deputies. In consideration of the Nazi 
terror, these results seemingly should have pleased Center 
leaders, but there were other significant facts about the 
election that provided grounds for pessimism in Catholic 
circles. Most serious, the number of Nazi delegates in 
the Reichstag jumped dramatically from 196 to 288, or
43.9 per cent of the total votes cast.^^ Secondly, the
^Matthias and Morsey, pp. 346-49-
Wheaton, p. 248. For a detailed analysis of each 
electoral district see the tables in Bracher, Sauer, and 
Schulz, pp. 95-133-
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Center Party actually received a slightly smaller per­
centage of the total vote than in November, despite 
its increase of three seats. Finally, for the first 
time the Nazis made significant gains in securing the 
vote of predominately Catholic Bavaria, which in turn 
brought about a slight decline in the percentage of 
votes cast for the Bavarian People's Party. As a re­
sult of these factors, the total effect of the March 5 
elections was to undermine rather than strengthen the 
political influence of German Catholicism. Admittedly, 
the election did not provide Hitler with the majority 
he had sought, but the results were still impressive 
enough to confirm the legal character of the Hitler 
government. This factor, when combined with the Nazi 
terror and dismissal of numerous Catholic civil ser­
vants, must have raised the question in the minds of 
many Catholics as to the feasibility of opposing the 
Hitler regime any longer and strengthened their de­
sire to reach an agreement. A number of Catholic 
leaders, who later became known as the "March casu­
alties," now left the Center Party, and several in­
fluential Catholic newspapers began to call for sup­
port of the new government. At this same time, 
reports were circulating that the Vatican wished to 
see friendly relations established between the Reich 
government and German Catholics, which could only have
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strengthened the desire of the Center leaders to seek an 
accommodation with Hitler.
On March 23i two days after an impressive cere­
monial opening at the Potsdam Garrison Church, the new 
Reichstag convened at its temporary quarters in the Kroll 
Opera House. It was well-known at the time that Hitler 
planned to request the passage of the so-called Enabling 
Act (ErmMchtigungsgesetz), which had already been drafted. 
In essence, the act granted dictatorial powers to Hitler 
for a period of four years. Since the Weimar Constitu­
tion was still in force, the act required approval of 
two-thirds of the Reichstag before it could become law. 
This meant, in the light of the political situation at 
the time, that passage of the act hinged upon the support 
of the two Catholic parties, the Center and the Bavarian 
People’s Party. Together, the members of these parties, 
either by abstaining or by voting against the measure, 
held the key to grant or to deny Hitler the legal assent 
to dictatorship. Hitler was well aware of this and took 
the necessary steps to assure himself the support of the 
Catholic parties. On March 20 and March 22 Hitler and 
Reich Minister of Interior Frick held discussions with 
Ludwig Kaas and other Center leaders to determine the 
conditions under which the party could be persuaded to 
support the Enabling Act. During these talks Kaas
^^Lewy, pp. 30-31 ; and Wheaton, pp. 248-50.
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12presented the Center's terms, to which Hitler not
only responded in a surprisingly conciliatory manner,
but agreed to accept the essential demands of the party
negotiators. Hitler's promises included the guarantee
of the continued existence of the separate German states,
recognition of the existing LMnder concordats with the 
13Vatican, assurance that the Reich government would not 
use the additional power granted by the act to alter the 
constitution, the retention of civil servants belonging 
to the Center Party, and the pledge to respect the irre­
movability of judges. Hitler also agreed to mention 
these promises in the text of his speech to be delivered 
before the Reichstag. On the morning of March 23 the 
Center Party delegates met to discuss these developments. 
Kaas, who had become convinced Hitler would force the act 
through the Reichstag by one means or another, warned of 
the serious consequences to the Center Party if it refused 
to support the act. Since former Chancellor Bruening and 
a small minority of deputies opposed the act, however, it 
was decided to postpone a final decision until after they 
had heard the Reich Chancellor's speech later the same
, l4day.
^^See Matthias and Morsey, pp. 429-31•
^^See below, p. 83.
^^Matthias and Morsey, pp. 36O-63; and Lewy, p. 33 «
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On the afternoon of March 23» just prior to the 
vote on the Enabling Act, Hitler delivered a major ad­
dress to the members of the new Reichstag. The tone of 
his speech was moderate, despite the ominous presence 
of armed SA and SS troops lining the walls. Hitler not 
only included a carefully worded version of his promises 
made previously to the leaders of the Center Party, but 
also went to some length to express his desire for co­
operation with the Christian churches :
The Government, being resolved to undertake the 
political and moral purification of our public life, 
is creating and securing the conditions necessary 
for a really profound revival of religious life.
. . . The national Government regards the two
Christian confessions as the weightiest factors 
for the maintenance of our nationality. It will 
respect the agreements concluded between it and 
the federal States. Their rights are not to be 
infringed. But the Government hopes and expects 
that the work on the national and moral regenera­
tion of our nation which it has made its task will, 
on the other hand, be treated with the same respect.
In the same way, the Government of the Reich, 
which regards Christianity as the unshakable founda­
tion of the morals and moral code of the nation, 
attaches the greatest value to friendly relations 
with the Holy See, and is endeavoring to develop 
them.15
In the recess that followed immediately after 
Hitler's speech, the deputies retired to their respective
Adolf Hitler, My New Order, ed. with Commentary 
by Raoul de Roussy de Sales (New York: Reynal & Hitch­
cock, 1941), pp. 152-58. Although not as complete, this 
is a smoother translation than the one printed in Hitler, 
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, I, 371-72. For the German 
text see Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, I, 229-37*
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party chambers to make their final decision on the vote.
In the tense meeting of the Center Party delegates,
Bruening again attempted to persuade the others to oppose
the act. The majority sided with Kaas, however, and the
Center deputies finally agreed to support the act as a
unit.^^ Apparently Hitler's assurances had satisfied
the Center leaders, despite the fact he had generally
avoided making specific promises that might later prove 
17embarrassing. When the deputies reassembled in the 
evening session to cast their votes, Kaas announced the 
Center's decision. He admitted the Center had enter­
tained certain reservations in regard to the Enabling 
Act, but the Reich Chancellor's explanations had made it 
possible for the party to reconsider its position. On 
the assumption that these statements constituted the 
"practical direction for the passing of legislation
which could be expected," Kaas continued, the Center
18Party supported the Enabling Act. Immediately after
^^Wheaton, pp. 265-66.
17One sentence did prove embarrassing, particu­
larly after the Reich government began its campaign 
against the confessional schools. The sentence, "the 
National Government will allow and secure to the Chris­
tian Confessions the influence which is their due both 
in the school and education," was omitted from later 
official versions of the speech. Ernst Christian Helm- 
reich, Religious Education in German Schools ; An His­
torical Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1959)) pT 334, footnote 3-
18Cited by Matthias and Morsey, p. 366.
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Kaas finished the spokesman for the Bavarian People's 
Party announced that his party would also support the 
act. As a result, the Enabling Act easily passed the 
Reichstag by a majority of 44l to with the Social
Democrats bravely casting the negative votes.
In general, historians have dealt harshly with
19the Center Party for capitulating so easily to Hitler. 
Perhaps this is partially because they have expected 
more from a party which established a reputation for 
vigorously defending its principles during the Kulturkampf. 
It is not easy to determine the precise motives behind the 
affirmative vote, especially when it is taken into consid­
eration that if the two Catholic parties had joined hands 
with the Social Democrats they might very well have blocked 
passage of the act. While the possibility exists that the 
Vatican might have had something to do with the decision
of the Center leaders, evidence is lacking and this ques-
20tion must remain open. It does appear, however, that 
the Center deputies were influenced by Hitler's promises, 
and that once he had convinced them the government would 
protect the rights and prerogatives of the Church the
19As an example, the distinguished English histor­
ian, Alan Bullock, refers to the vote of the Center as "a 
fitting close to the shabby policy of compromise with the 
Nazis which the Center had followed since the summer of 
1932.” Bullock, p. 245.
20Matthias and Morsey, p. 369»
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majority were willing to take a chance on authoritarian
rule. Kaas seemed to be especially impressed by Hitler's
assurances, and he worked hard to persuade others that
resistance was unwise and would be punished. Apparently
the coercive measures of the Nazis during the election
campaign and the dismissal of Catholic civil servants
had convinced many Center deputies that opposition was
useless, and the dramatic increase in Nazi strength as a
result of the elections further undermined their will to
resist. Finally, the widespread belief that Catholic
patriotism would again be questioned at a critical time
in Germany's history also contributed to the affirmative 
21vote. Whatever the motives, the Center and all other 
parties that voted for the act had in effect written 
Hitler a blank check.
The Center Party's acquiescence to the Enabling 
Act clearly dealt a serious blow to German Catholicism 
and its continued resistance to Hitler, but this action 
did not stand alone. Only five days after the passage 
of the act the bishops followed by withdrawing the pro­
hibitions they had previously imposed on the Nazi Party. 
On March 2k Cardinal Bertram of Breslau advised the 
members of the Fulda bishops' conference to issue with­
out delay a public proclamation on the position of the
o 1Lewy, pp. 35-36; and Wheaton, pp. 272-73*
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22Catholic Church. To expedite matters, the Cardinal 
drew up a draft of the proclamation, which the bishops 
accepted with minor changes. Although Bertram had sug­
gested March 29 as the date of publication, most bishops 
made it public on March 28 :
The bishops of the diocese of Germany . . .  have 
adopted, for weighty reasons during the last years, 
an attitude of opposition toward the National So­
cialist movement, through prohibitions and warnings, 
which were to remain in effect as long and as far as 
those reasons remained valid.
It should now be recognized that there are public 
and solemn declarations issued by the highest repre­
sentative of the Reich Government--which acknowledge 
the inviolability of the teachings of the Catholic 
faith and the unswerving mission and rights of the 
Church and which expressly guarantee the full valid­
ity of the legal pacts concluded between the several 
German LMnder and the Church.
Without lifting the condemnation, implied in our 
previous measures, of certain religious and ethical 
errors, the Episcopate now believes it can be confi­
dent that those general prohibitions and warnings 
prescribed need no longer be regarded as n e c e s s a r y . 23
On the next day, March 29, the bishops followed through by
issuing specific instructions to their clergy. Henceforth,
the members of the Nazi Party could be admitted to the
sacraments, even when appearing in uniform and in large
groups, and party membership did not by itself constitute
sufficient ground for refusing Church burial. Thus, in
n nPrinted in Müller, No. 29, p . 76. For a discus­
sion of Bertram's motives in taking this step, see Lewy,
p. 37.
^^TMWC, IV, 501. For the German text, which is 
printed side by side with the original draft by Cardinal 
Bertram, see Müller, No. 30, pp. 76-78.
Lewy, pp. 40-4l; and Müller, No. 33, pp. 8O-8I.
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this dramatic turn of events, the bishops established a
working relationship between the Catholic Church and the
new Hitler regime. By lifting the prohibitions against
National Socialism, the bishops had in effect informed
Catholics they could participate in Hitler's program of
national regeneration without fear of betraying the
principles of their Church. On the whole, Catholics
accepted this action with approval. Several Catholic
organizations quickly issued statements urging coopera-
25tion with the new government, and the response of the
Catholic press was generally f a v o r a b l e . T h i s  comes
as no great surprise for many Catholics earnestly wished
to see the Church make peace with the Nazi government.
In part at least, the bishops had only acted in response
27to this growing sentiment. Whether or not there was
any connection between the action of the Center Party in
voting for the Enabling Act and the bishops' proclamation
of March 28 is simply not known as conclusive evidence is 
28lacking. It is also possible the Vatican may have
played a role in the decisions of the Center Party and
the Episcopate during this period, but again it cannot
29be established on the basis of the available sources.
pp. 43-44.
o trLewy, pp. 42-43» For Catholic dissent see
^^Eriksen, p. 349» ^^Lewy, p. 43.
^^Ibid., p. 34. 2^Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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In any case, a great many Catholics must have been grati­
fied by the proclamation of March 28 for it not only per­
mitted them to express their true feelings toward the new 
regime freely, but also to resolve a moral dilemma which 
was generally regarded as intolerable.
In the ensuing weeks, the process of Gleichschaltung 
proceeded at a rapid pace. Buttressed by the power of 
the Enabling Act, the Nazis continued to rout their oppo­
nents and mobilize all forces to the task of rebuilding 
Germany. The government declared April 1 official "Boy­
cott Day," and SA men stood guard before placarded Jewish
30stores throughout the country. On April 7 a new Civil 
Service Law provided the authorities with the utmost lati­
tude in cases involving the dismissal of Jews and persons
whose political record did not give assurance they "would
31support the national State without reservation." It 
was a period of tremendous insecurity for all Germans, 
and thousands of Catholics were among those who lost 
their jobs or suffered abuse in a variety of other ways.
Alarmed over these events. Cardinal Bertram com­
plained about the Nazi excesses in a personal letter to
32the Reich Chancellor on April l6 . In his lengthy reply 
of April 28, Hitler made every effort to pacify the Car­
dinal. If priests had been abused, he was "sincerely
^^Wheaton, p. 283. ^^Ibid., pp. 288-89.
^^Printed in Müller, No. 44, pp. 97-98.
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sorry," and he asked the Cardinal to accept "with trust
the good will and the good intentions of the National
Government." In concluding Hitler reminded Bertram
that National Socialism actually protected Christianity
3 3against the great danger of Bolshevism. The Reich 
Chancellor was also in an agreeable mood on April 26, 
when he discussed the religious situation with Bishop 
Wilhelm Berning of Gsnabrück and Monsignor Paul Stein- 
mann of Berlin. After the two clergymen had pointed 
out the major grievances of the Church, Hitler calmly 
replied that he was keenly hurt by the accusation he 
had acted against Christianity. He had become "firmly 
convinced" that neither a personal life nor a State 
could be built without Christianity, and therefore, 
the State must support the Church in the fight against 
godlessness and Bolshevism. The State would have to 
accompany this fight with sternness and force, but this 
could not be avoided. Hitler denied Germany was under­
going a Kulturkampf, and asserted the government had no
34intention of interfering with the rights of the Church. 
Throughout the talk. Bishop Berning later commented. 
Hitler spoke with warmth and calmness; he expressed only
Hitler to Bertram, April 28, 1933> DGFP, C,
Vol. I, No. 196, pp. 358-61. The German text is printed 
in Müller, No. 501 PP- 122-25-
34■̂ Unsigned Note, June 7, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. I,
No. 188, pp. 34^-48. The German text is printed in Müller, 
No. 49, pp. 120-22. See also Lewy, pp. 5O-5I-
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appreciation for the bishops and said nothing against 
the Church.
Despite Hitler's repeated assurances he intended 
no harm to the Christian churches, the actual situation 
remained critical as the government continued to apply 
pressure on all fronts. Obviously, there was a wide 
discrepancy between Hitler's promises and the political 
realities. On May 30, 1933i the bishops again met at 
Fulda, and although they criticized some aspects of 
National Socialism in their pastoral letter of June 6, 
their protests were accompanied by repeated affirmations 
of loyalty to the Reich government. In essence, the 
letter indicated the bishops wished to continue the 
policy of cooperation that had been decided upon in 
March, despite the pressure applied against the Church 
since that time.^^ It clearly revealed the dilemma of 
the German Catholics, who were apprehensive over the 
Nazi excesses but still earnestly desired to cooperate 
with the new regime. In the words of the French his­
torian, Robert d'Harcourt, they were "trying to recon­
cile the irreconcilable, to flatter the hangman and
37console the victim." Perhaps, as Lewy suggests, the
S^MÜller, No. 48, p. Il8.
36The text of the pastoral letter is printed in 
Mason, appendix; and Müller, No. 64, pp. 152-61. See 
also Lewy, pp. 94-100.
^ ^ H a r c o u r t , p. 84.
82
Catholic Episcopate so welcomed Nazi opposition to free­
thinkers and godless Communism they failed to apprehend
o Qthe true inhumanity of National Socialism. Also, the
bishops at Fulda undoubtedly found cause for optimism in
the anticipation of a concordat, which by this time had
39become a near-certainty.
In attempting to conclude a concordat with the 
Vatican, Hitler did not embark upon a new course in 
German foreign policy but simply continued one already 
well-established. As early as 1919, negotiations had 
taken place between President Friedrich Ebert and Mon­
signor Eugenio Pacelli, who at the time was the papal 
nuncio to Germany. These negotiations were discontinued 
in 1922, however, primarily because the non-Catholic
majorities which dominated the Reichstag and Reichsrat
40opposed a formal treaty with the Vatican. They were
resumed in the final years of the Weimar Republic, but
4lagain no settlement was reached. As a result the Holy
^®Lewy, pp. 98-99. ^^Ibid., p. 56.
^^Ibid., p. 58; and John Brown Mason, "The Con­
cordat with the Third Reich," Catholic Historical Review,
XX (April, 1934), 24.
4lDiscussions of the negotiations for a Reich Con­
cordat between 1919 and 1933 may be found in Lewy, pp. 57- 
62; Ernst Deuerlein, Das Reichskonkordat: Beitrflge zu
Vorgeschichte, Abschuluss und Vollzug des Konkordates 
zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und dem deutschen Reich vom 
20. Juli 1933 (Düsseldorf; Patmos-Verlag, 1956), pp. 15- 
40 ; and the memorandum by Menshausen from the files of 
the German Foreign Ministry, April 5, 1933, 6153/E46o617-20,
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See subsequently set about to conclude agreements with
the individual German states, or Lflnder governments.
These goals proved to be within reach, and the Vatican
concluded concordats with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929),
42and Baden (1932).
The passage of the Enabling Act in one way vastly 
improved the chances of a Reich-Vatican concordat, i.e., 
it provided Hitler with the legal right to conclude 
treaties without having to obtain a parliamentary major­
ity. On the other hand, the radical position of the 
Nazis on race and religion provided a good reason for 
the Vatican to refuse a settlement with the Hitler 
government on any terms. In the end, the Vatican and 
the Reich reached an agreement because both expected to 
make substantial gains, and this took precedence over 
the wide philosophical gap that separated Catholic 
doctrine and Nazi ideology.
From Hitler's point of view, the new government 
could expect to boost its international prestige consid­
erably by concluding a treaty with the Vatican. A con­
cordat would help substantially in demonstrating to for­
eign governments that the Nazis were respectable and eager
42The texts of all three concordats are printed in 
Joseph Wenner, ed., Reichskonkordat und LHnderkonkordate: 
Mit Einleitung und Schverzeichnis (5th ed.; Paderborn : 
Ferdinand Schëningh Verlag, 1949), pp. 40-86. For dis­
cussions of the negotiations see Deuerlein, pp. 40-52 
(Bavaria), 71-84 (Prussia), and 85-87 (Baden).
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to solve problems through peaceful negotiation. Secondly, 
it would be useful in proving the good intentions of the 
government toward the Church, which in turn would rally 
to the Nazi banner those Catholics who either opposed or 
had not committed themselves to the new regime. Thirdly, 
Hitler hoped to secure a number of concessions from the 
Church, particularly the termination of "political Ca­
tholicism." Fourthly, since a Reich Concordat would 
apply to all parts of Germany it would aid the new 
regime in achieving the goal of Gleichschaltung. Finally, 
it would be a personal triumph for Hitler and would add 
immensely to his prestige, just as Mussolini benefited
43from his role as maker of the Lateran Accord.
Fortunately for Hitler, the authorities at the 
Vatican also believed a concordat with the Reich govern­
ment would be advantageous. In the first place, a formal 
agreement of an international character would provide a 
legal safeguard for the rights and activities of German 
Catholics. If the Hitler government did not prove to be 
permanent, as many in the Vatican believed, then a con­
cordat would serve as a useful starting point for nego­
tiations with the ensuing regime. Secondly, a Vatican 
rebuff of Nazi efforts to reach an agreement would very
4 3Westermeyer, p. 140; George Nauman Shuster, Like 
a Mighty Army; Hitler versus Established Religion (New 
York and London: 51 Appleton-Century Co., 1935) , p. iBB;
and Lewy, p. 66.
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likely be misunderstood by the large numbers of German 
Catholics who were sympathetic toward the Hitler govern­
ment. Many would undoubtedly assume the Vatican was 
deliberately trying to bring an end to the Nazi regime 
by refusing to grant it the prestige that would auto­
matically accompany the conclusion of a Concordat. Fi­
nally, despite the hostility which many Nazi leaders 
had expressed toward the Christian religion, in 1933 
the Vatican considered the Communist gospel of "world 
revolution" to be more of a threat to the peace and 
security of the world than National Socialism. There­
fore, in order that Germany might serve more effectively 
as a bulwark against Communist expansion, many in the 
Vatican felt it would be wise to grant the Reich govern­
ment the additional strength and prestige it would de-
44rive from a concordat.
As his principal negotiator for the Concordat, 
Hitler assigned his Vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen.
A diplomat by profession, Papen was in many ways ideally 
suited for the role. He was a devout Catholic, a mon­
archist by conviction, graceful in manner, and favored 
by a proper heritage from an old Westphalian family.
Like Neurath, he had no real enthusiasm for National 
Socialism, but he still served the Hitler government
44Shuster, p. l88; and Gurian, "Hitler's Unde­
clared War on the Catholic Church," pp. 267-68.
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45effectively. Despite his important role in obtaining 
an agreement with the Holy See, it is doubtful whether 
Papen actually "initiated" the discussions as he im­
modestly boasts in his Memoirs ;
I was not content with mere assurances by Hitler.
I wanted to establish a legal basis for the rights 
of the Christian Churches in Germany. The violent 
anti-clericalism of the Nazi Party's radical wing 
increased the urgency of the problem. 1 decided 
to pay an Easter visit to Rome to study the pos­
sibility of reaching some firm agreement.
Papen's story is interesting but probably untrue. More 
likely, Monsignor Kaas informed Hitler of the willingness 
of the Vatican to conclude a concordat, and the Reich 
Chancellor decided to explore the possibility. Accord­
ingly, Hitler instructed Papen to familiarize himself
with the details through the Foreign Office and dispatched 
47him to Rome.
Papen arrived in Rome on April 9, and although the 
purpose of his mission was supposedly secret, the news
48leaked out. According to Papen, the Pope and the
Davidson, p. 1?7* At Nuremberg Papen was charged 
with using his position as "Germany's Most Famous Catholic 
Layman and as Negotiator of the Vatican Concordat" to pre­
pare for Nazi aggression. NCA. II, 931- While the Nurem­
berg Tribunal found Papen innocent, two German courts later 
found him guilty under the denazification laws and sen­
tenced him to eight years in prison. For the entire de­
fense testimony of Papen see the TMWC, XIX, 143-59»
^^Papen, p. 2?8. ^^Lewy, pp. 65-67.
48Memorandum by Menshausen, April 7, 1933, DGFP,
C, Vol. I, No. 145, p. 268.
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Cardinal Secretary of State received him warmly. The
Holy Father even remarked that it pleased him to see the
German government headed by a man "uncompromisingly op-
49posed to Communism and Russian nihiliism." The follow­
ing day Papen was joined by Gdring, whom Hitler had or­
dered to Rome to assist in the discussions. The German 
ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen, also played 
a prominent part in the negotiations. On the Vatican 
side the negotiations were conducted largely by Cardinal 
Pacelli, who had obtained a thorough knowledge of the 
German political scene by virtue of his experiences in 
Munich and Berlin as the Apostolic Nuncio. Pacelli re­
ceived a great deal of assistance from Monsignor Kaas, 
who on March 6 had resigned as the head of the Center 
Party and settled in Rome.^^
In the next several days, discussions on the Con­
cordat took place between Kaas, Papen, Güring, and Car­
dinal Pacelli. For the most part the talks were harmon­
ious, and on April l8 Bergen reported that the Pope had 
stated to third persons he "entertained the best hope of 
a continuance of friendly relations between the Holy See 
and G e r m a n y . P r i m a r i l y  through the efforts of Kaas, 
a draft of the Concordat was already prepared by the time
^^Papen, p. 279. ^^Lewy, p. 71.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, April l8, 1933» 
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 162, p. 298.
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of Papen's departure for Berlin on the same day. Kaas 
■was authorized to continue the negotiations by maintain­
ing written contact with Papen in Berlin and by keeping 
in touch with Ambassador Bergen in Rome. Also, as the 
negotiations progressed beyond the preliminary stages,
K 2the Foreign Office began to participate in the work.
The main point of contention centered around 
Article Thirty-one, which pertained to the role of the 
Catholic associations in Germany. The Reich government 
wished to dissolve all Catholic organizations which were 
in any way involved in the political life of Germany.
On this issue, even the normally optimistic Papen ad­
mitted he found it difficult to see how the government's
position could correspond to the stand which the German
5 3Episcopate intended to take. The bishops examined the 
draft of the Concordat early in June at the Fulda bishops' 
conference. As Papen had foreseen, they refused to accept 
the government's draft of Article Thirty-one, although 
Cardinal Faulhaber let Papen know they did not "at all 
want to let the conclusion of the Concordat break down 
over that." The government continued to insist the 
clergy be taken out of politics, however, and on June 1
*5 2Lewy, p. 71.
^^Papen to Bergen, May 26, 1933» DGFP, C, Vol. I,
No. 263, p. 491.
K 4Papen to Menshausen, June I6 , 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. I, 
No. 319, pp. 573-74.
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Bergen wrote Papen this should be done "even at the risk
R 5of failure of the negotiations."
On June 22 Papen made a detailed report to Hitler 
on the status of the negotiations. In general, Hitler 
approved the content of the provisions, but still insisted 
that Article Thirty-one must exclude the clergy from all 
political activity. He also insisted that Article Twenty- 
seven should give the right of nominating the army bishop 
to the Reich government.
During June the Nazis opened up a systematic cam­
paign of terror against Catholics, especially in Bavaria. 
On June 9 bloody street battles broke out between the SA 
and the members of the Catholic Journeymen's Association, 
who had gathered in Munich for a conference. On June 19 
Eugen Bolz, a prominent member of the Center Party and 
the former Prime Minister of Württemberg, was arrested 
and brutally mistreated. The seizure of the offices and 
funds of the Christian Trade Unions followed on June 24, 
and two days later the Bavarian Political police announced 
they had arrested the prominent members of the Bavarian 
People's Party. The campaign also saw the possessions of
many Catholic organizations confiscated and the arrests
57of large numbers of priests.
^^Bergen to Papen, June 1, 19331 DGFP, C , Vol. I, 
No. 278, pp. 507-8.
^^Papen to Menshausen, June 23» 1933, DGFP, C, 
Vol. I, No. 333, pp. 593-94.
^^Wheaton, pp. 319, 322-24.
90
Whatever the intention of these measures, they had 
the effect of applying pressure on the Vatican to comply
m Qwith Hitler's demands. By June 30 Papen was back in
Rome, and, assisted by Ambassador Bergen, he immediately
59began discussions with Cardinal Pacelli. At the first 
meeting Pacelli appeared upset over the general situation 
in Germany, especially the arrests of Catholic priests 
and the repeated opening of official diplomatic letters 
addressed to the Pope and himself by currency control 
officials. Papen urged Pacelli to contribute to the 
general pacification by a swift conclusion of the Con­
cordat. The Vice-Chancellor also requested the Reich 
government to take urgent steps to stop the practice of 
opening official diplomatic correspondence.^^
Hitler's insistent demand that the Center Party 
be dissolved encountered no serious difficulty, and its 
formal dissolution took place quietly on July 5*^^ That
m OLewy, p. 73» It should be added that Papen be­
lieved the repressive measures against Catholics had quite 
the opposite effect on the negotiations. On July 2 he 
wrote Hitler that the reports concerning the arrests and 
abusive treatment of clergymen, etc., had "brought about a 
frame of mind which made the conclusion of this concordat 
very difficult." DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 34?, P . 624.
59Also present during the final two sessions were 
Archbishop GrOber, who acted as the representative of the 
German Episcopate, and Monsignor Kaas.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, June 30, 1933i 
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 341, pp. 610-11.
^^Wheaton, p. 332. The Bavarian People's Party 
had already announced its dissolution on July 4.
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Papen should have no strong objections to the demise of 
the Center comes as no great s h o c k , b u t  the Vatican's 
silent acceptance of this fact is something of a surprise. 
According to Lewy, the Vatican had always been suspicious 
of the Center Party's "essentially political commitment," 
and believed a concordat would be a far better way of 
dealing with Hitler than by relying on the Catholic po­
litical parties. Also, after the passage of the Enabling 
Act, the usefulness of the Center Party was clearly at an 
end.^^ Apparently the Vatican decided to concede this 
point to Hitler and obtain concessions elsewhere.
In the early part of July events began to move 
swiftly. On July 2 Papen wired the Foreign Office that 
the final conference with Pacelli had just taken place,
6kand the Pope had approved the draft of the Concordat.
On the following day a courier plane hurried the draft 
to Berlin for final approval by the Reich government.
At meetings held on July 4 and 5i Hitler, Neurath, Frick, 
Count von Schwerin-Krosigk (Minister of Finance), and 
Franz Gürtner (Minister of Justice) examined the draft
^^See Papen's note to Bergen, May 26, 1933> DGFP, 
C, Vol. I, No. 263, pp. 491-92.
6 ̂ Lewy, p. 69. Along this same line, see the com­
ments by Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzardo, the Papal Under­
secretary of State, as reported by Sir Robert H. Clive 
to Sir John Simon, April 22, 1933, DBFP, Second series. 
Vol. V, No. 85, p. 156.
64Papen to the Foreign Ministry, July 2, 1933,
DGFP, C , Vol. I, No. 341, p. 611, footnote 2.
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and agreed upon a number of changes. Neurath entered 
these changes directly on the draft, and on July 6, 
Rudolf Buttmann, Director of the Cultural Policy De­
partment of the Reich Ministry of Interior, journeyed 
to Rome to obtain the Vatican’s approval of the 
c h a n g e s . T h e  final negotiations were conducted by 
Papen, Pacelli, Kaas, Grëber, and the newly arrived 
B u t t m a n n . S i n c e  the two parties disagreed over the 
specific Catholic organizations to receive protection 
under Article Thirty-one, it was decided to settle the 
matter by "mutual agreement" in future discussions be­
tween the Reich government and the German Episcopate. 
Late in the evening of July 8, Bergen wired the Foreign 
Ministry that the Vice-Chancellor and the Cardinal Sec­
retary of State had initialed the Concordat.
In a quick change of political tactics. Hitler 
now decided to "soften" the campaign of terror against 
the Church. In a public statement issued to the press 
on July 9, Hitler declared the Concordat appeared to 
furnish sufficient guarantees that German Catholics
For the draft of the Concordat see DGFP, C,
Vol. I, No. 348, pp. 625-33» The changes made on the 
draft by Neurath are printed in the footnotes. Butt­
mann was unable to obtain the Vatican's approval of all 
of these changes. Lewy, p. 76.
discussion of the final talks of July 6-8 may 
be found in Deuerlein, pp. 117-19»
6 7Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, July 8, 1933, 
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 356, p. 642.
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would henceforth "place themselves unreservedly in the 
service of the new National Socialist state." Therefore, 
Hitler continued, "all coercive measures against priests 
and other leaders of the Catholic organizations are to be 
annulled." Hitler concluded by expressing his delight to 
see the end of a period in which religious and political 
interests were all too often locked in "apparently inex­
tricable conflict," and he hoped a settlement of the ques­
tions affecting the Protestant faith would f o l l o w . H i t ­
ler continued to express high hopes during the discussions 
of the Concordat at a cabinet meeting held on July 14.
The Reich Chancellor explained that one should see only 
success in the Concordat. It created an area of confi­
dence which was particularly significant in the urgent 
fight against international Jewry. Any possible short­
comings in the agreement could be rectified later when the 
foreign policy situation had improved. After making a few 
minor changes in the text, the cabinet agreed to accept 
the draft.
On July 18 a final round of talks regarding Article 
Thirty-one took place. After the government made additional 
assurances pertaining to the future of the Catholic
6 8U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 19331 II, 298-300. The German text is 
printed in Deuerlein, pp. 119-20. See also Lewy, p. 77 «
69Extract from the Minutes of the Conference of Min­
isters on July l4, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 362, pp. 65I-
53.
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organizations, the Vatican approved the treaty, although 
there was still no agreement on the specific organiza­
tions to come under this article. On July 20 Cardinal 
Pacelli and Vice-Chancellor Papen formally signed and
sealed the Concordat in an elaborate ceremony held in the
70Papal Secretariat. The final text of the Concordat, 
which contained Thirty-four articles, was published on 
July 22. It was written in both German and Italian, with 
the two texts having "equal force." The following is a 
brief summary.
Article One simply guaranteed German Catholics the 
right to profess and practice their religion in Germany. 
Article Two recognized the continued validity of the 
existing LMnderkonkordate with Bavaria, Prussia, and 
Baden, while Article Three confirmed the continuation of 
diplomatic representation between the Reich and the Holy 
See. Article Four pledged and agreed that ecclesiastical 
authorities could transmit instructions, pastoral letters, 
etc., to the faithful in the usual manner.
^^Wheaton, pp. 337-38; and Deuerlein, pp. 122-23* 
71The translation of the Concordat referred to 
here, together with the secret annex, may be found in 
the appendix. It is the same as the one printed in DGFP, 
C, Vol. I, No. 371, pp. 669-79* For a different English 
translation see Sidney Z. Ehler and John B. Morrall, 
trans. and ed., Church and State Through the Centuries ;
A Collection of Historic Documents with Commentaries 
(Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1954), pp. 404-96.
The German text is printed in Wenner, pp. 12-27* Sum­
maries may be found in Lewy, pp. 76-82; and Wheaton, pp. 
338-40.
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Articles Five-Ten pertained to the legal status of 
the clergy. Specifically, they dealt with such matters 
as exemptions from taking public offices and other duties 
regarded as incompatible with their clerical status. Ar­
ticle Nine affirmed the secrecy of the confessional, while 
Articles Eleven-Thirteen dealt with the administrative or­
ganization of the Church. Any change in the demarcation 
of the dioceses must have government approval. Article 
Fourteen, the longest of all the articles, concerned the 
appointment of bishops. "In principle" the Church had the 
right to make appointments freely to "all Church offices 
and benefices without the participation of the State." It 
was agreed, however, the bull for the nominations would be 
drawn up only after it had been confirmed that the State 
had "no objections of a general political nature against 
the person." If the State did have objections, according 
to the Final Protocol it would have to make them known 
within a period of twenty days or the Holy See would assume 
the candidate was acceptable. As events were to prove 
later, the Reich government had in effect established the 
right of veto because it could effectively block the fill­
ing of a vacant see by repeatedly issuing political objec-
72tions to the nominees of the Vatican.
Article Fifteen guaranteed the religious orders 
freedom to carry on their work "subject to no special
^^Lewy, p. 81.
96
restrictions on the part of the State." Article Sixteen 
required the bishops to take a loyalty oath to the German 
Reich and to their particular province before taking pos­
session of their dioceses. Article Seventeen guaranteed 
the Church the right to own property, and Article Eight­
een declared the Reich and the Vatican would reach a
"friendly agreement" prior to any discontinuance of pay-
73ments to the Church by the German government.
Articles Nineteen through Twenty-five pertained to 
the Catholic educational system. While Hitler later fla­
grantly disregarded them, at the time they represented
some of the most significant concessions to the Church
7kfound in the entire document. Article Nineteen affirmed 
the retention of the Catholic theological faculties in the 
State institutions of higher learning, and Article Twenty 
guaranteed the right of the Church to establish theologi­
cal seminaries. Article Twenty-one recognized Catholic 
religious instruction in the primary, vocational, second­
ary, and higher schools as a "regular subject of instruc­
tion" to be taught "in accordance with the principles of 
the Catholic Church." Special emphasis, however, would 
be placed on the "inculcation of a patriotic, civil, and
7 3Ibid., p. 82. It is interesting to note that 
despite all the measures undertaken by the Nazi regime 
to harass and subdue the Catholic Church, it never 




social sense of duty.” Article Twenty-three guaranteed 
the retention of the existing Catholic denominational 
schools and provided for the establishment of new ones 
when requested by the parents or guardians.
In Article Twenty-six the Reich government agreed 
to allow the Church marriage to take place prior to the 
civil wedding in the event the betrothed person became 
critically ill or in case of a "serious moral emergency." 
Article Twenty-seven concerned the duties of the army 
bishop, a subject which had been a matter of controversy 
since the early years of the Weimar Republic. The Reich 
government wished the army bishop to have exclusive au­
thority over the military chaplains, without interference 
from the local bishops. The German hierarchy, fearful of 
losing its control over the military clergy, naturally 
opposed this exempt status. In the settlement of this 
issue the Vatican granted the government's wish for 
"exempted pastoral care," i.e., the chaplains would be 
under the direction of the army bishop rather than the 
local bishop. The Vatican and the Reich government would 
select the army bishop by mutual agreement, and he would 
have authority to appoint other military clergymen after 
obtaining prior agreement from the competent government 
authorities. Article Twenty-eight permitted the Church 
the right to make pastoral visits and hold services in 
State hospitals, prisons, and similar institutions, while
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Article Twenty-nine defined the rights of Catholic minor­
ities residing in Germany. Article Thirty required the 
churches to offer a prayer on Sundays and religious holi­
days for the "welfare of the German Reich and Nation" 
following the main service.
As previously stated, the Reich and the Vatican 
resolved their impasse over the highly controversial 
Article Thirty-one by postponing the decision on the 
specific organizations which would receive protection 
for future discussions. While this procedure enabled 
the two parties to go ahead with the signing of the Con­
cordat, it was no solution, and the disputes over this 
article sharply aggravated future Reich-Vatican relations. 
Even the provision which protected Catholic organizations 
and societies serving "exclusively religious, purely cul­
tural and charitable purposes" did not offer a real solu­
tion, as the problem of distinguishing such organizations 
from those serving "political" purposes provided ample 
opportunity for disagreement over the interpretation of 
these terms. Article Thirty-two granted Hitler his all- 
important goal of excluding the clergy from politics. 
Specifically, it stated that the Holy See would "publish 
stipulations which exclude the clergy and members of 
orders from membership in political parties, and activity 
for such parties." While Hitler insisted upon such a 
provision as a prerequisite for a settlement with the
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Church, by the time the Concordat was signed he had already 
succeeded in outlawing all opposition political parties to 
the NSDAP.75
The Concordat concluded on a congenial note. Arti­
cle Thirty-three provided that in the event a difference 
of opinion should occur over the interpretation or appli­
cation of any of the articles, the Holy See and the German 
Reich would arrive at a "friendly solution by mutual agree­
ment." Finally, Article Thirty-four stated ratification 
would take place as soon as possible, and the treaty would 
go into effect on the day of ratification.
Although it was not generally known at the time, 
the Reich and the Vatican also agreed to a secret annex 
which was ratified several weeks after the Concordat.
This agreement, which governed the treatment of the clergy
in the event Germany introduced universal military service,
76was made at the request of the Fulda bishops’ conference. 
According to the terms of the agreement, students studying 
for the priesthood and most of the diocesan clergy, i.e., 
bishops, parish priests, curates, rectors, professors in 
seminaries, etc., would be exempt from military service 
except in the event of mobilization. Those who did not 
qualify for an exemption would, if declared fit, enter 
the armed forces and either devote themselves to pastoral 
work with the troops or enter the medical service.
^^Bullock, p. 249. ^^Lewy, p. 85.
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According to Cesare Orsenigo, the papal nuncio to Germany,
even future State Secretary Ernst von Weizsâcker did not
know of its existence until shortly before the outbreak
77of World War IX. This is surprising as rumors of a 
secret agreement were circulating as early as August of
1933.^®
Clearly, the Concordat contained serious weaknesses. 
It was sometimes badly drafted, did not anywhere define 
its terms, and left for future negotiations the important 
matter of deciding the specific organizations to come 
under Article Thirty-one. Such shortcomings could not 
help but undermine the value of the Concordat as a legal 
basis for guarantees against the strong-arm methods of 
National Socialism, despite the fact that twenty-one of 
the thirty-four articles pertained to the rights and pre­
rogatives of the Church. No one seems to have been more 
aware of these weaknesses than Cardinal Pacelli, who ex­
pressed his views on the Concordat a few weeks later to 
the British charge d ’affaires to the Vatican, Ivone Kirk­
patrick (later Sir Ivone). According to Kirkpatrick, 
Pacelli jnade no effort to conceal his disgust at the 
activities of the Hitler government, and he was actually 
apologetic when he explained how he had come to sign the
77Memorandum by State Secretary WeizsMcker, Au­
gust 29, 1939, DGFP, Series D, Vol. VII, No. 432, p. 426.
78See below, p. 117-
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Concordat. Pacelli declared a pistol had been pointed at 
his head, giving him no alternative. Since the Reich 
government had offered concessions, he had to choose be­
tween an agreement along their lines or the virtual elim­
ination of the Catholic Church in Germany. The first and 
only consideration, was the spiritual welfare of the twenty 
million Catholics in Germany. The German government was 
certain to violate the Concordat, Pacelli admitted, but in
this event the Vatican would at least have a written agree-
79ment on which it could base a protest.
In the years ahead Pacelli never wavered in his de­
fense of the Concordat, either as Papal Secretary of State 
or as Pope. Even after the holocaust of World War II, 
Pacelli was able to make the following statement in a 
speech to the Sacred College of Cardinals on June 2, 194$:
It must, nevertheless, be recognized that the Con­
cordat, in the years that followed, brought some 
advantages, or at least prevented worse evils. In 
fact, despite all the violations to which it was 
subjected, it gave Catholics a juridical basis for 
their defense, a stronghold behind which they could 
shield themselves in their opposition--as long as 
this was possible--to the ever growing campaign of 
religious persecution.80
While Pacelli's defense of the Concordat at first 
appears reasonable, it is highly vulnerable in one respect. 
In consideration of all that happened during the War,
^^Kirkpatrick to Sir R. Vansittart, August 19, 1933, 
DBFP, Second series. Vol. V, No. 342, pp. 524-25.
^°TMWC, XVI, 284.
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including the murder of six million Jews, what "worse
evils" could possibly have occurred than did actually
take place? Anything worse seems almost inconceivable
to the human mind, and Hochhuth did not fail to point
8lthis out in The Deputy. Some critics have also sug­
gested the Concordat was in reality harmful to Catholics 
because it tended to hide the fundamental differences 
between National Socialism and Christianity by persuad­
ing Catholics the Hitler government sought an honest 
understanding with the Church. The noted German his­
torian, Gerhard Ritter, admits the Concordat served as 
a means of defense for Catholics, but believes it also 
"acted as a brake since it could legitimately be feared 
that over-loud protest would endanger the rights that
82were left untouched." In a more critical tone, Guenter
Lewy expresses a similar opinion:
The pact with Hitler in effect, then, dictated a 
policy of caution when a more vigorous opposition 
was called for or desired. An open conflict or 
break with the regime had to be prevented at all 
cost, for either might jeopardize those privileges 
the Concordat still protected. To make matters 
worse, the Concordat was virtually no deterrent at 
all against the Nazis’ attacks. At the same time, 
it very definitely broke the back of any latent 
Catholic resistance to the Hitler regime before it 
could develop. The fact that the Holy See had
Q  T Hochhuth, p. 329.
82Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance: Carl
Goerdeler’s Struggle Against Tyranny, trans. by R. T. 
Clark (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 54.
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concluded a pact with the National Socialist State 
paralyzed the will to resist of those Catholics 
who, despite this diplomatic reapproachement, did 
not consider the Nazis reformed and r e h a b i l i t a t e d . 83
Despite the criticism which has been leveled at 
the Concordat, it cannot justly be condemned simply be­
cause it was imperfect. All treaties contain flaws, and 
often they do not become apparent until after a few years 
have passed. What is most important for the successful 
execution of a treaty is a sincere desire on the part of 
those responsible to make it work, and in Hitler’s case, 
this was clearly lacking. Essentially, the Concordat 
failed to safeguard Catholic rights adequately because 
Hitler did not intend for it to work. No treaty is work­
able if one party has no intention of adhering to its 
terms. While the Vatican can be criticized for failing 
to recognize Hitler's unlimited capacity for deceit, it 
should be remembered that some of Europe's most distin­
guished statesmen repeatedly made the same mistake during 
this period. In a way the Catholic leaders fought the 
Nazis on uneven terms; they continued to rely on the Con­
cordat as the legal basis for the settlement of their 
grievances while Hitler considered the agreement valid 
only so long as it served the interests of party and State, 
As the history of Reich-Vatican relations after the conclu­
sion of the Concordat shows, this would not be long.
®^Lewy, p. 90.
C H A P T E R  IV
JULY 21 - SEPTEMBER 10: FROM THE SIGNING
OF THE CONCORDAT TO ITS RATIFICATION
In general, the conclusion of the Concordat between
the Reich and the Vatican pleased both Catholics and Nazis.
A few of the Nazi extremists opposed a settlement with the
Church, but they were exceptions.^ As could be expected,
Papen was pleased with the results of his handiwork, and
in the period immediately following the Concordat he lec-
2tured extensively on its behalf before Catholic groups.
In a speech delivered at the Benedictine monastery of 
Maria Laach on July 22, Papen praised the Concordat as 
the final conclusion of the Kulturkampf; advised German 
Catholics to forego their old political ties, since the 
Concordat provided the Church full opportunity to develop; 
and asked them to forget their former resentments and join 
in the building of a Third Reich. Two days later the 
Vdlkischer Beobachter hailed the Concordat as a refutation 
by the Church of its past "provocative agitation" against
^Papen, p. 281. ^Eriksen, p. 371.
OLewy, p . 86 .
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the Nazi Party, which signified a "tremendous moral 
strengthening of the National Socialist government of 
the Reich and its reputation." This boast was not en­
tirely without foundation as the Concordat most certainly 
enhanced the international prestige of the Hitler govern­
ment. Mussolini seemed especially pleased that Hitler 
had decided to reach a settlement with the Church. Just 
one week after the initialing of the Concordat the Duce 
requested the German ambassador to Italy, Ulrich von 
Hassell, to convey his gratification to Hitler and Papen 
for their recent success. Together with the Four-Power 
Pact,^ Mussolini asserted, the Concordat would vitally 
ease Germany’s position.^
Catholics received the news of the Concordat with 
equal enthusiasm, and Church leaders wasted no time in 
expressing bright hopes for a forthcoming era of cordial
7relations between Church and State in Germany. A deluge 
of books and articles poured forth testifying to the bond 
of union which had always existed between Roman Catholicism
^VBlkischer Beobachter, No. 205, July 23, 1933, 
cited by Lewy, pT̂ 86.
^Signed on July 15 between Germany, France, Italy, 
and Great Britain. See Konrad Hugo Jarausch, The Four 
Power Pact, 1933 (Madison, Wis.: The State Historical So­
ciety of Wisconsin for the Department of History, Univer­
sity of Wisconsin, I965).




and National Socialism but which had passed unnoticed
until 1933- On July 21 the following statement appeared
in the influential Catholic newspaper, the Këlnische
Volkszeitung;
The Concordat gives us great happiness as Germans 
as well as Catholics. . . . We hope that it will be
put into effect with the same spirit of peace which 
inspired its creation. We owe warm thanks to all 
the leaders who made it possible--the Pope, Pacelli, 
Hitler, von Papen, and Kaas.8
Cardinal Bertram was equally jubilant, and in a warm
letter to Hitler on July 22, he declared the cooperation
of Church and State had found solemn expression in the
Concordat, thanks to the Pope and the vision of the gov-
9ernment. Two days later Cardinal Faulhaber expressed 
his approval of the Concordat in a letter to the Reich 
Chancellor. Faulhaber complimented Hitler for accom­
plishing in six months, by his "statesmanlike foresight," 
what the old political parties and parliaments had not 
accomplished in sixty years.
The honeymoon between the Reich government and 
the Church was not, however, entirely free of difficulties
oKëlnische Volkszeitung, July 21, 1933, P* 1, cited 
by Eriksen, pi 36Ô.
^Bertram to Hitler, July 22, 1933, 8ll8/E58l420-21. 
Printed also in Müller, No. 76, pp. l69-?0.
l°Faulhaber to Hitler, July 24, 1933, 8ll8/E58l422- 
25. Printed also in Müller, No. 77, PP* 170-71* Hitler 
thanked Cardinal Faulhaber for his letter in a short note 
written about a week later. Hitler to Faulhaber, Au­
gust 2, 1933, 8II8/E581426.
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The first problem occurred as a result of two articles 
which appeared on July 26 and July 27 in the semi-official 
organ of the Vatican, the Osservatore Romano. According 
to Eugen Klee, who handled Vatican affairs while Ambassador 
Bergen was on vacation. Cardinal Pacelli had informed him 
a correction would be necessary because of inaccurate 
statements made about the Concordat in the newspapers. 
Pacelli stated that not only the German newspapers, but 
also the French and Austrian press had interpreted the 
Concordat incorrectly.^^
In the attempt to correct these errors, the 
Osservatore Romano referred to Article Twenty-one of the 
Concordat. This article, the Osservatore Romano admitted, 
clearly implied that education should develop one's sense 
of duty toward the Fatherland, but this should be done 
according to the writings of the Gospels, which demanded 
"justice and love." The Osservatore Romano articles also 
insisted the Concordat did not mean the Church had aban­
doned its traditional neutrality regarding the various
Klee to the Foreign Ministry, July 26, 1933i 
8II5/E581422-25• Klee refused to accept Monsignor Piz­
zardo 's assertion that the Osservatore Romano articles 
were not official, and he emphatically stated they were 
"without doubt" inspired by Pacelli. It should be noted 
that even though Klee's note was dated July 26, he en­
closed a copy of the article published on July 27 
(8II5/E579938-39) as well as July 26 (8115/E579933-37)• Apparently the Vatican had provided Klee with advance 
copies of the Osservatore Romano articles, both of which 
were translated into German before Klee forwarded them 
to the Foreign Ministry.
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forms of government, or that the Concordat represented
a recognition of any "specific trend of political doc-
12trines and ideas."
The German response to the Osservatore Romano came 
quickly. On July 29 the Wolffs Tele.graphisches Büro 
(W.T.B.), the principal German news agency, published a 
critical but unsigned reply. The article was in reality 
written by Buttmann of the Reich Ministry of Interior, but 
stated only that its information was based upon an "in­
formed source" ("unterrichtetet Seite"). In the reply 
Buttmann corrected a number of allegedly false interpre­
tations of the Concordat made in the Osservatore Romano, 
especially those pertaining to Articles Twenty-one, 
Twenty-six, and Thirty-two. He reminded the Vatican it 
had concluded a treaty with a government which was moving 
solely in a National Socialist direction, and this itself 
implied facto and de jure recognition of the Nazi 
gov ernment.̂  ̂
The reaction of the Foreign Ministry to the W.T.B. 
article is both interesting and enlightening. In a note 
to Klee, Menshausen apologetically confessed that the 
article unfortunately appeared in the press before the
12 See Ibid.; or Gerhardt Ohlemüller, éd., Reich- 
skonkordat zwischen Deutschland und dem Vatikan (Berlin; 
Saemann-Verlag, 1937 ) , pp. 3&-44. See also Lewy, p. 8?; 
and Wheaton, p. 3^1-
13Enclosed in Menshausen's note to Klee, July 29,
1933, 8125/E581693-96 .
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Foreign Office had the opportunity to read it. The 
Foreign Office, Menshausen continued, would have pre­
ferred a milder reply. In particular, the conclusion 
should have been more conciliatory. Menshausen stated 
he had discussed the matter with Buttmann and had ad­
vised him not to engage in polemics with the Vatican 
as this would only diminish the meaning of the Concor­
dat and delight the enemies of Germany. If asked, 
Menshausen informed Klee, he could tell the Vatican
with the "purest conscience" that the Foreign Ministry
l4in no way participated in the W.T.B. article.
The controversy over the Osservatore Romano and 
W.T.B. articles continued well into August, despite the 
fact that neither the Reich nor the Vatican wished the 
matter to seriously interrupt their cordial relations.
On July 31 Klee reported to the Foreign Ministry that he 
had discussed the matter with Cardinal Pacelli, who had 
informed him the Vatican could not accept the incorrect 
interpretations of the Concordat printed in the German 
press without comment because foreign powers, especially 
the French, were criticizing the Holy See for concluding 
a treaty with the Hitler government. When Klee remarked 
that debates between the Vatican and the Reich would only 
aid the Marxists, the common enemy of both the Church and
94.
^^Menshausen to Klee, July 29, 1933, 8125/E581693-
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State, Pacelli promptly agreed. In concluding, Klee ex­
pressed the opinion the Vatican would be willing to drop 
the matter if the press debates ceased, although the 
"authoritarian" Pope might intervene personally at any 
time.
In Berlin, discussions over the press commentaries 
took place between Menshausen and Cesare Orsenigo, the 
papal nuncio to Germany. Menshausen, obviously on the 
defensive, pointed out to the Nuncio that the government 
had instructed the press immediately after the publica­
tion of the Concordat to refrain from public commentary 
on the treaty and that Buttmann's reply had been made 
necessary because of the two articles published in the 
Osservatore Romano. Menshausen also assured Orsenigo 
that if he had been given the opportunity to look at the 
article before publication, he would have made certain 
it did not appear as if there were contradictions in the 
respective points of view held by the Reich and the Vati­
can. Orsenigo replied he was convinced the government 
would fulfill the treaty obligations with the same good 
will it had shown during the negotiations, and he be­
lieved the Vatican also wished to avoid polemics over 
the matter. Menshausen concluded from the talk that 
Orsenigo was striving to convince Vatican authorities
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, July 31, 1933i
3241/0702273-74.
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they should refrain from using strong language in reply­
ing to Buttmann's article.
Gradually, the Foreign Office took firmer steps 
to prevent the controversy over the press commentaries 
from becoming more serious. On August 3 State Secretary 
Bülow notified the German Embassy to inform Pacelli of 
the German government's strong desire to prevent an open 
debate over the Concordat, and that the government had 
instructed the German press to avoid a biased interpre­
tation of the Concordat or to take stands toward articles
17appearing in the Osservatore Romano. By this time, 
however. Cardinal Pacelli wanted assurances that Butt­
mann' s article was not the official statement of the 
Reich government. Menshausen, in discussing the matter 
with Orsenigo, asserted he had no objections to this 
demand, but felt he could not make such a statement 
without first securing the approval of the Reich Minis­
try of Interior. At this point Menshausen ran into 
difficulty. Hans Pfundtner, State Secretary of the 
Ministry of Interior, informed Menshausen he was of the 
opinion that such a statement could not be made because 
the articles in the Osservatore Romano contained inter­
pretations of the Concordat which were incompatible with
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, July 31, 1933, 8113/ 
E579940-41.
17B ü l o w  to the E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See, A u g u s t  3,
1933, 8125/E581697.
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the German point of view. Going one step further, 
Pfundtner presented Menshausen with the proposed reply 
to be sent in the event Pacelli decided to answer the 
article by Buttmann. Menshausen found the reply too 
harsh, but passed it on to the Nuncio because he was 
unable to get in touch with Pfundtner to work out a new 
draft. Orsenigo in turn rejected it on the grounds it
x8was not sufficiently apologetic.
On August 7 Klee wired the Foreign Ministry that
Cardinal Pacelli believed the interpretation contained
in the W.T.B. article was at least the "semi-official
announcement" of the Reich government, and this the Holy
19See could not accept. In an effort to resolve the 
issue, on the following day State Secretary Billow pro­
posed that the Reich government and the Vatican publish 
a joint official communique which in effect would inform 
their respective presses they had agreed discussion on 
the Concordat should cease. If a public interpretation
should become necessary, then this should be done with
20the agreement of both sides. Cardinal Pacelli opposed 
the publication of a joint communique for the time being.
1 8Memorandum by Menshausen, August 4, 19331 8115/ 
E579947-52.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 7, 1933i 
8II5/E579953-54.
^ ^ B ü l o w  to the E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See, A u g u s t  8,
1933, 3241/ D702278.
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however, largely because he felt it could be misinter­
preted by public opinion. He did indicate the Osservatore 
Romano would publish no further commentary on the Concor­
dat unless the German press initiated new discussions. If
additional articles did appear, the Holy See reserved the
21right to reply. About a week later Bülow informed the
Embassy the German government also wished to postpone the
publication of the communique. He also stated the German
press had been instructed once again to adhere to her pro-
22hibition against discussions of the Concordat.
By the latter part of August, the press commentar­
ies on the Concordat had ceased and the matter was no 
longer an issue of importance in Reich-Vatican relations. 
While neither side could be accredited with a clear-cut 
diplomatic victory, it should be noted the German govern­
ment did not dissociate itself from the W.T.B. reply as 
Cardinal Pacelli had requested. It is also interesting 
that during the entire controversy, both the government 
and Vatican appeared anxious to settle the matter quietly 
and peacefully, perhaps because the Concordat was still 
not ratified. The Vatican must have been especially eager 
to maintain cordial relations at this time as it chose to
Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 11, 1933i 
324:1/0702279-80. Cardinal Pacelli emphasized he had not 
consulted the Pope and was only expressing his personal 
views.
22Bülow to the Embassy to the Holy See, August 1?,
1933, 8115/E579966-67.
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remain silent when the government published a law in­
tended to improve the human race through eugenics--a 
law certain to offend Catholics.
On July 251 1933i the government made public 
the "Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased 
Offspring," or Sterilization Law. According to the 
provisions of the law, which would go into effect on
January 1, 1934, anyone afflicted with hereditary dis-
23ease could be rendered sterile by surgical means. On 
this issue Church doctrine was perfectly clear, for 
Pope Pius XI had reaffirmed the traditional Catholic 
position on sterilization as recently as December 31, 
1930. In his encyclical, Casti Connubii (On Christian 
Marriage), the Pope stated that public magistrates had 
"no direct power over the bodies of their subjects," 
and where no crime had taken place they could never 
"directly harm, or tamper with the integrity of the 
body, either for reasons of eugenics or for any other
2 3The list included hereditary imbecility, schizo­
phrenia, manic depression, hereditary epilepsy, Hunting­
ton chorea, hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, 
and extreme physical malformation. Individual cases 
were to be decided by a special "Hereditary Health 
Court" (Erbgesundheitsgericht), which was composed of a 
judge, a medical officer, and a medical practitioner.
A higher court (Erbgesundheitsobergericht), which had a 
similar composition and whose decision was final, re­
ceived appeals from the lower court. Franz Neumann, 
Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Social­
ism, 1933-1944, Harper Torchbooks (New York and Evanston: 
Harper & Row, I966), pp. 111-12; and Wheaton, p. 335-
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24reason." This law, however, concerned the all-important 
question o f  race, and Hitler was determined the Church 
would not stand in his way. Consequently, shortly after 
the Nazis assumed power the government began preparations 
for a law on sterilization. The bishops were not unaware 
of this, and at their Fulda conference in June they had 
before them a draft of a law providing for "voluntary" 
sterilization. As expected, they opposed the proposed 
legislation as a violation of traditional Catholic doc­
trine. Nevertheless, on July l4 the cabinet approved a 
law requiring "compulsory" sterilization. Because Hitler 
did not wish to jeopardize the negotiations on the Con­
cordat still in process, the Reich government postponed 
the publication of the law until July 25* But this in 
no way altered the fact that Hitler had delivered a back- 
stab to the Church at the very time he was promising to 
respect Catholic rights and morality. In view of the 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to assume the Vatican 
would have protested the law immediately, but there is 
no sign of such a protest in the German archives. Even 
the controversial articles which appeared in the Osserva­
tore Romano on July 26 and 2? failed to mention the newly
24Anne Fremantle, ed., The Papal Encyclicals in 
their Historical Context, A Mentor-Omega Book (New York; 
New American Library, 1963)1 P* 24l.
^^Wheaton, p. 3 3 5 i and Lewy, pp. 258-59»
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published law. Apparently, the Holy See was unwilling
at this time to jeopardize the cordial relations it had
thus far maintained with the new Hitler government by
registering a formal diplomatic protest.
During July and August the Reich and the Vatican
exchanged notes on a variety of other issues, but most
were of a routine or minor nature. A number of the notes
during this period pertained to changes in the text of
the Concordat, sometimes involving nothing more than
27changes in the punctuation. The forced resignation of 
Alfred Hugenberg on June 29 as Minister of Economics
28caused Cardinal Pacelli some concern. The reason is 
contained in Article Six of the Enabling Act, which 
stated that "if the present federal cabinet is replaced
29by another" the act would lose its validity. Because 
of this provision, Pacelli was apprehensive that Hugen­
berg' s resignation would leave the Hitler government
without the legal power to carry out the ratification
10of the Concordat. State Secretary Bülow soon put
The Vatican did bring the issue up during the 
early part of 1934, after the promulgation of the law.
See below, pp. I87-88.
2̂ See 8II5/E579927-3O, 8II5/E579972-73, 8115/
E579976, and 8II5/E57998O, dated August 7, I6 , 25, and 
31, respectively.
28Bullock, p. 251.
^^Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, I, 420-501. 
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 11, 19331
3241/D702279-8O.
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Pacelli's mind at ease by assuring the Cardinal the res­
ignation of Hugenberg in no way affected the Enabling
Act, which would be invalid only in the event the entire
31cabinet was dismissed.
During this same period Cardinal Pacelli informed 
Klee that various persons, including two foreign diplo­
mats, had asked if the Concordat contained a "secret" 
agreement. Pacelli stated one of the diplomats believed 
the secret agreement referred to a common Reich-Vatican 
front against Russia, while the other understood it dealt 
with military pastoral duties. The Cardinal, Klee wired
32Berlin, "displayed much concern" over this indiscretion.
A few days later, Pacelli also called Klee's attention to
comments on the secret annex in the press, and he cited
the August 12 edition of the Journal de Geneve as an ex- 
33ample. If anyone in the German government knew how the
leak occurred this information was certainly not passed
on to the Vatican. Billow's evasive reply stated only that
the German government placed "great value" on keeping the
3kannex of the Concordat secret.
31Billow to the Embassy to the Holy See, August 17, 
1933, 3241/D702282.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 11, 1933, 3241/0702279-80.
3 3Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August l6, 1933, 
3241/0702281.
34Billow to the E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See, A u g u s t  17,
1933, 8I I5/E579966-67.
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Also during August a minor disagreement occurred
over the place of the ratification. In late July the
German government suggested that since the signing of the
Concordat had taken place in Rome, the ratification should
take place in B e r l i n . T h e  Vatican pressed for Rome,
however, and on August 8 Bülow informed the German Embassy
the Reich government would be happy to accept Rome as the
37place of ratification. Upon receiving the news, Pacelli 
expressed his appreciation to Klee for this concession, 
and added he would like the ratification to take place
Q Obefore September 8, when he would leave on his vacation.
In September, as Pacelli and Klee began the final 
round of discussions prior to ratification, new obstacles 
appeared. On September 5 Pacelli informed Klee the Pope 
had received information a German newspaper had discussed 
the Concordat, despite the prohibitions of the government. 
Also, the Vatican had recently received reports from Ger­
many which spoke of disagreements over the execution of 
Articles Thirty-one and Thirty-two. In view of the situ­
ation, Pacelli suggested it would be better to postpone
^^Bülow to the Embassy to the Holy See, July 29, 
1933, 8115/E579942.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 7, 1933, 
8115/E579953-54.
37Bülow to the Embassy to the Holy See, August 8,
1933, 8II5/E579957-58.
^®Klee to the Foreign Ministry, August 11, 1933,
3 2 4 1/0 7 0 2 2 7 9-8 0 .
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the ratification. After inquiring as to the origin of
these disturbing reports, Klee expressed the opinion to
Pacelli the matter would not prevent ratification since
Article Thirty-three provided for the settlement of such
disagreements through future negotiations. The Cardinal,
Klee concluded, was "apparently under the influence of
39his discussion with the Pope."
On the following day Pacelli handed Klee a note 
regarding their conversation, which Klee immediately 
forwarded to the Foreign Ministry. The note, entitled 
a "Short Note on a Discussion on September 5» 1933," 
was surprisingly harsh in tone. Pacelli began by re­
ferring to "disquieting reports" which had reached him 
from various parts of Germany regarding actions taken 
against the Catholic clergy, the Catholic press, and 
Catholic organizations. Unfortunately, the Cardinal 
wrote, his anxieties concerning these reports had since 
been confirmed by subsequent reports:
The above-mentioned reports show that not only 
are there differences of opinion or uncertainties 
about the meaning of Concordat provisions . . .  
but that unquestionably the basic views diverge 
on essential points, and that, above all, the Con­
cordat has in practice been applied in a manner 
detrimental to the Catholic interests and contrary 
to the intention of the Holy See.
In these circumstances the Holy See considers 
it highly expedient, if not absolutely imperative, 
that a number of Concordat provisions be clarified
8I I5/E57998I.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, September 5, 1933,
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and their practical application assured even beforeratification.40
Pacelli continued by citing the specific points which 
should be given "special attention." These included 
Articles Fourteen, Thirty-one, and Thirty-two, with some 
additional changes to be made in the Final Protocol. In 
particular, Pacelli believed it "urgently desirable" to 
agree upon the list of Catholic organizations to be pro­
tected by Article Thirty-one before ratification. There 
must also be assurances that the Catholic organizations 
would not be prohibited from appearing in public and 
that the members would not suffer any "legal or economic 
discrimination on account of their membership." Already 
the Holy See had received reports that the recent decree 
of the Reich Youth Leader, which prohibited simultaneous 
membership in both the Catholic and National Socialist
youth organizations, discriminated against the Catholic
4lyouth associations. For professional and economic 
reasons, Pacelli continued, many Catholic youths believed 
they must belong to the latter. Because of the press
40Short Note on a Discussion on September 5i 1933i 
enclosed in Klee's note to the Foreign Ministry, Septem­
ber 6, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 4l8, pp. 782-85.
41Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach's order 
of July 30 is printed in The Persecution of the Catholic 
Church in the Third Reich; Facts and Docvunents Translated 
from the German (London; Burns, Oates, 19^0) , p"! 89. The 
author of this volume has long been anonymous, but it is 
now believed it was Father Walther Mariaux, a German Jesuit 
priest who resided at the Curia. See Deutsch, p. 123, and 
Lewy, p. 367, footnote 5»
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controversies carried on in connection with Article 
Thirty-two, it was urgent that the "concepts and spheres 
of activity of party politics, politics in general and 
public life be defined in relation to each other." In 
concluding, Pacelli stressed his remarks were not in­
tended to evade ratification; he wished only to "gain
time for reaching an amicable agreement on the sense
42and implementation of the Concordat."
On September 6 Cardinal Pacelli discussed the
ratification with Klee. Pacelli informed Klee the Pope
desired to have certain "mentioned points" cleared up
43before the ratification took place. Klee replied 
this would take some time, and since Pacelli intended 
to leave on his vacation, it would delay ratification. 
Klee also informed the Foreign Office he believed Pacelli 
would like an immediate ratification, despite the "appar­
ent uncooperative and critical position of the Pope." 
Pacelli expressed the opinion that ratification could 
take place as early as Saturday, September 9, provided 
the German government would issue a declaration indicat­
ing its willingness to begin discussions on unsettled
42Short Note on a Discussion on September 5 , 1933,
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 4l8, pp. 783-85.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, September 7, 1933,
8II5/E579998-99• Presumably, the "mentioned points" re­
ferred to were those contained in Pacelli's "Short Note 
on a Discussion on September 5, 1933," although Klee did 
not specifically indicate this in his note.
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kkprovisions of the Concordat as soon as possible. If
there was no other way, the Cardinal agreed to postpone
his vacation until Sunday. In order to maintain the
secrecy of the annex, Klee recommended that a special
diplomatic courier be delegated to carry the necessary
45documents by regular air service.
On the following day (September 8), Klee got in 
touch by telephone with Hermann Hüffer, a legation Coun­
selor in Department II of the Foreign Ministry. Hüffer 
suggested minor changes in the text of the proposed 
statement, which Klee asserted served only the purpose 
of pacifying the Pope. Klee immediately presented the 
proposed changes to Pacelli, who expressed the fear the 
Pope would not accept them. Klee again telephoned Berlin 
and informed Buttmann and Hüffer of Pacelli's concern. 
Both agreed to use the wording of the original statement 
proposed by the Vatican, but Hüffer stated it was opposed
^^8125/E581705-06 (undated). The last section of 
this declaration, which is printed in DGFP, C , Vol. I,
No. 419, p . 786, footnote 3, reads as follows: "The Ger­
man Government is prepared to enter into consultations as 
soon as possible on these and other Concordat matters 
which in the opinion of the Holy See need to be clarified 
and definitively settled immediately in order to bring 
about an understanding that is genuinely in harmony with 
the letter and the spirit of the Concordat and will en­
sure a fruitful cooperation of Church and State." Klee 
informed Pacelli he would only forward this last section 
to the Foreign Office since the other points mentioned in 
the declaration had been brought up in the "Short Note" 
of September 5* Pacelli at first objected to this pro­
cedure but soon agreed.
4ŝKlee to the Foreign Ministry, September 7, 19331
8II5/E57999B-99.
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by the Reich Ministry of Justice, Nevertheless, Klee was 
authorized to inform the Vatican "verbally" that the gov­
ernment agreed to the original declaration without the
46changes.
At eight o'clock on the evening of the same day, 
Cardinal Pacelli contacted Klee and informed him a verbal 
statement would not satisfy the Pope. Klee explained to 
Pacelli the lack of time had made it impossible to obtain 
the agreement of all the offices involved to the original 
declaration. Klee and Pacelli then sat down and worked 
out a statement which took into consideration the position 
of both the Holy See and the Reich government:
The German Government is prepared to enter into 
consultations as soon as possible on the Concordat 
matters set forth in the "Short Note on a Discussion 
on September 5» 1933j" delivered by His Eminence the 
Cardinal Secretary of State, as well as on all those 
Concordat matters which need to be clarified and 
definitively settled immediately in order to bring 
about an understanding that is genuinely in harmony 
with the letter and the spirit of the Concordat and 
that will ensure a fruitful cooperation of Church 
and State.4?
The statement was subject to the approval of the Pope and 
Reich government, which proved to be no major hurdle. On 
September 9 Pacelli informed Klee the Pope had agreed to 
the statement with the insertion of the word "likewise"
("gleichfalls") following the words " . . .  all those
^^Memorandum by Klee, September 8, 1933, 8125/
E581708-I2.
^?Me
Vol. I, No. 422, p. 789.
^ morandum by Klee, September 8, 1933, DGFP, C,
12k
48Concordat matters which . . . The government accepted
this insertion and thus removed the last obstacle to rati­
fication. On September 10, at 5:30 P.M., Cardinal Pacelli
and Klee exchanged the documents of ratification in the
49Vatican, and the Concordat went into effect.
Not surprisingly, there are some important questions 
on the ratification of the Concordat left unanswered by the 
German archives. For example, it would be most enlighten­
ing to know more about the precise role of the Pope during 
these proceedings, but the German documents provide only 
passing comments. Undoubtedly, the Vatican archives would 
be of great use here. The most intriguing question, how­
ever, pertains to the role of the Cardinal Secretary of 
State. Although Pacelli declared in his "Short Note" of 
September 5 it was "absolutely imperative" to clarify a 
number of issues before ratification,^^ he afterwards 
worked fervently for immediate ratification, even though 
the controversial issues had not been clarified. While 
it is true Pacelli was scheduled to leave on his vacation, 
it seems unlikely he would rush an event of such importance
48Ibid., footnote 4.
^^Klee to the Foreign Ministry, September 11, 1933i 
8II5/E58OOI6-I7 . The Pope signed the Concordat on Septem­
ber 9 « The ratification documents pertaining to the secret 
annex were not exchanged until November 2, 1933, this time 
between Pacelli and Ambassador Bergen. See 6153/E56O915-I6 
(October 10), 6153/E460918 (October I6), and 6153/E460928 
(November 2).
50 See above, pp. 119-20.
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for purely personal reasons. The most plausible answer
is Lewy's suggestion that Pacelli waived his earlier
demand for a settlement of the problems listed in his
"Short Note" primarily because the German Episcopate
wished a speedy ratification.^^ According to Lewy,
Pacelli consulted the Episcopate on the question of
whether ratification should precede a satisfactory so-
5 2lution of the most important problems. The bishops 
discussed the question at the second session of the 
Fulda conference, which took place between August 29 
and 31* On September 2 Cardinal Bertram answered 
Pacelli in the name of all the German bishops. Leaving 
no doubt as to the position of the Episcopate, Bertram 
proceeded to explain why "any delay in the ratification 
of the Concordat was not to be recommended." It was 
generally believed, he wrote, that Hitler had no inter­
est in the Concordat other than the increase in inter­
national prestige it would bring Germany. Also, many 
were of the opinion that the government had gone too 
far in making concessions to the Church. If the rati­
fication were postponed, Bertram continued, these 
voices would become louder, and this would cause un­
rest among Catholics. Not until after the Concordat 
was ratified would it be possible for the Church to 
proceed against the numerous anti-Catholic activities
^^Lewy, p. 89. ^ ^ I b i d . , p. 88.
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with determination. Any further delay would only weaken
53the position of the Episcopate.
It should be clearly understood that the members 
of the Episcopate did not press for immediate ratifica­
tion because they were unaware of those violations of the 
Concordat which had already occurred. As a matter of fact, 
in a visit with Counselor Hüffer of the Foreign Ministry 
on September 6, Cardinal Bertram specifically pointed out 
the attacks of the Hitler Youth on the Catholic youth or- 
ganizations. On the following day, in a formal protest 
to the Reich government, Bertram complained about the 
violations of Article Thirty-one, which, as far as could 
be seen, the government was doing nothing to prevent.
The Cardinal also let it be known he had obtained a thick 
pamphlet containing a list of violations against the Cath-
55olic youth organizations at the Fulda bishops' conference.
In the light of this information, it would seem the 
Episcopate might have recommended a postponement of the 
ratification until the difficulties had been cleared up, 
but such was not the case. The bishops were not being 
inconsistent; they simply believed the Concordat would
^^Müller, No. 8?, pp. 105-90.
^^Memorandum by Hüffer, September 6, 19331 8115/ 
E579994-96.
5 5B e r t r a m  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, S e p t e m b e r  7,
1933, 8I I5/ E57999I -93• M e n s h a u s e n  r e p l i e d  to B e r t r a m  on
S e p t e m b e r  I5 , 1933, 0 1 1 5 / E 5 7 9 9 9 4 - 9 6 .
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provide the means for the settlement of their disputes 
with the Reich government. Once this is understood it 
is not difficult to see why the bishops at Fulda favored 
immediate ratification, for they saw in the implementa­
tion of the Concordat the legal instrument by which the 
abuses committed against the Catholic Church might be 
corrected.
CHAPTER V
SEPTEMBER 11 - DECEMBER 31 : THE FIRST
APPLICATION OF THE CONCORDAT
To many observers, the quick ratification of the 
Concordat came as a surprise. According to Klee, the 
foreign correspondents were especially astonished since 
it was rumored the Reich government and the Vatican were 
unable to agree on its interpretation. Consequently, 
many believed the ratification would be postponed at 
least until Pacelli returned from his vacation. When 
the ratification did take place, Klee reported to Berlin 
the representatives of hostile states were "painfully 
surprised," and some members of the press refused to be­
lieve it at all. The French especially found the news 
unpleasant.̂
During this same period a new controversy emerged 
as a factor in Reich-Vatican relations--the Jewish ques­
tion. Despite the fact the Concordat did not specifi­
cally deal with this matter. Cardinal Pacelli raised the




question during the ratification proceedings by asking
Klee to accept a pro memoria on the dismissal of Catholic
2officials and Catholics of Jewish descent. In essence, 
Pacelli requested the government to treat the officials 
in both classifications the same and to reinstate those 
who had already been dismissed for political reasons.
Klee replied by informing Pacelli the appointment of 
officials was an "internal matter" which only the Reich 
government could decide. It was impossible to give 
Catholics of Jewish descent the same status as Catholics 
of Aryan descent because the "Jewish question was not a 
religious but a race problem." At this point Pacelli 
indicated it was the Pope who wished the pro memoria 
delivered, and although Klee promised he would take this 
into consideration, he still had to insist the pro memoria 
include a statement indicating the Holy See would not in­
terfere in the internal political affairs of Germany.
Also, Klee insisted that the sentence concerning equal 
status for Catholics of Jewish descent be deleted. Pacelli 
agreed to these demands and decided not to forward the pro
3memoria to the German government.
Later the same night Cardinal Pacelli delivered 
another note to Klee, stamped by the seal of the Papal
2Klee to the Foreign Ministry, September 12, 1933i 
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 425, p. 793.
^ I b i d . , pp. 793-94.
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Secretariat of State. The ''Notiz, " as it is referred to 
in the German archives, complied with both of Klee's de­
mands. The Holy See, the Notiz began, has "no intention 
of interfering in Germany's internal political affairs." 
The Holy See did have information, however, that a great 
many Catholic officials and employees had been dismissed 
because the government feared they were "nationally un­
reliable." If these recent steps taken were reviewed 
and as "far as possible rescinded or their harsh effects 
mitigated," it would "contribute immensely to the friendly 
understanding between the Holy See and Reich government." 
Also, the Holy See wished to "add a word in behalf of 
those German Catholics" who were descendants of Jews,
but who "for reasons known to the Reich government" also
4suffered from social and economic difficulties.
Although the German government did not bother to 
make a formal reply to the Notiz, Klee did respond to 
the comments on the Jewish question in a detailed note 
which he handed Under-Secretary of State Pizzardo on 
September l4.^ Basing his information on material pre­
viously sent to the Embassy, Klee explained in his note 
why the Jews represented a "danger to the German race and 
culture." The "rootlessness" of the Jews, Klee contended.
^Enclosed in ibid.
^Pacelli left on his vacation shortly after the 
ratification of the Concordat.
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had proved to be a source of danger in all areas of 
German spiritual life. The Catholic Church itself has 
long recognized this danger, Klee continued, and as an 
example he referred to a decree passed in 1593 at the 
General Assembly of the Jesuits which excluded the 
descendents of Jewish families from the order.^ While 
the Church had since moderated this decree, it had never­
theless retained it throughout the centuries. It ex­
ceeded in severity the measures taken against the Jews 
in Germany, and therefore showed plainly how justified 
the anxieties of the Reich government were in maintaining
7the racial purity of the German people.
Despite the confidential nature of this subject, 
the British and French press announced on September 10 
and 11 the Vatican had brought up the Jewish question. 
Ambassador Bergen, who had recently returned from his 
vacation, pointed out to Pizzardo on September l6 that 
this "indiscretion" could seriously hinder the smooth 
progress of the forthcoming discussions on the
The fifty-second decree of this assembly ruled 
that applicants of Jewish or Moorish origin could not be 
admitted to the Society of Jesus. Even those Jews and 
Moors who were already members had to be expelled if the 
error was discovered prior to their profession. Thomas J. 
Campbell, The Jesuits, 1534-1921: A History of the So­
ciety of Jesus from its Foundation to the Present Time 
(2 vols.; New York; Encyclopedia Press, 1921), I , 211.
^Klee to the F o r e i g n  M i nistry, S e p tember l 4 , 1933,
8I I 5/ E 58O O 32-34. K l e e  a s k e d  the F o r e i g n  Office to i n f o r m
the M i n i s t r y  of I n t e r i o r  of this matter.
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implementation of the Concordat. Pizzardo replied it was 
impossible that such indiscretions could have occurred 
from within the State Secretariat as only a few persons 
had knowledge of the matter. Nevertheless, the French 
Le Temps hinted the information had come from Vatican 
authorities. Bergen surmised it came from a prelate in 
the press information services whose views were of a
gpurely private character.
On September 21 Ministerialdirektor Kdpke of the 
Foreign Office forwarded a copy of the Notiz to the Reich 
Ministry of Interior. At the same time he requested the 
Ministry's views on the advisability of answering the
QNotiz. About two weeks later State Secretary Hans 
Pfundtner informed the Foreign Office a reply to the 
Notiz did not appear to be necessary. He justified this 
decision on the premise the dismissal of civil service 
employees who offered no assurance they would give "un­
reserved support" to the State had no relation to confes­
sional q uestion s . T h u s ,  the Ministry of Interior sup­
ported Klee in judging the Jewish question to be one 
concerning race rather than religion. Apparently the
gBergen to the Foreign Ministry, September l6, 
1933, 8II5/E58OO3I. See also, 8ll5/E5800l4-15.
gKOpke to the Ministry of Interior, September 21,
1933, 8II5/E58OO37-39.
^^Pfundtner to the Foreign Ministry, October 4, 
1933, 8II5/E58OO56.
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Foreign Office accepted this decision as KOpke later 
informed the German Embassy it would not be necessary 
to reply to the Notiz.
During the later part of September, the Reich 
Ministry of Interior made an effort to initiate the 
negotiations on the implementation of the Concordat as 
had been agreed upon at the time of ratification. Butt­
mann informed Menshausen he had even managed to make an
appointment to see Pacelli at Rorschach, where the Car-
12dinal was vacationing. Due to the Pope's intervention, 
however, Buttmann's efforts proved unsuccessful. On Sep­
tember 21 Pizzardo informed Ambassador Bergen the Pope 
wished Cardinal Pacelli to recuperate from his recent 
exhausting activities, and it would therefore be impos­
sible for the negotiations to take place at Rorschach. 
When Bergen asked if the negotiations could take place 
at the end of Pacelli's vacation, Pizzardo was evasive. 
Bergen saw proof in these events that the Pope, as in
recent times, wished to follow the negotiations closely
13to enable him to intervene directly at any time.
Despite these attempts by the Ministry of Interior 
to initiate discussions, there is no other evidence to
^^Ktipke to the Embassy to the Holy See, October l6,
1933, 8II5/E580O59.
^^Menshausen to Bergen, September I8, 1933, 8115/ 
E58OO23-24.
13Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, September 21,
1933, 8II5/E58OO40.
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indicate the Reich government sincerely wished to bring 
about a settlement of the differences over the Concordat.
As a matter of fact, during the fall of 1933 there was an 
intensification of the campaign against the Catholic Church 
as the process of Gleichschaltung picked up momentum on all 
fronts. On October 2, the papal nuncio in Munich, Monsi- 
gnor Vassallo di Torregrossa, complained to the Chief of 
the Bavarian State Chancellory, Staatsminister Hermann 
Esser, about the increased pressure applied by the Bavarian 
political police against the Catholic associations and trade
l4unions. Ministerialdirektor Buttmann informed Menshausen 
these violations of the Concordat would continue in certain 
regions because they were provoked by the Lender govern­
ments, especially those relating to Article Thirty-one.
On September 22 the cabinet approved a law for the 
establishment of the Reich Cultural Chamber, which placed 
the cinema, press, radio, theater, literary production, 
music, and fine arts under the control of Goebbels' Propa­
ganda Ministry. This was followed on October 4 by the 
promulgation of the "Law Concerning Editors" (Schrift- 
leitergesetz), which strengthened and legalized the already
l4Dieter Albrecht, ed., Der Notenwechsel zwischen 
dem Heiligen Stuhl und der deutschen Reichsregierung; Vom 
der Ratifizierung des Reichskonkordats bis zur Enzyklika 
"Mit brennender Sorge" (Mainz : Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag,
1965) , No. 1, pp. 1-2.
F^^Menshausen to Bergen, October 2, 1933, 8125/ 
E581723-24.
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tight controls on the press. Henceforth, editors had to 
be German citizens of Aryan descent, they must possess 
the ability to influence public opinion, and they would 
be prohibited from publishing anything potentially damag­
ing to the Reich from any point of view. The decision as 
to whether a particular editor met these requirements 
rested with the "National Chamber of the Press" (Reich- 
spressekammer), headed by Max Amann but subject to the 
control of Goebbels. This measure was strengthened by 
another decree promulgated on November 1, which prevented 
escape from the rigid inspection of the Reich Cultural 
Chamber by requiring all persons connected in any way 
with the output of cultural material to belong to the 
particular chamber concerned with their field of activity. 
Such laws spelled the loss of jobs for hundreds of jour­
nalists, and the number of magazines published dropped 
from around 4700 in 1932 to )100 by 193^*^^
Tension also increased as the result of a speech 
delivered on October 5 by Reich Youth Leader Baldur von 
Schirach, who was known as a zealous disciple of Rosen­
berg. Schirach stated he saw the deepest significance 
in the fact the Nazi movement vanquished the confessional 
consciousness and put national conviction in the place of
Wheaton, pp. 377-79; Lewy, pp. 13^-35; and Karl 
Aloys Altmeyer, ed., Katholische Presse unter NS-Diktatur, 
Die katholischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften Deutschlands 
in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945î Dokumentation (Berlin: 
Morus-Verlag, 1962), pp. 31-32.
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religious conviction. The German youth no longer
thought in terms of confessions but longed for unity,
and Schirach declared he took great pride in the fact
17he himself did not belong to a confession.
These events naturally increased the apprehen­
sion of the German Episcopate, and this in turn prompted 
Ambassador Bergen to express his concern over the latest 
Nazi excesses. In a note to the Foreign Ministry on 
October 12, Bergen admitted the bishops were striving 
to cooperate with the new State, but declared their 
attitude toward the execution of the Concordat was 
changing because of recent unpleasant experiences.
They now believed, Bergen continued, the Church made 
too many concessions regarding Article Thirty-one, and 
that the present text of this article did not provide 
sufficient protection for clerical demands. For this 
reason the bishops considered the practical formulation 
of Article Thirty-one to be extremely important. They 
had hoped an improvement of the text would take place 
between the signing of the Concordat and the ratifica­
tion, but for a number of reasons this had not occurred. 
The bishops still did not doubt the sincerity of the 
government in carrying out the provisions of the
17Shirach's speech is summarized in Charles Sted- 
man Macfarland. The New Church and the New Germany; A 
Study of Church and State (New York; Macmillan Company,
1934), p. Ô8 .
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Concordat, however, and attributed to subordinate offi­
cials the responsibility for the disturbances in the 
18provinces.
Two days later Bergen again wrote the Foreign Of­
fice, this time concerning a matter of considerable impor­
tance. Cardinal Pacelli, Bergen reported, declared the 
Pope had instructed him to lodge a "strong protest against 
the violations of the Concordat and oppression of the 
Catholics," which were increasing steadily despite the 
solemn promises of the Germans. Furthermore, Bergen con­
tinued, the Pope was planning to emerge from his silence, 
which the faithful had found incomprehensible, and speak 
out publicly against the objectionable events in Germany.
A note of protest had already been drafted, Bergen as­
serted, although he had warned Pacelli against carrying 
out steps which could not be justified in view of the 
"cooperative measures of the Reich Government." Such 
action would have "incalculable consequences," and Bergen 
further advised the Cardinal Secretary of State to take 
up the negotiations on the Concordat with Ministerial­
direktor Buttmann. In reply, Pacelli informed Bergen he 
doubted if he could dissuade the "deeply annoyed" Pope
19from carrying out the protest, but he was ready to try.
1 ftBergen to the Foreign Ministry, October 12, 1933i 
8II5/E58OO7I-78.
^ ^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  M i n istry, O c t o b e r  l 4 , 1933,
DGFP, C, Vol. I, No. 501, pp. 927- 28.
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Obviously, Cardinal Pacelli was a more amiable 
man for the Reich government to deal with than the Pope. 
Bergen made this point perfectly clear in a note to the 
Foreign Office on October l6. The "inflexibility and 
unpredictability" of the Pope, Bergen declared, often 
created "serious obstacles" which even the influential 
and politically realistic Cardinal Secretary of State 
could not counter. This obstacle became apparent at the 
time of the ratification, and it was now assuming "dis­
turbing proportions." As promised, Cardinal Pacelli 
discussed the protest with the Pope. Despite all the 
new arguments which were introduced, the Pope still 
considered it necessary to make the protest, and he 
even expressed the desire it should be sharply worded. 
Pacelli was preparing to carry out the Pope's instruc­
tions, Bergen continued, but decided to discuss the matter 
with the Pope again under the pressure of "our new and 
serious arguments." The Cardinal had repeatedly ex­
pressed his willingness to receive Ministerialdirektor 
Buttmann at any time for the initiation of talks on the 
implementation of the Concordat. Nevertheless, Bergen 
informed Pacelli he would not propose sending Buttmann 
to Rome as long as the "threat of protest persisted."
The lodging of such a protest, Bergen maintained, would 
"greatly impede and perhaps make impossible the commence­
ment of negotiations," and the Pope's rebuke of the Reich
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government in an allocution was "bound to entail serious
II20consequences."
On the following day Bergen again talked to Car­
dinal Pacelli in another attempt to find a solution 
which would satisfy the Pope and avoid the threatening 
conflict. Bergen described the talk as a "friendly con­
versation" of a "purely private nature." He proposed 
that Pacelli again explain to the Pope his "serious ob­
jections" to a protest note as the resulting delay and 
public criticism would inevitably produce a severe en­
counter. Bergen also proposed the commencement of nego­
tiations as soon as possible, and for this reason would 
ask the Reich government to send Buttmann to Rome at 
once. Upon his arrival, Cardinal Pacelli could then 
present Buttmann with a memorandum concerning the griev­
ances of the Holy See, rather than a note of protest. 
Bergen also suggested Buttmann conduct the negotiations 
"without haste" in order to avert a serious conflict with
20Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, October l6, 1933i 
DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 3-5. Bergen added that the 
frequent audiences of the German bishops, who regularly 
unburdened their grievances, had contributed to the re­
cent "unpleasant remarks and annoyance of the Pope."
Also, Bergen expressed the opinion there was strong 
pressure from Vienna for the Pope to make a public dec­
laration against the Nazi government. The reason: if
the Pope assumed a friendly attitude toward Germany in 
the face of Nazi violations of the Concordat, it would 
bewilder the faithful in Austria. Two days later Bergen 
informed the Foreign Ministry the visits of the Austrian 
bishops to Rome were having a "disturbing effect" on the 
Pope (October l8, 1933, 324l/D?02298).
i4o
the Vatican. A conflict could be permanently avoided,
however, only if the Reich government complied with the
wishes of the Curia insofar as they were justified and
gave "binding assurances" for the "effective implementa-
21tion of its promises."
As Bergen had requested, the Reich government 
wasted little time in deciding Buttmann should travel 
to Rome to begin the negotiations. On October l8 For­
eign Minister Neurath wired the German Embassy the matter 
had been discussed with Hitler, and Buttmann would leave 
during the course of the week. Furthermore, he would be
supplied with the necessary instructions and granted
22"full authority." On the following day Hitler dis­
cussed the forthcoming negotiations with Buttmann and 
Neurath and presented Buttmann with personal instructions 
for his trip.^^
21Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, October 17,
1933, DGFP, C , Vol. II, No. 6, pp. 8-9. In the last 
paragraph Bergen stated he was attempting to calm the 
German bishops in Rome, and had advised them to present 
their complaints to the "leading authorities" in Germany, 
"who would not neglect to take remedial action, if 
required."
22Neurath to the Embassy to the Holy See, Octo­
ber 18, 1933, 8II5/E58OO9I.
^^October 19, 1933, 8II5/E58OO94 (the signature 
on this note is illegible). Unfortunately, the note says 
nothing as to the nature of Hitler's instructions. On 
the following day Menshausen informed Klee of these events 
and that Buttmann would arrive in Rome on Sunday evening, 
October 22. Memorandum by Menshausen, October 20, 1933,
8II5/E58OO95.
I4l
On October 19 Cardinal Pacelli wrote Bergen the 
Holy See was prepared to begin the negotiations imme­
diately after Buttmann's arrival in Rome. In connection 
with Buttmann's mission, Pacelli requested the Ambassador 
to present Buttmann, in his capacity as "Plenipotentiary 
Extraordinary" for the Reich government, with the enclosed 
pro memoria. In presenting the pro memoria, Pacelli con­
tinued, the Holy See in no way wished to touch upon the 
"purely political sphere," but it was forced to take this 
step because of the "difficulties and persecutions" en­
dured by the Catholic Church in Germany and which had 
been carried to a "virtually intolerable degree." The
Cardinal concluded by expressing the hope the forthcoming
24talks would lead to a settlement of the difficulties.
The enclosed pro memoria, signed by the "Secre­
tariat of State of His Holiness," set forth the condi­
tions in Germany which were in violation of the Concordat. 
The language used is strong, which is an indication the 
Pope may have played an important role in its formulation. 
The pro memoria opens by reminding the Reich government 
the Holy See had on several occasions called attention to 
the violations of the Concordat, even before ratification. 
Since these violations had continued, the Holy See was of 
the opinion it must speak out on the "flagrant acts of
24Pacelli to Bergen, October 19, 1933, DGFP, C, 
Vol. II, No. 17, pp. 23-24.
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unlawfulness and violence in Germany." These incidents 
had not only violated the rights of the Catholic religion 
protected by the Concordat, but had created a situation 
which differed from the tragic Kulturkampf only by its 
"greater harshness and despotism." The Holy See had 
reason to presume the Reich government was well informed 
on the continued "acts of interference with Catholics." 
While a detailed discussion of these acts could wait 
until the forthcoming negotiations, the main issues were 
as follows: (l) the repression of the Catholic organiza­
tions; (2) the curbing of the Catholic press; (3) the 
dismissal of Catholic civil servants; (4) the desecra­
tion of the Sabbath; (5) the violations of the rights of 
Catholic students of theology; (6) the sequestration of 
Church property and Church endowments; (?) the threat to 
the Catholic confessional schools; (8) the compulsory 
courses on the ideology of National Socialism, which all 
public servants must attend in certain parts of the Reich; 
and (9) the Sterilization Law. In concluding, the pro 
memoria called for a prompt and effective halt to these 
encroachments, which were "ascribable to subordinate but 
powerful authorities." While the Holy See had thus far 
observed self-restraint, it would eventually have to 
speak out if these violations continued:
If the convincing language of facts should not soon 
be able to demonstrate to the Catholic world that 
the legitimate demands of the Catholic Church have
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been fulfilled, the Holy See will have no other 
course but to make known, in such manner as it 
may deem appropriate, what it has done in the 
interest of peace, justice, and freedom and to 
make it clear that the offenses against justice 
and the freedom of the Church and its followers 
in Germany, which have not been corrected de­
spite all the efforts of the Holy See, cannot 
hope through the palliating silence of the su­
preme authority of the Church to escape just 
censure.25
On October 22 Buttmann arrived in Rome as sched­
uled, and shortly afterwards he received a copy of the 
pro memoria. The negotiations began the following day, 
with Archbishop Grtiber of Freiburg also present. During 
the course of the discussions Pacelli informed Bergen 
privately he feared the outcome would not be good.
Bergen reported he was able to calm the Cardinal only 
by telling him Buttmann would return to Rome to continue 
the negotiations if they should prove to be unsuccessful.^^ 
The discussions ended inconclusively on October 28, and 
the next day Buttmann left for Berlin where he reported
directly to the Reich Chancellor on the results of his 
27mission.
On October 28 Pacelli sent Buttmann a memorandum 
setting forth both the agreements reached and the questions
25Pacelli's pro memoria is enclosed in ibid., pp. 
24-30. Printed also in Albrecht, No. 2, pp. 9-l4•
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, October 28, 1933i 
3241/0702300.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, October 28, 1933i 
8II5/E58OIO2. Bergen reported on the same day the final 
talks proceeded satisfactorily (8II5/E58OIO3). See also 
Deuerlein, pp. 137-38.
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still unresolved. A large portion of the memorandum con­
cerns the controversial Article Thirty-one. While it had 
been agreed that Catholic organizations protected by this 
article should have complete autonomy, the Reich govern­
ment was provided with a loophole by being granted the 
right to intervene in the event the Catholic organiza­
tions failed to carry out their duties to the State. The 
government did concede the right of Catholic organizations 
to have their own possessions, banners, and uniforms. The 
Reich and the Vatican also agreed, in contradiction to
28Reich Youth Leader Schirach’s order of July 30, to per­
mit simultaneous membership in State and Catholic organi­
zations. If carried out this represented an important 
concession to the Church, because it was rumored at the 
time the Hitler Youth would be established as an official 
state organization with compulsory membership for all
29German Youths. None of the concessions made to the 
Church, however, were of any real value until the Reich 
government and the Vatican agreed upon the specific Catho­
lic organizations which would receive protection under 
Article Thirty-one. Since Pacelli and Buttmann failed to 
reach a settlement on this critical issue, Article Thirty- 
one could still not go into effect. They decided only 
that the Reich government should present its list of pro­
posed organizations with the greatest possible speed.
28 29See above, p. 120. Lewy, p. 11?.
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Discussions on Article Thirty-two also took place, during 
which Buttmann emphasized and Pacelli agreed that all 
members of the clergy must be excluded from active polit­
ical life.^^
The results of the negotiations gave little cause 
for optimism, and they certainly did nothing to improve 
the mood of the Pope. In his welcoming speech to a pil­
grimage of the German Catholic Young Men's Association on 
October 2?, the Pope expressed fear for the youth and 
religion in Germany:
German Catholic Youth! German--Catholic--Youth: 
three words and each one of them a reason for a 
specially hearty welcome. You feel that it is so, 
especially at this time, in this hour which is so 
historic for Germany, and not merely so historic, 
but so hard. You understand Us. By temperament 
and desire We are optimistic. And so, difficult 
and hard as this hour undoubtedly is. We are con­
strained to say that great hopes are reposed in 
you. . . . But beloved sons, our hopes cannot ex­
clude every danger. You know that We are filled 
with the deepest anxiety and real alarm about the 
youth of Germany, and entertain fears with regard 
to religion in Germany.31
Ambassador Bergen regarded the language used by the Pope
as quite strong, and he reported to the Foreign Office
that he planned to tell Pacelli he had not expected such
an address after the recent discussions. Nevertheless,
30Text Concerning the Execution of the Concordat 
which Pacelli Delivered to Buttmann on October 28, 1933» 
enclosed in Buttmann's note to Neurath, December 1, 1933, 
8II5/E58OI3I-42. See also Albrecht, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 
14-18.
31Quoted in The Persecution of the Catholic Church 
in the Third Reich, p. 2.
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Bergen felt the Reich government should wait until after
32the election campaign before making any kind of rebuttal.
In the early part of November, events in Germany 
centered around the forthcoming plebiscite, which had been 
prompted by Hitler's announcement on October l4 that Ger­
many was withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference and
33the League of Nations. This action had been necessary.
Hitler claimed, by the refusal to grant Germany equality
of rights, which was the "indispensable moral and material
condition" for Germany's participation in international
34institutions and treaties. While this move proved to 
be one of Hitler's first and most successful gambles in 
foreign policy, he wished to have it blessed by a vote of 
confidence from the German people. Hence, on November 12, 
a national plebiscite was scheduled, to be combined with 
the election of a new Reichstag.
Catholics, like the majority of Germans, seemed to 
approve of Hitler's decision. In some instances Catholics 
even used the occasion to send pledges of support to the
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, October 30, 1933, 
3241/D702301.
3 3See the "Proclamation of the German Government 
to the German Nation, October l4, 1933," printed in DGFP, 
C, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1-2; and Hitler's Reden und Prok- 
lamationen. I, 307-8.
^^DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1-2. The refusal 
of the French to disarm was undoubtedly a factor in 
bringing Hitler to take this step. Bullock, p. 294.
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35Reich Chancellor. Catholic enthusiasm was dampened, 
however, by the sobering fact this action flagrantly 
disregarded international treaty obligations. If Hitler 
could regard one treaty so lightly, how could he be ex­
pected to carry out the terms of the Concordat? In view 
of the numerous violations of the Concordat which had 
already occurred, this question was a matter of grave 
concern for Catholics. The bishops were aware of the 
problem posed by the plebiscite of November 12, and some 
found it difficult or impossible to give unqualified sup­
port to the Hitler government. The Nazis fully realized
the importance of the vote, and they applied considerable
36pressure on individual bishops to support their cause.
Eventually, most bishops did issue public pro­
nouncements on the elections and plebiscite, but it was 
not always the unqualified statement of support the gov­
ernment had desired. Some bishops, such as the always 
cooperative Archbishop Grdber, asserted that Germany’s 
demand for equal rights was in consonance with "national
honor as well as with the Christian law of morality and
37international law." Other bishops, however, attached
35gee Müller, No. 100, p. 212, and No. 109, p. 220.
^^Lewy, pp. 177-78.
37Cited by Lewy, p. 179* In the early years of the 
Hitler government, Grdber was so closely attached to the 
Nazi movement he was sometimes sarcastically referred to 
as "the brown bishop." It should be added, however, that
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reservations to their call for an affirmative vote. As 
an illustration, in their November 8 declaration the 
Bavarian bishops in effect asked for a positive vote, 
but at the same time they indicated their disapproval 
of certain recent events:
Chancellor Adolf Hitler had called the German 
people to vote on November 12 in order to prove 
the peaceful intentions of the German people.
. . . The German bishops, who have consistently
supported peace among the nations in sermons and 
pastoral letters, welcome this public avowal of 
peace. Because of their patriotic and Christian 
spirit. Catholics will cast their vote for peace 
among nations, for honor, and for equality of 
rights among the German people.
The voting on November 12 does not ask us 
whether we approve of all those events and decrees 
of the past months, which fill us with sorrow and 
anxiety, nor whether we approve of the measures 
taken against the Catholic organizations in Bavaria 
and the desecration of the Sabbath. We bishops be­
lieve the Reich Concordat will also be carried out 
in regard to the protection of religion and public 
morality, the consecration of Sunday, the confes­
sional schools, the freedom and autonomy of the 
Catholic organizations, and that the stresses on 
the Catholic conscience will cease and the equal­
ity of rights of Catholics before the law and the 
State be recognized.38
In regard to the elections to the new Reichstag, the bish­
ops declared this was a question of party politics, which 
the voters would have to decide for themselves.
the Archbishop showed increasing opposition to the Nazis 
in later years, at a time when the risk was greater. See 
Gordon C. Zahn, German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A
Study in Social Control (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962),
chap. ix. Zahn discusses Grüber's role as a resistance 
figure in the Catholic hierarchy.
^^Müller, No. 107, p. 219.
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Despite the mildness of the criticism, the Nazis 
prohibited both the reading of the declaration from the 
pulpit and its publication in the press. Furthermore, on 
the eve of the plebiscite and almost certain victory for 
the Nazis, the Bavarian radio publicized the first para­
graph of the declaration only, which made it appear the
bishops had pledged their unqualified support to the Hitler 
39government. In the light of the overwhelming victory of
40the Nazis at the polls, these steps were hardly necessary.
The Vatican's reaction to the plebiscite and elec­
tions was not long delayed. On November 25 Cardinal Pacelli 
sent a note to Otto Freiherr von Ritter, the Bavarian am­
bassador to the Holy See, with the request it be forwarded 
to the German government. Pacelli declared bluntly the 
Vatican found no evidence the Bavarian Episcopate had ex­
ceeded its authority during the recent plebiscite. If the 
Episcopate had given no hints to the voters, Pacelli con­
tinued, the world would have gained the impression the 
Bavarian bishops did not dare to express themselves. With 
much regret, the Holy See found the Nazi ban on the publi­
cation of the bishops' declaration to be a violation of
^^Lewy, p. l8l.
^^On the plebiscite, 96.3 per cent of the eligible 
voters went to the polls and 95•! per cent voted in ap­
proval of Hitler's action. In the elections to the Reich­
stag, 92.2 per cent voted for the Nazi slate, the only 
party allowed. Wheaton, p. 385•
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Article Four of the Concordat. The Holy See was also
surprised to learn the Bavarian government had published
a shortened and censured version of the declaration, which
4ldistorted the whole meaning of the announcement.
Ritter replied to Pacelli's note on December l4.
The Bavarian government, he began, had received the note 
of November 25 with regret. It could explain some of the 
statements contained in the note only by attributing them 
to the mistaken judgments of the Cardinal Secretary of 
State. The Bavarian government knew of no instances 
where it used pressure as Pacelli had charged. Also, 
the Bavarian government denied the accusation it had pro­
hibited the reading of the declaration from the pulpit.
The bishops were not allowed, however, to publish the
42declaration in the official press.
Obviously, Reich-Vatican relations were taking a 
turn for the worse. In November, more tension developed 
as a result of the failure of the German government to 
resume the negotiations on the execution of the Concordat
Pacelli to Ritter, November 25, 1933, 6153/ 
E460949-54. Printed also in Albrecht, No. 6, pp. 19-23. 
The mention of a "censured" version apparently refers to 
the publicity given to the first paragraph of the declara­
tion on the Bavarian radio.
Cardinal Faulhaber, in a letter directed to the 
Bavarian State Chancellery on November l8, also protested 
the curbs imposed by the government authorities. See 
Müller, No. 112, pp. 221-24.
42Ritter to Pacelli, December l4, 1933, 6153/ 
E460978-85. Printed also in Albrecht, No. 10, pp. 29-33*
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as soon as expected. Cardinal Pacelli was quite con­
cerned over the delay but could obtain no definite answer
from Bergen when be inquired as to the date Buttmann in-
43tended to renew the talks. Also, Pacelli regarded the 
absence of any word from Buttmann, wbicb bad been expected 
since the first of November, as "lacking in courtesy." 
"Contrary to my repeated assurances," Bergen reported, 
Pacelli interpreted this to mean the Reicb government no 
longer intended to resume the negotiations or to consider
44the numerous grievances of the Curia.
Bergen as well as Pacelli was disturbed over the
delay in the renewal of the negotiations. In a note to
Mensbausen at the end of November, Bergen stated be could
not understand why Buttmann bad not written Pacelli, and
be suggested the matter be referred to Vice-Chancellor 
45Papen. Bergen's concern over the matter is understand­
able as it was bis sincere wish to settle the differences 
between the Reicb and the Holy See. In bis own mind at
43̂Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, November 23,
1933, 8115/E58OII6 .
44Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 3,
1933, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 98, pp. 172-73. Bergen re­
quested the Foreign Ministry to ask Buttmann to communi­
cate with Pacelli, at least to explain bis silence and 
bis willingness to continue the negotiations as soon as 
it was feasible. Bergen added the Cardinal bad found 
Buttmann quite acceptable as a partner in the negotiations
[Bergen] to Me n s b a u s e n ,  N o v e m b e r  29, 1933, 8125/
E581747.
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least, he was succeeding rather well at this task. In 
the same note to Menshausen, Bergen declared his efforts 
in preventing a conflict had been successful because of 
his friendly relations with Cardinal Pacelli. He ad­
mitted, however, that these efforts would eventually fail 
if the Reich government did not adhere to the obligations 
of the Concordat.
While Bergen probably exaggerated his role as the 
peacemaker in Reich-Vatican affairs, there were occasions 
when his efforts to prevent new disputes from erupting 
may very well have been decisive. One such occasion per­
tained to the proposed transfer of Bishop Nicolaus Bares 
of Hildesheim to the Episcopal See of Berlin. The diffi­
culty arose when the arrogant and radical Ministerial-
direktor of the Prussian Ministry of Ecclesiastical Af-
47fairs, August JMger, expressed objections to the pro­
posed transfer of Bares. The reason, JMger confidentially 
informed the Foreign Office, was the bishop's indisputable 
opposition to National Socialism. In JMger's opinion, the 
important Episcopal See of Berlin required a person whose 
loyalty to the new government could not be questioned. 
Therefore, as long as the Foreign Office concurred the 
Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs intended to reject his 
appointment. In order to determine its own position, the
^^Ibid.
47 ,See the description of JMger in Wheaton, p. 324.
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Foreign Office asked Bergen for his opinion. Bergen re­
plied the rejection of Bares as Bishop of Berlin might 
easily lead to difficulties with the Vatican, as the Curia 
considered Bares to be a strictly ecclesiastical bishop 
who was not inclined to get involved in politics. At 
Neurath's request, Menshausen informed JMger of Bergen's 
statement and of the need to avoid controversies with the 
Vatican, which the Reich Chancellor also wished. JMger 
reluctantly accepted these arguments, and the Reich gov-
48ernment made no formal protest of Bares's transfer.
On the first day of December, Bergen reported to 
the Foreign Office he had obtained confidential informa­
tion from an Italian prelate with good connections in the 
Vatican and who had proven to be well-informed in the past. 
According to his informant, the Vatican viewed the suppres­
sion of the Bavarian bishops' declaration on the November 
plebiscite as an "intentionally hostile act" against the 
Catholic religion. The Vatican was especially concerned 
with the report police officers had approached officiating 
priests during the service in order to prevent the reading
48Memorandum by Menshausen, November 24, 1933» DGFP,
C , Vol. II, No. 85, pp. I5O-5I and 151» footnote 5 « GMring, 
acting in his capacity as Minister-President of Prussia, 
did oppose the transfer of Bares to Berlin, The Foreign 
Office brought the matter to the attention of Hitler, with 
the recommendation that no objection be made. Hitler 
later indicated he had no objection to Bares provided an 
understanding with Prussia could be reached. See below,
p. 163.
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of the declaration. The Vatican wished to know the mean­
ing of these hostile measures, and if Germany intended to 
treat the Concordat as nothing more than a "piece of paper." 
These opinions, Bergen continued, the Vatican had kept com­
pletely secret, although it had received numerous inquiries 
about the position of Catholics in Germany, especially from 
France, Britain, and the United States. Nevertheless, the 
Vatican replied only that certain difficulties had arisen
regarding the execution of the Concordat which gave cause 
49for concern.
On the same day, December 1, Bergen summarized Vati­
can opinion on the religious situation in Germany in a note 
to Foreign Minister Neurath. Again obtaining his informa­
tion from a confidential source, Bergen informed Neurath 
there was talk in the Papal Secretariat of organizing the 
Catholic world press against Germany during the Christmas 
holidays. Although the highest Vatican authorities felt 
no animosity toward the Fuehrer and his government, they 
were annoyed by the fact that except for Italy, only the 
Vatican recognized the National Socialist government as a 
partner. Even against the urgent warning of the other 
major powers, Bergen continued, the Vatican had acted in 
a most cooperative manner toward Germany. In recent weeks, 
however, the Vatican had become increasingly apprehensive
49B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, D e c e m b e r  1, 1 9 3 3 i
K2255/K621882-84.
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over the permanence of the Reich government's intention 
to adhere to the Concordat. In addition to these anxie­
ties, Pope Pius was uneasy over the ideological direction 
of Germany, which had deposed the Old Testament, purged 
the New Testament, and replaced the biblical Christ with 
a new "heroic Aryan Christ-type." In this movement the 
Pope saw a danger for faith and morality which he could 
not ignore. The Pope also missed a "public" disavowment 
of Rosenberg's Myth by the Reich Chancellor, even though 
Hitler had repeatedly stated the ideas expressed in this 
book represented only the personal opinions of the author. 
In concluding, Bergen suggested a person high in the Reich 
government should make a statement emphasizing the firm 
Christian principles upon which the Third Reich was 
founded. This should help prevent the Pope from making 
a public declaration on the dangerous ideology which pre­
vailed in Germany.
The growing impatience of Vatican authorities with 
the religious developments in Germany was clearly indicated
Bergen to Neurath, December 1, 1933, 6153/E460939- 
44. A few days later Bergen wrote the Foreign Ministry he 
felt the disagreements, which had been created by misunder­
standing, could be cleared up if the Reich Chancellor would 
only engage some of the high ranking but "positive minded" 
members of the German Episcopate in an open discussion.
For this purpose Bergen suggested Cardinal Schulte of 
Cologne and Archbishop Grdber of Freiburg. He did not 
think it advisable to permit Cardinal Bertram of Breslau 
to participate in the discussions. Bergen to the Foreign 
Ministry, December 5, 1933i 3241/702309*
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by Cardinal Pacelli's note of December 4. Pacelli not 
only cited numerous violations of the Concordat, but also 
enclosed a special supplement protesting the government's 
failure to adhere to the terms of the secret annex. Al­
though the demands made on the students and lecturers of 
theology by the subordinate authorities were inadmissable, 
Pacelli declared, in consideration of the secrecy of the 
agreement the Holy See had not discussed the matter with 
the German Episcopate. Nevertheless, the Holy See expected 
the "High Government" to find a way to restrict the activi­
ties of the subordinate authorities, who naturally were not 
aware of this agreement, and to provide the necessary se­
curity to allow the education of the Catholic clergy to 
continue peacefully and without interruptions.^^ Pacelli's 
anxiety could only have been intensified two days later 
when he received a copy of the protest made previously by 
Clemens August von Galen, the Bishop of Münster. Destined 
to become one of the outspoken critics of National Social­
ism, Galen had complained about the infringements against 
the Catholic press in a letter to Reich Minister of In­
terior Frick.
Pacelli to Bergen, December 4, 1933i 6153/ 
E46096I-65. Bergen forwarded the supplement (6153/
E460967) to the Foreign Ministry on December 11. Printed 
also in Albrecht, No. 8, pp. 25-27.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 7» 1933, 
3241/702311. For Galen's protest and the reply by Buttmann 
see 8II5/E58OI6I-62 and 8II5/E58OI63, respectively.
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On December 12 Monsignor Orsenigo payed a personal 
visit to Neurath. Orsenigo declared the government's fail­
ure to comply with the terms of the Concordat had caused 
great disturbances in Catholic circles. The Holy See, he 
continued, had instructed him to point out to the German 
government that the unfinished negotiations over Article 
Thirty-one had resulted in "untenable conditions" through­
out the Reich. Neurath promised Orsenigo he would bring
5 3these complaints before the Reich Chancellor.
By the middle of December, Reich-Vatican relations 
once again centered around the negotiations on the imple­
mentation of the Concordat. Pacelli remarked to Bergen 
he hoped this time the German government would send a 
negotiator with the authority to conclude a final agree­
ment without further delay, as the matter could no longer 
54be postponed. In a note to Bergen, however, Neurath in­
dicated the discussions would not likely lead to a perma­
nent settlement:
The Reich Government now as before has the firm 
desire to obtain agreement on pending questions.
It cannot be expected, as matters stand at the 
moment, however, that the talks which are to be 
conducted again by Ministerialdirektor Buttmann 
will this time lead at once to final agreements.
A clarifying discussion of some important points
^^Memorandum by Neurath, December 12, 1933, 8115/ 
E58OI73-74.
54Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 10,
1933, 8II5/E58OI67.
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taking account of the entire situation is first of 
all necessary.55
The reason, Neurath concluded in "strict confidence," was 
because the pending reforms of the Reich Constitution made 
it necessary to seriously consider initiating negotiations 
in the near future on a "new" Reich Concordat, which would 
set aside the existing LMnder concordats. Only then would 
it be possible to find a "final and comprehensive settle­
ment for all pending questions.
Bergen believed the new Reich reforms would not be 
easy to bring about, and on December 13 he informed the 
Foreign Office of his opinion on this matter. The agree­
ments and promises made in the present Concordat, he wrote, 
would be an "uncomfortable hindrance" to the pending con­
stitutional reforms, because the Vatican would fall back 
upon and make extensive use of their rights which have al­
ready been recognized. This would be especially true of 
Article Two, which guaranteed the validity of the LMnder 
concordats. Therefore, the government would have to em­
phasize in a determined manner that after the Reich re­
forms the treaties concluded with the individual German 
states would be void, because the sovereignty of the
5 5Neurath to the Embassy to the Holy See, Decem­
ber 12, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. XI, No. 121, p. 210.
^^Ibid. The pending reforms mentioned refers to 
the "Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich," which the
Reichstag passed on January 30, 1934. See below, p. I96.
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Lflnder would be revoked. In any case, Bergen concluded, 
the government should make no binding promises in the 
realm of Church-political affairs until after the pro­
mulgation of the constitutional reforms.
After a short delay caused by Cardinal Pacelli's 
busy schedule,both the Reich government and the Vatican 
were ready to resume the negotiations on the implementation 
of the Concordat. By the middle of December Buttmann was 
back in Rome, and at 10:00 o'clock on the morning of Decem­
ber 18 he and Pacelli began the discussions. According to 
Buttmann's own account, he opened the nearly two-hour con­
versation by requesting the Cardinal not to consider his 
visit as a continuation of the October discussions. This 
meeting should instead be considered as an expression of 
his desire to remove any fears the Reich government would 
continue to ignore the questions directed to it, which 
might have developed as a result of his silence after the 
conclusion of the October talks. The Fuehrer was of the 
opinion, however, that questions pertaining to the inter­
pretation and completion of the Concordat could "best be 
answered in connection with the negotiations of a new Reich 
Concordat," which would take place in the near future.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 13,
1933, 81I5/E58OI7O-7I.
c QBergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 6,
1933, 8II5/E58OI27.
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Choosing to ignore Buttmann's referral to a "new Reich
Concordat," Pacelli stated that while he did not regard
59the silence as a lack of courtesy, he was nevertheless 
delighted that Buttmann had come in person to explain his 
delay in replying. The Holy Father was still greatly con­
cerned about the situation in Germany, which he definitely 
intended to bring up in his Christmas allocution. If only 
His Holiness could receive some pleasant news, Pacelli re­
marked, he believed his disposition would improve. Butt­
mann replied that relations between the Reich and the 
Vatican would undoubtedly be further along if it had not 
been for the "unfortunate electoral manifesto of the Ba­
varian b i s h o p s . T h e  expressions used by the bishops 
were not only a painful surprise to him personally, but 
they had also acutely depressed the mood of the Reich 
Chancellor. Pacelli countered by referring to the "ex­
ceedingly difficult situation" of the Bavarian bishops 
and the complaints they had received concerning the inade­
quate fulfillment of the Concordat. This prompted Butt­
mann to reply that no electoral manifesto at all would 
have been better than the one issued, which was virtually 
the same as a recommendation to reject the list of candi­
dates submitted for the Reichstag. It is a "remarkable
59This contradicts the statement made by Bergen in 
his note of December 3* See above, p. I5I.
^^See above, p. l48.
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fact," Pacelli responded, that the Bavarian government 
actually denied it had issued a ban on the reading of the 
manifesto from the pulpit, and the Cardinal then showed 
Buttmann a carbon copy of the ban which he had in his pos­
session. Buttmann replied that he would discuss the matter 
with the Bavarian Minister-President, who definitely stood 
by what he had done.^^
After discussing the November plebiscite and elec­
tions, the conversation turned to the controversial Arti­
cle Thirty-one. Cardinal Pacelli expressed regret there 
had been such a delay in compiling the list of organiza­
tions to receive protection under this article. Buttmann 
retorted it was difficult to overcome the "spirit of mis­
trust," because the heads of these organizations were 
often the same men who had long opposed the National So­
cialist movement. Buttmann then suggested that the Vatican 
consolidate the Catholic organizations into four or five 
large groups and provide them with new leadership. Pacelli 
reserved an answer to this proposal.
The remainder of the conversation hit upon a variety 
of topics. Pacelli informed Buttmann he had learned Prus­
sia intended to object to the choice of Bishop Bares for
^^Memorandum by Buttmann (unsigned and undated), 
enclosed in Buttmann's letter to Neurath of January 9, 
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 133, pp. 239-45.
G^ibid.
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the Episcopal See of Berlin, despite the fact the twenty- 
day limit specified in Article Fourteen of the Concordat 
had passed. Nevertheless, because the Holy See placed 
great value on maintaining good relations with the German 
government, it did not wish to go through with the appoint­
ment until the Prussian government had expressed its agree­
ment. At the conclusion of the discussion Pacelli informed 
Buttmann he had heard some things during the conversation 
which he would "gladly report to the Holy Father." Never­
theless, it would still be necessary for him to have a note 
which he could show the Pope. It should deal with the fol­
lowing points :
1. An interpretation of the various provisions of 
the Concordat, which the Holy See had previously inquired, 
must be given in the ensuing negotiations.
2. In the event the Reich reform should take place, 
the Reich government would have to recognize the interim 
financial obligations from the LHnder concordats.
3. The existing obstacles concerning the election 
of the Bishop for the Episcopal See of Berlin must be re­
moved before Christmas.
4. The suspensions and dismissals of clerical 
teachers must be reversed.
5. Theology students must be relieved of SA and 
Labor Service.
Buttmann replied he would get in touch with the Reich
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government by telephone and give Pacelli an answer by the 
next morning. After asking Buttmann to give his best re­
gards to the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Minister of 
Interior, the Cardinal amiably departed.
Immediately after his conversation with Pacelli on 
December l8, Buttmann telephoned Berlin as he had promised. 
As a result Hitler ordered State Secretary Pfundtner of 
the Ministry of Interior to reply to Buttmann the same 
evening. This reply, however, would have to be in accord­
ance with Hitler's own instructions, which in this case, 
proved conciliatory. Hitler saw no objection to informing 
the Vatican oral negotiations could take place in the 
future on those points of the Concordat it desired; he was 
willing to approve the transfer of Bishop Bares provided 
Prussia was agreeable; and he agreed to exempt students 
of Catholic theology from participation in the SA and Labor 
Service. Hitler also promised to fulfill "as far as pos­
sible" the financial obligations resulting from the LMnder 
concordats until a new Reich Concordat could be concluded. 
This should not, however, "prejudice the forthcoming Reich 
concordat.
G^Ibid.
^^On the same day, December l8, the Prussian gov­
ernment decided it would not object to the selection of 
Bares as Bishop of Berlin. Buttmann to Pacelli, Decem­
ber 19, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 135, p. 246.
^^Position Taken by the Reich Chancellor with Re­
spect to the Inquiries of Ministerialdirektor Dr. Buttmann,
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Buttmann, Bergen, and Pfundtner immediately drew 
up a note which closely followed the instructions of the 
Reich C h a n c e l l o r O n  the morning of December 19 Butt­
mann presented the note to Cardinal Pacelli, who read it 
aloud slowly. According to Buttmann, Pacelli immediately 
expressed his anxiety over the reference to a "new Reich 
concordat." Buttmann replied that the provisions of the 
LMnder concordats would be worked into the existing Con­
cordat, thus giving the majority of the articles a new 
wording. In this way a new Reich Concordat would come 
about. Also, the sentence in which the government prom­
ised to fulfill the obligations of the LMnder concordats 
during the negotiations for a new Reich Concordat only 
"as far as possible" worried Pacelli. Buttmann replied 
that since he had to assume the responsibility for him­
self in Rome, he was forced to choose the wording with 
great care. After a brief discussion on the suspension 
and dismissal of Catholic officials, Pacelli asked when 
the negotiations for the new Concordat might begin. Butt­
mann stated he still had a great deal of work to do in 
Berlin but he hoped to be free in February for detailed 
negotiations. Rather suddenly, Pacelli spoke of the dan­
ger of a Kulturkampf in Germany. Such a conflict, Buttmann
enclosed in Menshausen's memorandum of December l8, 1933i 
DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 134, pp. 245-46.
^^For the text of this note see Buttmann to Pacelli, 
December 19, 1933, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 135, P- 246.
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replied, would not benefit the Church in any way. The 
November elections must have made it clear to the Church 
that the loyalty of German Catholics to their fatherland 
was of "decisive importance" in resolving their difficult 
conflict of conscience. At the conclusion of the talks, 
Pacelli asked Buttmann to send him the draft of the pro­
posed list of Catholic organizations to receive protection 
under Article Thirty-one, which Buttmann promised he would
do.67
On December 20 Monsignor Kaas informed Bergen 
during a visit that Cardinal Pacelli was disturbed by 
the note he had received from Buttmann on the previous 
day. According to Kaas, Pacelli did not understand the 
note and feared it represented a danger for the Reich 
Concordat. The oral explanations of Buttmann, however, 
had made a more favorable impression on the Cardinal. In 
response, Bergen asked why Pacelli did not let the oral 
discussions stand alone. Bergen also pointed out that in 
case the LMnder concordats were voided, the Reich govern­
ment would still voluntarily assume the obligations spec­
ified in these concordats. Kaas appeared satisfied with
6 7Memorandum by Buttmann (unsigned and undated), 
enclosed in Buttmann's letter to Neurath of January 9, 
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 136, pp. 247-49. For the 
list of Catholic organizations protected by Article 
Thirty-one see M132/M004894-963• According to a mar­
ginal note, Bergen received the list on April 10, 1934, 
but there is no indication when the list was presented 
to Pacelli.
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Bergen's explanations and declared he would try to calm
P a c e l l i . ^ G
On the same day Buttmann left for Berlin (Decem­
ber 20), Bergen wrote the Foreign Office. He expressed 
hope the talks between Pacelli and Buttmann would bring 
about a slight release of the tension, and stated he 
would advise Pacelli to be objective and cautious. All 
questions pertaining to either the present or the future 
Concordat, Bergen recommended, should be handled first 
in the Reich Ministry of Interior before being turned 
over to the Foreign Office. Buttmann should continue 
with the oral negotiations, however, in order to achieve
69a calm and objective treatment of the difficult problems.
The Reich government could have strengthened its 
position considerably by replying promptly and regularly 
to the Vatican notes, and it is difficult to understand 
why it did not do so. In a December 22 note to the For­
eign Ministry, Bergen declared the Pope had recently re­
ferred to the government's failure to answer Pacelli's 
notes as a "plot of silence." Pacelli also valued written 
agreements, Bergen continued, and the Cardinal had exper­
ienced the same feeling as the Pope. Characteristically, 
when the Bavarian government replied to the Vatican's
fiftBergen to Buttmann, December 20, 1933» 8125/
E 5 8 1 7 5 7 - 5 9 .
69' Bergen to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, D e c e m b e r  20,
1933, 8125/ E581756.
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70complaints concerning the November elections, Pacelli 
remarked, "at last an answer to my note." In view of 
these conditions, Bergen concluded, the Reich government 
should consider sending a "lengthy written reply to any
71note" of Pacelli's which had not yet received an answer.
Despite the unwillingness of the Reich government
to adhere to the terms of the Concordat, the Christmas
allocution of the Pope was surprisingly moderate in tone.
Speaking to the College of Cardinals on December 23, he
refrained from mentioning specific complaints against
Germany except for the Sterilization Law, which he de-
72scribed as inconsistent with Christianity. In a New 
Year's greeting to the German people delivered a few days 
later, however, the Pope was far less restrained, and his 
statements corresponded more closely to what many had ex­
pected in his Christmas message. This time he referred 
to the "constantly increasing complaints" coming from Ger­
many, which caused him "deep pain." Some reports, such as 
those concerning the education of the youth, caused him 
particular anxiety. Although the temptation to mention 
all these things in his Christmas message had been strong, 
he had refrained from doing so and called attention only
70See above, p. 150.
71Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 22,
1933, 8II5/E58OI8O.
^^New Y o r k  Times, D e c e m b e r  24, 1933, P* !•
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to the repugnant Sterilization Law. People abroad, he 
declared, were unable to understand why the German meas­
ures were so extreme and why there was such a rapid tempo
73of everything in Germany.
After the Pope's speech, Bergen visited Cardinal 
Pacelli, who remarked it would not be feasible to debate 
with the Pope. Bergen also commented on the recent pas­
toral letter issued by the Austrian bishops, who, after 
praising their own country as an example of a Christian 
political system and a center of western culture, went 
on to point out that the German bishops had for years 
condemned National Socialism from a religious point of 
view. The Reich Concordat, they continued, "did not in 
the least denote the recognition and approval of the re-
74ligious and ecclesiastical errors of National Socialism."
Pacelli replied he knew nothing of the letter prior to its 
75publication.
Bergen's evaluation of Reich-Vatican relations at 
the end of the year tended to be on the pessimistic side.
In the past few weeks, Bergen stated in a note to Neurath,
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 27, 1933, 
DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 149, pp. 276-78. Bergen suggested 
the Pope's statements reflected the ideas which he origi­
nally intended to put in his Christmas address but was 
prevented from doing so by pressure from the German Embassy,
74Deuerlein, pp. l40-4l. The letter is dated Decem­
ber 21, 1933.
7 5 l b i d . , p. 278.
169
the tension had grown to "extremely serious proportions." 
The entire world had expected the Pope to make a sharp 
pronouncement against the German government in his Christ­
mas allocution, and the German Embassy succeeded in "elim­
inating bit by bit the harsh ideas already set down in 
writing" only by exerting great effort and by using all 
possible means of diplomacy. While a few weeks of rela­
tive calm could follow if nothing unforeseen happened, 
Bergen urged the German government to "step out of the 
defensive and send a long fighting note to the Cardinal 
Secretary of State." Not only did Pacelli like written 
replies, Bergen continued, but he possibly intended to 
publish the Vatican notes sent to the Reich government 
in a White Book. Sooner or later a conflict with the 
Curia appeared "quite possible," and in this event the 
government would have nothing in writing to refute the 
charges made in the White Book. World opinion would 
interpret this silence on the German side as an admission 
of guilt.
Bergen to Neurath, December 28, 1933i DGFP, C, 
Vol. II, No. 152, pp. 283-85. Bergen enclosed the out­
line of a note to be presented to Cardinal Pacelli as 
soon as possible (8II5/E58OI83-86). In another note 
written the same day Bergen stated he assumed Menshausen 
would get in touch with Buttmann in regard to the formu­
lation of the proposed note to Pacelli. Menshausen was 
a "good and efficient" editor, Bergen commented, and the 
resulting note would undoubtedly be well-written. The 
longer the note the better, but it should be soon. Ber­
gen to Menshausen, December 28, 1933, 8125/E58I76O.
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In his final notes of the year, Bergen summarized 
two articles which appeared in the Osservatore Romano. 
The first article, published on December 22, discussed 
in an unfavorable light the new hereditary health courts 
which would soon go into operation as a result of the 
promulgation of the Sterlization Law on January 1. Ac­
cording to the Osservatore Romano, the information it 
had obtained from the published report of the Reich gov­
ernment was sufficient to make its meaning obvious to
77anyone with humane and Christian feelings. The second 
article, which appeared on the last day of the year, was 
headlined, "The Silence of the Pope." This article 
pointed out that while the Pope had remained silent in 
his Christmas address to the College of Cardinals, this 
silence was "harsh and fearful." It was as significant 
as the speeches which the Pope made throughout the year; 
it was itself a "frightful protest.
As the turbulent year of 1933 drew to a close,
events inside Germany failed to show any improvement in
the relations between the Reich government and the Cath­
olic Church. It was obvious certain members of the 
Catholic hierarchy were becoming impatient with the Nazi
77Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, December 30, 
1933, MI29/MOO4718.
7 ftBergen to t he F o r e i g n  Ministry, D e c e m b e r  31,
1933, K 2255/K621889-9O.
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regime, including some of those who had previously mani­
fested enthusiasm for the Hitler government. The most 
dramatic and the most critical note was sounded by Cardi­
nal Faulhaber of Munich. During the month of December, 
Faulhaber boldly delivered three Advent sermons in the 
Munich Cathedral in which he both defended the Old Testa­
ment as an integral part of the Christian tradition and 
pointed out the errors of National Socialist ideology.
In contrast to Rosenberg, who had emphasized the many 
virtues of the ancient Germans, Faulhaber called attention
to their vices, such as savagery, indolence, and excessive 
79drinking. While he admitted there was nothing wrong 
with standing up for one's own race, this must not lead 
to the hatred of other races, and race culture must not
60be allowed to assume hostility toward Christianity. The 
Cardinal agreed it was good German youths received instruc­
tion on the origin of their nation and early ancestors, but 
he warned that they should also learn about the golden age 
of intellectual life in early Christian times in order to 
know the religious as well as the pagan side of their peo­
ple. He called upon the German people to let no one rob 
them of their priceless inheritance by banning biblical
79Michael Faulhaber, Judaism, Christianity, and Ger­
many , trans. by George D. Smith (New York: Macmillan Com-
pany, 1934), pp. 96-IO7.
80°^Ibid., p. 107.
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instruction from the German schools. An apostasy from
Christianity and a relapse into paganism, the Cardinal
pleaded, would be the beginning of the end of the German 
81nations.
Unfortunately, not all members of the German hier­
archy were as critical of National Socialism as Cardinal 
Faulhaber. During the same month Bishop Berning declared 
before a mass meeting of Catholics that the Reich Chan­
cellor had informed him personally of his intention to 
build the State upon a Christian foundation, and the 
Bishop counseled his audience to serve the new Germany 
with love. A short time later the chancery of Passau 
issued instructions forbidding the Catholic organiza­
tions to criticize the government. Instead, they should 
emphasize love of fatherland and national solidarity.
It may be, as Lewy suggests, that these views were more 
typical of the German hierarchy at the time than the
82more critical views expressed by Cardinal Faulhaber. 
Nevertheless, the Cardinal's sermons strongly indicated 
that the charismatic brand of leadership provided by 
Hitler was not by itself sufficient to retain the full
O TIbid., pp. 109 and ll4. The Nazis soon prohib­
ited the sale of the sermons but not until many copies 
had already been sold. Furthermore, knowledge of these 
sermons was spread by the loudspeaker system used for 
the occasion and by the foreign press. Shuster, p. 205.
82Lewy, p. 111.
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support of the Catholic leadership so long as the prom­
ises of the Reich government remained unfulfilled.
CHAPTER VI
JANUARY 1, 1934 - MARCH l4, 1934:
A DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS
If 1933 closed ominously, the opening weeks of 
1934 certainly revealed nothing to indicate relations 
between the Church and the Reich government would im­
prove. The promulgation of the Sterilization Law on 
January 1 resulted in the suppression of several papers 
which dared to discuss the subject.^ On the following 
day the Rector of the theological seminary at Freising, 
Dr. Josef Rossberger, received a sentence of eight
months in prison for suggesting at a dinner conversa-
2tion the Nazis had set fire to the Reichstag. On Jan­
uary 5 the government arrested and imprisoned two Cath-
3olic priests for allegedly seditious conduct.
Despite the seriousness of these official arrests 
and trials, they tell only part of the story, because
^Shuster, p. 220.
2Ludwig Volk, Der bayerische Episkopat und der 
Nationalsozialismus, 1930-1934 (Mainz: Matthias-
Grünewald-Verlag, I965 ) , pp. Ï67-68.
^New York Times, January 6, 1934, p. 4. Also, 
undated and unsigned memorandum, 8l25/E58l793-95•
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the "unofficial" violations of Catholic rights committed 
by overzealous Nazis occurred with increasing regularity. 
As an example, on January 17 a group of Catholic students 
performed a religious play at Würzburg in the presence of 
a number of high Church dignitaries. Since the police 
had granted the students permission to perform the play, 
there seemed to be no reason to suspect an incident would 
occur. Nevertheless, during the performance members of 
the Hitler Youth secretly slipped into the balcony and 
began throwing spitballs and stinkbombs. During an inter­
mission, the leader of the Hitler Youth appeared suddenly 
on the platform and began to make a recruiting speech, 
while others attempted to tear down the Christian flag.
Eventually, the youths created so much noise and confusion
4the remainder of the play had to be canceled.
The Reich government, of course, did not officially 
approve of these aggressive tactics on the part of the 
Hitler Youth. On the other hand, neither could the au­
thorities logically condemn the youths for provoking inci­
dents which Nazi propaganda had helped to inspire. Con­
sequently, when disturbances did occur the police would 
frequently arrive too late to stop the violence, conduct 
a sham investigation, and perhaps make a few temporary 
arrests. The following day the Nazi newspapers would 
either say nothing of the incident or refer to it in
4
N e u h M u s l e r ,  I, 174.
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distorted terms, such as a "spontaneous expression of 
popular indignation."^
The promulgation of the Sterilization Law on Jan­
uary 1 necessitates consideration at this point of a con­
ference which took place late in 1933» The report of the 
conference is enlightening, not only because of the im­
portance of this issue in Reich-Vatican relations, but 
also because it shows clearly how far some members of 
the Catholic hierarchy were willing to go to accommodate 
the Nazis. It also reveals some interesting sidelights 
on the attitude of Nazi officials regarding the place of 
the individual in a totalitarian state. The participants 
of the conference included Archbishop Grdber, Bishop 
Berning, Ministerialdirektor Buttmann, and Ministerialrat 
Arthur Gütt of the Reich Ministry of Interior.
According to the report, Grdber welcomed the "ad­
vantages" contained in the law, especially the intent of 
the government to create a vital nation through the elim­
ination of people with hereditary disease. He admitted, 
however, that according to the moral principles of the 
Catholic Church the end did not justify the means, and 
Rome had informed him the Sterilization Law could not be 
accepted as compatible with the teachings of the Church. 
Nevertheless, since the Church wished to avoid a conflict
^The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the
T h i r d  Reich, p. 103.
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with the government, it would make proposals intended to 
bring about a solution to this conflict. The Church 
would also concentrate its attention on paragraph twelve 
of the law, because only this paragraph failed to provide 
for "voluntary" sterilization. In this way the Church 
could show that the interpretation of the paragraph actu­
ally did permit voluntary sterilization, which would 
eliminate part of the conflict. Also, the Bishop con­
tinued, the general public required protection from 
sterilized persons, who would still retain their sexual 
desire even though unable to bear children.^
Buttmann refused to agree that sterilization was 
in any way immoral, as Grëber had implied. Since the 
State provided for sterilization in "federal law," Butt­
mann declared, as such it could "never be immoral." In 
making these laws, the National Socialist State had to 
consider the entire people, not the individual. Dr. Gütt 
seconded Buttmann by pointing out the danger of inherited 
disease to the individual, the family, and the Volk, be­
cause it had been proven a couple could pass these diseases 
on to their children. Therefore, Dr. Gütt continued, the 
State must exclude these people from the act of procrea­
tion. As a matter of fact, the State had the "duty" of
Report of the Bishops' Conference Concerning the 
Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseases, November 3, 
1933, M129/M00475^-72, enclosed in Menshausen's note to 
the German Embassy, January 19, 1933, M129/M004773•
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protecting healthy persons from those afflicted by heredi­
tary disease. Unfortunately, the individual could not be 
expected to volunteer for sterilization, thus obligating 
the State to make the application through physicians.
Bishop Berning refused to accept the claim that 
sterilization would strengthen the Volk, a goal that only 
healthy families could achieve. Although the Catholic 
Church sympathized with the purpose of the law, it could 
not ignore the welfare of the individual. In certain 
cases, such as hereditary blindness, the possibility 
existed that only a part of the offspring would be af­
fected, and this made sterilization all the more ques­
tionable. Furthermore, the State should only make laws 
which all persons could obey without betraying their in­
dividual conscience.
Buttmann rejected any obligation on the part of 
the State to consider the conscience of individuals.
Since all citizens were civil servants, he argued, they 
must therefore subject their wills to the State. Berning 
retorted that a law-abiding and conscientious Catholic 
physician would be unable to practice his profession under 
the new law, because he would be required to recommend 
sterilization. Dr. Gütt replied that the physician only 
sent in the application for sterilization; the decision 
rested with the courts. If the physician found no cause 
for sterilization, he did not have to send in the
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application. Berning suggested the State should find 
substitutes for those physicians with a conflict of 
conscience. Dr. Gütt agreed with this proposal but 
stated he could not promise the government would carry 
it out.^
On the basis of this conference, it is clear the 
bishops did not vigorously resist the compulsory sterili­
zation law. This may very well explain why the Vatican 
failed to protest the promulgation of the law, although 
only access to the Vatican archives can resolve this 
question. In any case, at the time both the Vatican and 
the Episcopate remained silent, and the law quietly went 
into effect on January 1 as scheduled.
Meanwhile, relations between the Reich government 
and the Vatican remained tense during the first weeks of 
1934 but without any spectacular developments. Ambassa­
dor Bergen, as at the end of 1933» continued to urge the 
Foreign Office to make some kind of response to the pre­
vious notes sent by the Vatican in order to eliminate the
Ibid. Pfundtner of the Reich Ministry of Inter­
ior further explained the government's point of view on 
this subject in a note to the Foreign Ministry on Janu­
ary 19, 1934 (MI29/MOO4793-95). He declared that while 
all doctors would be obligated to report persons af­
flicted with hereditary disease, only the "official" 
doctors decided whether or not an application for ster­
ilization should be made. Pfundtner felt that even 
Catholics should be able to "report" cases, since they 
did not have to make the decision. The bishops, he 
maintained, had recognized this view in the conference 
on November 3» 1933*
l 8o
Impression the government was guilty of a "plot of si-
glence." On January 11 his efforts finally bore fruit, 
as Foreign Minister Neurath sent a lengthy memorandum 
which he instructed Bergen to present to Cardinal Pacelli 
in the name of the Reich government. While altered, the 
memorandum retained the basic ideas of the outline which 
Bergen had enclosed in his note of December 28.^
The German government, the memorandum opens, be­
lieved the complex problems brought up for discussion 
could be more easily settled by means of a "confidential 
exchange of views" rather than by a long drawn out ex­
change of documents or by public discussions. Therefore, 
the Reich government preferred to reserve further treat­
ment of the individual questions for the oral negotiations 
agreed to by Ministerialdirektor Buttmann in December. The 
government believed, however, that these future discussions 
should be preceded by a few remarks of a "general charac­
ter," particularly in view of Pacelli's pro memoria of 
October 19 and the "unusually sharp reproaches made in it."^^
QBergen to Ktipke, January 2, 1934, 8l25/E58l762-64; 
and Bergen to Buttmann, January ^ , 1934, 8125/E581765-66.
^See above, p. I69, footnote 76.
^^Memorandum of the German Government to the Holy 
See, enclosed in Neurath's note to Bergen, January 11, 
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 177, pp. 339-44 and 339, foot­
note 4. Printed also in Albrecht, No. 12, pp. 37-44. 
Bergen wired Neurath on January I5 he had delivered the 
memorandum to Cardinal Pacelli on the same day and with­
out discussion.
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The ensuing remarks of the memorandum touch upon 
a variety of subjects but provide few specific answers to 
the questions raised in the pro memoria of October 1 $ .
The Reich government reminded the Holy See of the sacri­
fices made by the Nazis in the fight against Communism.
In replying to the charge made in the pro memoria that 
the situation in Germany resembled the tragic Kulturkampf, 
the government avowed nothing could be "further from the 
mind of the German Government than the intention of fos­
tering a struggle between Church and State in any way." 
Even before the Reich Chancellor assumed power, he made 
known his "sincere desire and intention to respect and 
protect the rights of the Christian churches, to live 
with them in peace, and to work together harmoniously 
with them." Despite his call for "peace and coopera­
tion," however, some Church dignitaries permitted an 
"unjustified critical attitude to be evident," and many 
of the younger clergy made "no secret of their dislike 
for the new Reich." The National Socialist government 
provided both freedom and protection for the Christian 
churches, and therefore it regarded the objections to 
the dismissal of Catholic civil servants made in the pro 
memoria as "inappropriate." In bringing about the intel­
lectual and spiritual unification of the German people, 
the National Socialist movement had to remedy not only 
false Marxist teachings but also the religious splits.
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which "certain politically active clergy" had widened.
The abuse of power and intervention in State matters by 
such clergymen would inevitably bring strong resentment 
from others. Also, the Catholic clergy's identification 
with the Center Party particularly made it susceptible 
to the charge of "inadmissible political activity." In 
the construction of the new Germany, innocent bystanders 
would unavoidably be injured during the first stage.
While the government would attempt to aid these persons. 
National Socialism must direct its sight beyond individ­
ual cases and toward the future.
In the light of some of the critical remarks made 
by the German government, it seems unlikely the Vatican 
authorities would have received the memorandum favorably. 
Nevertheless, on January 20 Bergen reported he had learned 
confidentially that the "polite form" of the memorandum 
had made a good impression upon Pacelli. The Cardinal did 
point out, however, that the memorandum failed to mention 
such fundamental questions as education, the Catholic 
press, and the Catholic youth organizations. The Vatican
still considered the implementation of Article Thirty-one
12to be the main problem. In any case, Bergen wrote a
^^Memorandum of the German Government to the Holy 
See, enclosed in Neurath's note to Bergen, January 11, 
1934, DGFP, c. Vol. II, No. 177, pp. 339-44.
12B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, J a n u a r y  20,
1934, 8II5/E580249-52.
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short time later, at least temporarily the memorandum
achieved its intended purpose, i.e., to prevent Cardinal
Pacelli from publishing a White Book. For the time being,
it appeared Pacelli would restrict his activities to for-
13mulating a reply to the memorandum.
Despite the strong remarks contained in the govern­
ment's memorandum, Bergen informed the Foreign Office on 
January 23 that the German position regarding the Concor­
dat was still "weak." In the same note he also suggested 
the government initiate a discussion of Article Thirty- 
two, i.e., on the political activities of the Catholic 
clergy in Germany, as a "tactical diversion." Insistence 
upon the fulfillment of the obligations contained in this 
article, Bergen declared, would tend to make the Holy See 
more generous in its concessions. Since von Papen re­
peatedly emphasized during the negotiations for the Con­
cordat that the Church would have to fulfill the promises 
made in Article Thirty-two before the Reich government
would implement Article Thirty-one, the Vatican should be
l4even more willing to make concessions.
The Foreign Office not only received Bergen's pro­
posal to initiate a discussion of Article Thirty-two fa­
vorably, but quickly complied with his request. After
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, January 22, 1934,
8II5/E580258-59.
^ ^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, J a n u a r y  2 3 1 1934,
8I I5/ E58026O -6I.
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conferring with Reich Minister of Interior Frick, Neurath 
sent a note to Bergen in the name of the Reich government. 
The note, which Neurath instructed the Ambassador to for­
ward to Cardinal Pacelli, dealt exclusively with Article 
Thirty-two. In the opening sentence the Reich government 
reminded the Vatican that in his talks with Pacelli the 
preceding October, Ministerialdirektor Buttmann had re­
ferred to the "serious abuses" resulting from the attitude 
of a number of Catholic clergymen toward the National So­
cialist State. At that time the Holy See learned of num­
erous incidents, especially in Bavaria, which clearly vio­
lated Article Thirty-two. Since then the number of such 
incidents had not only failed to diminish but had actually 
increased. The conduct of these clergymen brought "unrest 
and confusion" and even undermined respect for the clergy:
When the National Socialist movement is called from 
the pulpit a work of the devil, when a priest in 
Württemberg announces and reads a mass for six Com­
munists executed in Cologne with whom there is not 
the slightest connection either personally or geo­
graphically, when this execution is made the subject 
of political remarks before school children in 
classes in religion, when furthermore. National 
Socialist usages, such as, for example, the German 
greeting, are forbidden to school children, as it 
can be shown has occurred at various times, this 
is nothing else than a rebellion against the State 
and an invitation to disregard legal regulations of 
the temporal authorities.
In order to maintain public peace and order, the 
note continued, the State would have to intervene energeti­
cally in such cases. The government had even found it 
necessary to arrest clergymen in order to "protect them
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from the indignation of the population." The represen­
tation of these measures in the Catholic press abroad as 
a general persecution of Catholics in Germany made them 
all the more regrettable. If only the Church had properly 
instructed the clergy, who in turn would have made it 
their duty to grant the National Socialist State its "due 
respect," many of the disagreeable incidents and resulting 
tensions would undoubtedly have been avoided. The silence 
of the higher Church authorities often left the impression 
they were in agreement with the refractory conduct of 
their subordinate clergy, and this in turn strengthened 
the latter in their rejection of the Nazi State. As a re­
sult, the note concluded, the Reich government expected 
the Holy See to instruct the German Episcopate to issue 
"suitable and uniform instructions to the German clergy.
The strong language used in this note must have 
come as a surprise to Vatican authorities, particularly 
since it came so soon after the government's memorandum 
of January 11. It seems obvious the German government was 
attempting to turn the tables on the Vatican by digging up 
the old charge of "political Catholicism," and in this way 
diverting attention from its own failure to adhere to the 
terms of the Concordat. It could not be expected, however.
Neurath to Bergen, January 51, 1954, DGFP, C, 
Vol. II, No. 252, pp. 440-42. On February 5 Bergen in­
formed the Foreign Ministry he had received the note of 
January 51 and had sent it on to Pacelli the same evening
(8II5/E580276).
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that the Vatican "would long accept severe criticism of 
this type without making an appropriate response, and on 
January 31 it replied to the Reich government's memorandum 
of January 11 in a lengthy pro memoria. In an accompany­
ing note to Bergen, Cardinal Pacelli stated the pro mem­
oria dealt with those matters which should be brought up 
in the forthcoming oral negotiations in order to lessen 
the tension.
The first part of the pro memoria consists of an 
outline of those points made in the Reich government's 
memorandum of January 15 which were agreeable and pleasing 
to the V a t i c a n . T h e s e  included the government's state­
ment regarding oral negotiations on the implementation of 
the Concordat; its acceptance of the Holy See as a partner 
in the fight against Communism; the explanation that it 
had no intention of beginning a Kulturkampf; the assertion 
it was not aiming to create a new faith movement; and its 
expressed willingness to fulfill the obligations of the 
Concordat. Unfortunately, the pro memoria continued, the 
ratification of the Concordat had failed to have any effect 
in bringing about a speedy application of Article Thirty- 
one. The Holy See could not ignore the incidents which 
were in violation of the Concordat, and would have to take
The pro memoria uses the date "January 15" rather 
than "January 11" when referring to the Reich government's 
memorandum, which is the date it was delivered to the 
Vatican.
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action, especially since these incidents had been publi­
cized in the world press. Some of the questions, par­
ticularly those pertaining to the implementation of Arti­
cle Thirty-one, demanded immediate settlement. Despite 
previous accusations by the Reich government, the Holy 
See refused to take any responsibility for the continued 
delay in the settlement of this article. As an example 
of how the government infringed upon the rights of Catho­
lic organizations, the pro memoria referred to a speech 
made by a Hitler Youth official in Düsseldorf, who made 
the following statement; "Just as we were able to deal 
with the parties, we will also be able to deal with the 
confessional organizations, which are not yet ready to 
give up their own existence." Because so many officials 
in both the party and State gave orders. Catholics found 
it difficult to know the proper authority to address a 
complaint. Also, the areas of responsibility for these 
officials often overlapped, which tended to make this 
difficulty worse. Sometimes those who complained, in­
cluding the bishops, did not even receive answers to
17their complaints.
On the controversial Sterilization Law, the Holy 
See reminded the Reich government the Church could not
17Pro memoria of the Holy See to the German Gov­
ernment, enclosed in Pacelli’s note to Bergen, January 31, 
1934, 8II5/E5803OO-45. Printed also in Albrecht, No. l4, 
pp. 46-71.
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alter its position on this issue for reasons already 
well known. When the bishops failed to prevent the en­
actment of the law they attempted to make its application 
morally acceptable to Catholics, but this too had proved 
unsuccessful. Even though the bishops had received per­
mission to explain the law from the pulpit and to make
X 8their position clear, when the time came the Reich 
Minister of Interior withdrew this permission. Further­
more, the police frequently spied upon clergymen in the 
execution of their duties, and the government had brought 
pressure on the bishops to remove certain members of the 
lower clergy. In some dioceses, the number of priests 
in prison exceeded the number imprisoned during the 
Kulturkampf. Restrictions on the press were so tight 
newspapers could not even designate themselves as 
"Catholic" papers. Government officials, the pro 
memoria charged, promoted pagan beliefs through their 
speeches, and while the Holy See naturally did not 
hold the Reich government responsible for individual 
incidents of this nature, it could explain these events 
only by acknowledging a "central influence" which per­
mitted them to occur. In attempting to counter this
X 8In order to soften the harshness of the law, 
the bishops had obtained permission to explain the law 
in the form of an announcement. Essentially, this was 
an abbreviated version of the Pope's encyclical, Casti 
Connubii. Bertram to Frick, January l4, 1934, Ml29/ 
M004774-76. Also see Lewy, pp. 259-60.
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new heathen movement, the Church found its protests were 
either muzzled or falsely interpreted.
In concluding, the Holy See expressed the hope 
that the German government would realize during the forth­
coming negotiations the validity of the points upon which 
the Vatican based its position. The Holy See also hoped 
these negotiations would lead to a satisfactory conclusion, 
thus making it unnecessary for the Holy See to announce
its wishes and suggestions publicly in order to prevent a
19misunderstanding of its position.
Any analysis of the pro memoria would have to 
concede one point--it was thorough. In its forty-five 
pages it covered every major issue of contention between 
the Reich and the Vatican. Perhaps most important, the 
pro memoria attributed the responsibility for individual 
incidents to a "central influence." While the Holy See 
did not hold the Reich government responsible for these 
incidents, it is impossible to see how the Reich govern­
ment and a "central influence" could be unrelated. In 
using this term, the Holy See apparently wished to as­
sign at least part of the responsibility for the inci­
dents to the Reich government rather than the local au­
thorities, but did not say so directly for fear of 
appearing too offensive.
19Pro memoria of the Holy See to the German Govern­
ment (January 31, 1934).
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Despite the "protests and veiled threats" con­
tained in the pro memoria, Ambassador Bergen believed it 
still revealed a certain relaxation of tension and the 
desire of the Vatican to reach an understanding through 
negotiations. He attributed at least a part of this good 
will to Prelate Kaas, who still enjoyed the "full confi­
dence" of Cardinal Pacelli and advised him on "all German 
matters." According to Bergen, Kaas had "continuously
sought to exert a tranquilizing, conciliatory, and mediat-
20ing influence in the Vatican." Foreign Minister Neurath 
agreed with Bergen's conclusion that the pro memoria re­
vealed the wish "to close the existing holes in the agree­
ments in a trusting exchange of opinions," and to reach 
positive and speedy results in the negotiations. He ap­
parently saw nothing urgent about the pro memoria as he
declared the Reich government would not reply, at least
21not for awhile.
This sharp exchange of notes between the Reich and 
the Vatican during the early part of 1934 only reflected
20Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 5, 1934, 
DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 2391 PP• 451-52. When presenting 
the Reich government's memorandum of January 11 to Pacelli, 
Bergen continued, he confidentially informed the Cardinal 
the objections made in regard to the "politically-active" 
clergy did not refer to Prelate Kaas. Pacelli received 
this statement with "visible satisfaction."
21Neurath to the State Secretary of the Reich Chan­
cellory [hammers], the Reich Minister of Interior [Frick], 
and the Deputy of the Reich Chancellor [Papen], Febru­
ary 11, 1934, 8II5/E580346-47.
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the increased tension between the government and Church 
leaders inside Germany. Relations were further embittered 
by the designation on January 24 of Alfred Rosenberg as 
the "Deputy of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of the 
Spiritual and Ideological Training of the National Social­
ist Party." In essence, this meant that the man who more 
than anyone else was responsible for the early opposition 
of the Church to the Nazi movement would now serve as the 
official ideological guide for the party. Many Catholics 
had believed Hitler would purge the party of its anti-
Christian elements, but instead he had "demonstrated his
22confidence in the Church's archenemy." Not surpris­
ingly, Rosenberg's appointment contributed to an increase 
in the criticism of Nazi teachings on the part of the 
Catholic clergy. On February 9 the Vatican manifested 
its strong support of the clergy by announcing the Holy
Office in Rome had placed the Myth on the Index of For- 
21bidden Books.
In an effort to increase understanding, on Febru­
ary 7 Cardinal Schulte had a two-hour conversation with 
the Reich Chancellor. In a chat with Menshausen on the
22Lewy, p. 151.
2 QWheaton, pp. 356-57. According to Kdpke, the 
German Embassy at the Vatican had learned from a confi­
dential but responsible source the formal request to 
have the Myth placed on the Index came from high eccle­
siastical authorities in foreign countries. KOpke to 
the Reich Chancellor, February l4, 1934, K2255/K621895•
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following day, the Cardinal indicated the talks were a 
good beginning, but he was evasive when Menshausen asked 
whether Hitler had given the impression the government 
intended to live peacefully with the Church. Schulte 
stated he had emphasized the failure to reach an agree­
ment on the implementation of Article Thirty-one as one 
of the reasons for the difficulties. In discussing 
Rosenberg's role as the spiritual and philosophical 
educator of the party, Schulte stated he feared the 
goals expressed in the Myth would be given special con­
sideration. Hitler replied he also opposed the Myth, 
and Rosenberg's position was due solely to "party 
politics.
Hitler's assurances, however, were no longer suf­
ficient to silence the members of the Episcopate, many 
of whom grew bolder in their criticism of the Nazis.
In reference to the Sterilization Law, on February 7 
Cardinal Faulhaber pointed out that although the bishops 
did not want the faithful to disobey the laws of the 
State, neither could they betray the laws of the Church
O ftMemorandum by Menshausen, February 8, 1934, 
8II5/E58O279-83. At the conclusion of the talks Cardi­
nal Schulte presented Hitler with a pro memoria con­
taining the grievances of the Church (8115/E480541-44).
Lewy speculates the Vatican might never have 
placed the Myth on the Index if Hitler had not disso­
ciated himself from the book. He bases his opinion on 
the fact the Vatican never excommunicated Hitler nor 
placed his writings on the Index. Lewy, p. 152, 
footnote,
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25through silence. On March 1 Cardinal Schulte vigor­
ously censured Nazi theories on race and blood in a letter 
to the members of his archdiocese. "It is heathenism and 
apostasy from Christ and Christianity," Schulte wrote, "to 
see the essential element in religion only in the require­
ments of alleged Blood and Race."^^ In his Easter message 
of March 26, Bishop Galen of Münster criticized the Nazi 
new heathenism even more severely: "The attack on Chris­
tianity which we are now witnessing surpasses in destruc-
27tive power everything of which history has record." A 
few days later Archbishop Grüber of Freiburg and the re­
cently installed Bishop Bares of Berlin also issued 
28warnings.
This increase in criticism on the part of the 
Catholic hierarchy did not mean that all bishops had taken 
a position in opposition to the Nazi regime. On the con­
trary, most bishops still urged Catholics to adopt an af­
firmative attitude toward the government, and when they
did protest they often passed over such important issues
29as the banishment of freedom and justice from Germany.
25Faulhaber to the Reich Minister of Interior
[Frick], February ?, 1934, M129/M004809-13•




7Ibid., No. 130, p. 262. Excerpt in Shuster,
28Ibid., No. 129, pp. 255-60, and No. 128, pp.
29Wheaton, pp. 358-60.
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Furthermore, even after one year of Nazi tyranny, most
Catholic laymen still desired to prove their patriotism
was beyond question by supporting Hitler's effort to
rejuvenate the German people. Von Papen, with his "Cross
30and Eagle Society," was typical of such Catholics, and
he did not hesitate to praise Hitler's achievements in
31speeches to Catholic groups. Nevertheless, a Gestapo
report drawn up during the spring of 1934 stated that
Catholic clergymen who completely adhered to National
32Socialist views were "extremely few in number." Hitler 
demanded not partial but absolute loyalty, however, and 
he regarded "any criticism" of the Reich government as 
synonymous with civil disobedience. Regardless of how 
carefully the clergy phrased their criticism, it usually 
enraged the Nazis.
Inevitably, the tense internal situation in Germany 
contributed to the deterioration of relations between the 
Reich and the Vatican. On February 12 Ambassador Bergen 
informed the Foreign Ministry the recent reports from
30An organization founded by Papen on April 3,
19331 essentially for the purpose of rallying Catholic 
support behind the creation of the new Reich. Lewy, p. 46,
31See Papen's speech to a group of Catholic workers 
delivered on January l4, 1934, at Gleiwitz (M129/M004723- 
48).
32Friedrich Zipfel, Kirchenkampf in Deutschland, 
1933-1945 ; Religionsverfolgung und Selbstbehauptung der 
Kirchen in der nationalsozialistischen Zeit (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., I965), pi 29^.
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Germany had caused apprehension in the Vatican, especially 
those concerning the appointment of Rosenberg. According 
to Bergen, Rosenberg's appointment had intensified the 
existing fears regarding Catholic beliefs and education, 
and had caused extreme anger on the part of the Pope. 
Bergen also reported he had learned confidentially that 
Cardinal Pacelli was in the process of writing an impor­
tant document, probably the outline of an encyclical. 
Bergen stated he had repeatedly warned the Vatican 
against taking this hasty step. The main danger, the 
Ambassador warned, was the "unpredictability and the im­
petuosity" of the Pope, who reportedly declared he had 
been "advised long enough to be quiet and patient."
While no encyclical appeared at this time, the Holy Of­
fice did ignore the established custom in order to ex­
plain publicly its reason for placing the Myth on the 
Index. In an article which appeared in the Osservatore 
Romano, the Holy Office sharply criticized the Myth for 
its rejection of the Christian creed and for holding to 
the principle that the Godly nature of man could be de-
34fended by blood.
3 3Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 12,
1934, 8II5/E580357.
34Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February l4,
1934, K2255/K621909-IO. The Osservatore Romano followed 
with an explanation of the errors contained in Ernst 
Bergmann's Die deutsche Nationalkirche, a pro-Nazi and 
racist book which the Holy Office also placed on the 
Index.
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On January 30 the promulgation of a new Reich law 
took place which directly affected relations between the 
German government and the Holy See. Entitled the "Law 
for the Reconstruction of the Reich," the law marked an­
other important step toward achieving the goal of Gleich- 
schaltung by transferring the authority of the LHnder to 
the Reich government in Berlin. It formally abolished 
the state Landtags, transferred the former sovereign 
powers of the states to the Reich government, and placed 
the state governors (Reichsstaathaelter) under the super­
vision of the Reich Minister of Interior. The Reich gov­
ernment could even promulgate new laws affecting the con­
stitution with no limitation imposed. Furthermore, in 
the new law the term "Reich government" was arbitrarily 
interpreted to mean the "individual members acting in 
their individual domains," not the cabinet as a whole.
As a result, cabinet members were now less restricted 
in their areas of responsibility, and they could more 
easily expand their legitimate activities, provided, of 
course, they did not collide with Hitler or other power- 
ful Nazi figures.
Specifically, the new law affected Reich-Vatican 
relations in two areas: (l) it raised the question of
the validity of the LHnder Concordats, which the Reich 
Concordat still guaranteed; and (2) it voided, at least
^^Wheaton, pp. 397-98; and Shirer, p. 200.
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in the opinion of the Reich government, the need to con­
tinue the special representation between Bavaria and the 
6Vatican. The move to dissolve the Bavarian Legation
in Rome began early in 1934, even before the new Reich
reforms went into effect. On January 15 Neurath wrote
Menshausen that since the German Embassy represented the
special interests of German Catholics at the Vatican,
sentimental reasons for maintaining the Legation should
37be given little weight.
Although the dissolution of the Legation did not 
seem to disturb Neurath, he was concerned with the fate 
of Otto Freiherr von Ritter, a distant relative of the 
Foreign Minister. Von Ritter would soon celebrate his 
twenty-fifth anniversary as the Bavarian envoy to the 
Holy See, and Neurath feared the news of the dissolution 
might hurt Ritter. In a note to Bergen on February 13, 
Neurath suggested that in order to make Ritter's departure
from Rome easier the Vatican should honor him in some spe-
. -, 38cial way.
The law also affected Prussia as the German am­
bassador to the Vatican, i.e., Bergen, had at the same 
time been serving as the special representative of Prus­
sia. In accordance with the Reich reforms, Prussia would 
lose this privilege and her interests would be represented 
by the German ambassador, the same as the other German 
states. Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 21, 1934,
K214o/K595617-19.
^^Neurath to Menshausen, January 15, 1934, K2l40/ 
K595602.
^^Neurath to Bergen, February 13, 1934, 3241/ 
0702331* On the same day Neurath wrote a personal letter
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A few days later Bergen wrote Neurath that Cardi­
nal Pacelli had inquired if the papal nuncio to Bavaria, 
Alberto Vassallo di Torregrossa, could remain in Munich 
after the dissolution of the Bavarian Nunciature. While
Bergen did not directly reply to Pacelli's question, he
39strongly implied this would not be possible. Because 
of the canonization on May 20 of the Bavarian monk, Konrad 
von Parzham, however, the Vatican did request a postpone­
ment of the date. The Reich government agreed to this 
request, and the date was changed from April 30 to May 31* 
The extension of time pleased Pacelli, Bergen reported
later, although the Cardinal still found the dissolution
k lof the Munich Nunciature a bit harsh.
During a visit with State Secretary Bülow on Febru­
ary 19, Monsignor Orsenigo brought up the other question 
resulting from the Reich reforms of January 30, i.e., the 
validity of the LMnder Concordats. Orsenigo especially 
wanted to know how the agreements made in the Reich Con­
cordat stood in relation to the laws of the individual
to von Ritter explaining why it was necessary to take this
step (3241/0702333).
^^Bergen to Neurath, February 19, 1934, 3241/
0702337-38.
^^Neurath to Bergen, February 26, 1934, K2l40/
K595615.
^^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, March 10, 1934, 
K214O/K595628.
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Lostates, but Bülow could not answer the question. Ber­
gen believed this question posed no particular problem, 
and he expressed his opinion in a note to the Foreign 
Office on February 26. According to Bergen, the Reich 
reforms made the LMnder Concordats void, although he 
admitted the Vatican would take a different point of 
view on this subject. Since the LMnder Concordats no 
longer had sovereign rights, Bergen continued, the 
Reich Concordat would need revision. While necessary 
this would not be an easy task, because the Vatican 
would insist upon retaining the concessions it had 
already obtained. Before the conclusion of a new Con­
cordat, Bergen advised, the State would have to examine 
all concessions closely. If this were done, certain 
difficulties which had resulted from the hasty formu­
lation of the present Concordat would not recur in its
43successor.
On February 4 Buttmann departed for Rome to hold 
another round of discussions with Cardinal Pacelli on 
the implementation of the Concordat. Buttmann found 
the Vatican in an uncooperative mood, and at times
42BÜI0W to the Embassy to the Holy See, Febru­
ary 19, 1934, 3241/D702323-24.
43Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 26, 
1934, 8II5/E580463-64. Bergen enclosed a preliminary 
draft of a new Concordat prepared by Monsignor Johannes 
Steinmann, the ecclesiastical adviser in the German Em­
bassy (8II5/E580465-90).
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LLeven the tactful Pacelli used sharp language. During 
the talks Buttmann demanded the incorporation of the 
Catholic youth organizations into the Hitler Youth, and 
refused to grant Catholic youths the right of double mem­
bership, i.e., to belong to both organizations as Pacelli 
had proposed. The Cardinal declared the anti-religious 
feeling within the Hitler Youth made the incorporation 
of the Catholic youth organizations out of the question.
To concede this point in view of those conditions which 
the Holy See mentioned in its pro memoria of January 31, 
Pacelli continued, would make Germany and the whole world 
say "we were crazy" ("dass wir einen Vogel hMtten"). When 
Buttmann asked Pacelli if he wished to postpone the nego­
tiations, the Cardinal agreed, suggesting at the same time 
they talk about something other than Article Thirty-one 
until after they had learned the results of Cardinal 
Schulte's visit with the Reich Chancellor on February 7»^^ 
Buttmann replied he would return to Berlin in order to 
learn more about the intentions of the Reich Chancellor.
On this inconclusive note Buttmann and Pacelli ended their
46discussions.
^^Deuerlein, p. l48.
45See above, pp. 191-92.
^^Bergen to Buttmann, February 20, 1934, 8125/ 
£581852-55» This is actually Pacelli's account of his 
discussions with Buttmann, as he reported it to Bergen. 
Pacelli had passed this information on to Bergen in order
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Buttmann's departure for Berlin did not mean the
German government intended to bring about a final break
up of the negotiations, however, and Bergen made certain
47this was brought to the attention of the Pope. At the
time Buttmann had assumed he would return to Rome shortly
after his meeting with the Reich Chancellor, then sched-
48uled for February 23. Nevertheless, according to Bergen 
the interruption of the negotiations had created a nega­
tive frame of mind among Vatican officials as to the suc­
cess of future discussions. On February 20 Bergen reported 
the interruption had spawned the supposition in the Vatican 
that the "delaying tactics" used by the Reich government 
did not at all result from technical difficulties. Instead, 
they resulted from the intention of the government to set­
tle the various questions unilaterally and present the Holy 
See with a fait accompli. Bergen assured the Foreign Of­
fice he was attempting to destroy this assumption on the 
part of the Vatican but had found it difficult. In his
to explain the whole affair and prevent any misunderstand­
ing which might arise as a result of using the expression,
"dass wir einen Vogel hMtten."
47Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 15, 193^, 
8II5/E58O353• At the same time Bergen suggested the Reich 
government formulate an immediate reply to the pro memoria
of January 31, giving serious consideration to the Vatican's
protests.
48Buttmann to Bergen, February 20, 193^, 8125/ 
£581856-57• Buttmann's audience with Hitler on the twenty- 
third was postponed but did finally take place on March 8. 
Buttmann to Bergen, March 10, 1934, 8I25/E58186I.
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opinion, the Reich and the Vatican would not likely reach
an agreement on the disputed points anytime in the fore- 
49seeable future.
Undoubtedly the pressure of foreign governments on 
the Holy See intensified Bergen's pessimism at this time.
On February l6 Bergen reported he had heard the Vatican 
was again considering the publication of a White Book as 
a means of justifying its attitude toward Germany. Accord­
ing to Bergen, "diverse quarters" had constantly reproached 
the Vatican for its weak defense of Catholic beliefs and 
interests. The French compared the "submissiveness of the 
Holy See toward National Socialism" to the "vigorous ac­
tion" the Pope had taken against the Action Française 
The American Episcopate and the Catholic lay world par­
ticularly failed to understand the cautious attitude of 
the Curia. People in the United States repeatedly com­
pared the brave stand of the German Protestants to the 
submissiveness of the Catholic Church. In these circum­
stances, Bergen suggested, the Reich government should 
compile further complaints against the German clergy and 
send detailed replies to the Vatican's pro memoria of Jan­
uary 31 and Pacelli's note of February l4.^^
49Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 20,
1 9 3 4 ,  8 I I 5 / E 5 8 0 4 5 2 - 5 3 .
^^Pope Pius XI condemned the militant Action 
Française in I925. Fremantle, p. 220.
^ ^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, F e b r u a r y  I6 ,
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 265, p. 504. P a c e l l i ' s  note
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The Italian government also showed keen interest 
in religious developments in Germany. According to Ber­
gen, an Italian diplomat whom he had known for years in­
formed him confidentially the Italian ministry was watch­
ing the hostile intentions of the German government with 
increasing anxiety. In time, Bergen's confidant main­
tained, the worsening of relations between the Holy See 
and the Reich government could not help but have an ef­
fect upon the attitude of Italy toward Germany. Prompted 
by these remarks, Bergen had a long talk with the Italian 
Ambassador to the Holy See, Cesare Maria de Vecchi, who 
had always demonstrated a "full understanding of National 
Socialism." The Vatican, de Vecchi informed Bergen, 
frankly admitted a regrettable but serious tension existed 
between the Holy See and the German government. Based 
upon what he had observed, the most serious worry of the 
Curia, and above all the Pope, was the increasing fear 
that the Nazis ultimately intended to destroy the Chris­
tian churches and form a new community church with heathen- 
istic tendencies. If it were possible to abolish this fear, 
de Vecchi continued, the suspended negotiations would have 
a much better chance of success. In reporting this con­
versation to the Foreign Office, Bergen emphasized the im­
portance of explaining the position of National Socialism
of February l4, which concerned the freedom of the Catholic 
press in Germany, is filmed on 8l25/E58l847-49, and printed 
in Albrecht, No. 17, pp. 77-78.
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in the government's reply to the pro memoria of Janu­
ary 31» Bergen suggested a quotation from Mein Kampf
as the best means of describing the Nazi attitude toward
5 2Christianity and undermining the fears of the Pope.
In referring to Mein Kampf, Bergen undoubtedly
executed a shrewd tactical maneuver as Hitler had made
a number of statements favorable to Christianity in the 
5 3book. This does seem to indicate, however, that at 
this time Bergen was experiencing no serious difficulty 
in accommodating himself to the Nazi regime. Fritz 
Menshausen was not quite so accommodating, and there­
fore perhaps a keener judge of the reasons behind the 
strained relations between the Reich and the Vatican. 
Menshausen expressed his opinions in a memorandum dated 
March 1, which deserves some attention. Much of the 
tension, Menshausen reflected, originated from the 
failure of the Reich government and the Vatican to reach 
an agreement on Article Thirty-one during the negotiations 
for the Concordat. The content of this article unfortun­
ately created hopes in the Church which the State could 
not fulfill. Thus, the recent negotiations on the imple­
mentation of the Concordat were again postponed because 
the Vatican insisted upon the fulfillment of its own
52Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, February 17,
1934, 8II5/E58045O-51.
5 3See above, pp. 42-43.
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interpretation of the promises made regarding Article 
Thirty-one. The government's efforts to achieve Gleich- 
schaltung, Menshausen continued, had caused deep resent­
ment on the part of the Vatican, which believed itself 
deceived. The Vatican also suspected the government 
intentionally interrupted the negotiations until after 
it had completely absorbed the Catholic associations and 
could present the Holy See with a fait accompli. Rosen­
berg's appointment on January 24 as the party spokesman 
for spiritual and ideological questions had also stiff­
ened Reich-Vatican relations. The situation had become 
so tense, that a break appeared inevitable unless the 
government reached an immediate agreement with the Church. 
Because of the effect upon German foreign policy, the 
Reich government would be wise to avoid an open conflict 
with the Holy See. Such a conflict would have an unfav­
orable effect upon the entire Catholic world, especially 
in Italy and Austria. Since the government could no 
longer restrain the Vatican, it must reveal a willing­
ness to reach an agreement through "action." The Holy 
See would be reasonable as long as it received satisfac­
tory assurances regarding the philosophical goals of 
National Socialism and the religious care of the youth.
The Nuncio agreed with this, Menshausen declared, for he 
recently remarked "the government had only to take one 
step and the Vatican would take ten steps." The Reich
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must take this one step in order to clear the way for an 
54und erst anding.
If this "one step" consisted of replying to the 
Vatican's pro memoria of January 31, then Menshausen's 
request was in the process of being granted. The first 
draft of the reply was prepared in the Reich Ministry of 
Interior, probably by Buttmann, and forwarded to the For­
eign Office by Reichminister Frick on February 24.^^ On 
the basis of proposals made by Vice-Chancellor Papen, 
this draft was revised and a second draft drawn up.^^
Since Menshausen believed it still left unanswered some 
essential points of the pro memoria, he made a number of 
additions, three of which concerned the Catholic organiza­
tions. When informed, Buttmann concurred with Menshausen
57and the additions were retained. On March 12 the text was
c Qsubmitted to Hitler, and later the same day sent on to
59Bergen for transmittal to the Cardinal Secretary of State.
E580454-58.
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, March 1, 1934, 8II5/
^^Frick to the Foreign Ministry, February 24, 1934, 
8II5/E58O365-84.
^^An Answer to the Pro Memoria of January 3I , 1934, 
undated, 8II5/E58O386-4II.
57Menshausen listed these additions to the draft in 
his memorandum of March 12, 1934, 8ll5/E580442-43.
g OMemorandum by Menshausen, March 12, 1934, 8115/
E580385.
59p[Neurath] to the G e r m a n  E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See,
M a r c h  12, 1934, 8ll5/E58o444.
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On March l4 Bergen presented to Pacelli the lengthy and 
undated pro memoria, the German government's answer to 
the Vatican's pro memoria of January 31.^^
The pro memoria begins on a friendly and optimistic 
note. The Reich government agreed with the Holy See that 
a way had to be found to overcome the difficulties regard­
ing the execution of the Concordat. In consideration of 
the "sincere willingness of both sides to reach an under­
standing" this goal appeared quite possible, but the nego­
tiations would have to be continued in an agreeable
. .^61 sp i r i t .
The Reich government believed the Church allowed 
too much time to pass before making an effort to end the 
active participation of the clergy in politics. Many 
members of the Catholic associations had still changed 
very little and they remained politically active. Also, 
important Church authorities continued to take a critical 
view of the Nazi movement, which confused Catholics and 
made the execution of the Concordat more difficult. In 
effect, the German people believed the Church leaders 
were unwilling to join the movement. The Reich government
The entire text of the pro memoria is printed in 
Albrecht, No. 19, pp. 81-99, with Papen's corrections in­
cluded in the footnotes, and filmed on 8ll5/E58o4l3-4l. 
For accounts of the formation of the pro memoria see 
Albrecht, No. 19, footnote 1, pp. 81-82; and DGFP, C,
Vol. II, No. 265, p. 304, footnote 4.
^^Albrecht, No. 19, p. 82.
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saw the reason for the worsening of relations between the 
Church and State in the attitude of a great many clergy­
men, who apparently had not overcome their tendency to 
interfere in political matters and who therefore remained 
opposed to the new Germany. As an example, a priest in 
Dietersheim (Hesse) made the following statement in his 
Sunday sermon: "There are today people in Germany who
are sowing weeds among the wheat. Such people must be 
exterminated, even if this includes Reich Chancellor 
Hitler." Another priest, this time in Emeringen (Württem­
berg) , referred to the Reich Chancellor and the NSDAP dur­
ing a recent service as "criminals and murderers." One 
priest even struck a boy for using the Hitler greeting.
Although the Reich government had complied with the 
wishes of the Holy See by releasing students of theology 
from the SA and Labor Service, leading Church authorities 
continued to prevent individual students from voluntary 
participation. The government saw in this act a lack of 
understanding for the great task of educating the people. 
Also, the Catholic associations continued to carry on 
political activities, and any organization which called 
itself "Catholic" fell back on Article Thirty-one. For 
this reason delays had occurred in reaching an agreement 
on the list of organizations that would receive protection
^^Ibid., pp. 86-88. Numerous other examples of this 
type are listed in the pro memoria.
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under this article, and the Reich government rejected the
accusation it alone was responsible for these delays. In
the event of the incorporation of the Catholic youth groups
into the Hitler Youth, the Reich government would take into
consideration the religious and pastoral interests of these
organizations in the same manner it had dealt with the
61Protestant youth groups. This willingness to permit the 
pastoral care of the interdenominational State organiza­
tions should remove the fear that the Nazis intended to 
undertake a struggle against Christianity.
The pro memoria continued by reminding the Holy See 
that Rosenberg had stated explicitly in the introduction 
to the Myth he was expressing only his personal views and 
not the views of the Nazi program. The Reich government 
found it strange that in some countries the press, with 
the approval of the "highest Church authorities," made it 
appear German Catholics were undergoing the "severest per­
secution." The Holy See even permitted the members of the 
Austrian Episcopate to criticize conditions in Germany
64publicly. On the question of sterilization, the Reich 
government regretted its opinions differed from those of 
the Holy See, but hoped the Holy See would honor the
6 ̂The Protestant youth societies, whose more than 
one million members had to swear love and loyalty to the 
Fuehrer, were incorporated into the Hitler Youth on 
December 20, 1933- Wheaton, p. 367-
64 See above, p. l68.
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reasons which made the pursuance of this policy essential. 
For its part, the government had considered some of the 
requests made by the Church. For example, it had conceded 
that sterilization would not take place in cases involving 
persons in institutions, under ten years of age, nearly 
sterile, or when it would endanger the person's life.^^ 
After a final comment on the clergy's involvement in poli­
tics, the pro memoria closed with a subtle warning:
If the Holy See wishes to engage in a public discus­
sion before reaching a friendly agreement with the 
German government, then the government will not de­
cline to engage in such a discussion, but it will 
also not be responsible for any increase in the al­
ready existing tension.66
When the pro memoria is considered in its entirety, 
one is struck by its muted but aggressive tone. In view 
of the Reich government's countless violations of the Con­
cordat and the numerous accusations which the Holy See 
made in its own pro memoria of January 31» a more defensive 
document might have been expected. Apparently the Nazis 
believed the shrewdest tactical maneuver in this situation 
was to disguise their own campaign against the Church with 
a verbal barrage aimed to prove that Catholics themselves 
perpetrated the evil deeds. Thus, the Reich government 
concentrated on its own grievances, especially the
State Secretary Pfundtner of the Reich Ministry 
of Interior had requested the granting of these conces­
sions in his note to the Foreign Ministry on January 29,
1934, MI29/MOO4793-95.
^ ^Albrecht, No. 19, p. 99-
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participation of the clergy in politics. While the gov­
ernment affirmed its desire for friendly relations with 
the Holy See, it did not hesitate to remind the Vatican 
in closing that it would not recoil from a public discus­
sion if this became necessary. Also, the government re­
minded the Vatican of the numerous clergymen who remained 
opposed to the new Germany, which forced Catholics to de­
fend themselves against the old charge of political dis­
loyalty. The Hitler government clearly understood the 
vulnerability of German Catholicism at this point, and 
it did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity.
CHAPTER VII
MARCH 15 - JUNE 29 : THE REICH GOVERNMENT
ENCOUNTERS INCREASED CRITICISM
During the Easter season, the Pope twice reacted 
to the increasingly tense religious situation in Germany. 
On the first occasion he sent a special Easter greeting 
to all the German Catholic youth associations through 
the General President of the associations. Published a 
short time later in the KOlnische Volkszeitung, the 
Pope's message had the effect of encouraging all Catho­
lic youths in Germany to remain firm in their faith 
against the pressure of Nazi heathenism:
In spite of all the difficulties through which 
Providence is leading you, and in spite of a prop­
aganda working with alluring appeals and with 
pressure for a new view of life leading away from 
Christ and back to heathenism, you have kept the 
vow of love and fidelity to the Saviour and the 
Church and for that very reason remain all the 
firmer in allegiance to nation and home, which 
as in past times, it is your desire to serve un­
selfishly in the closest spirit of union.
We know from our own responsibility of pastoral 
care--and we know that it is also the great anxiety 
of your bishops--the situation of the Catholic youth 
of Germany. Your associations should in any event 
know that your cause is our cause. We lead you in 
fatherly love beneath the cross of Jesus Christ 
which shines from your banners and bestow from our 
heart upon you, your parents and your relatives
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the desired Apostolic blessing as a source of 
unshakable loyalty to the Faith.1
A few days later the Pope spoke out again, this time in 
an address to 300 German Catholic youths on a pilgrimage 
to Rome. He spoke of the deep anxiety with which he ob­
served events in Germany and the distressing news he re­
ceived daily on the difficulties confronting the German 
Catholics. The Pope promised the youth they could assure 
their comrades in Germany that he would do everything 
possible to support them in their defense of the Catho­
lic Church.^
The remarks of the Pope quite naturally created 
an unfavorable reaction in the German government. In a 
note to the Foreign Office, Ambassador Bergen referred 
to the "exceedingly hard and unfriendly statements" made 
by the Pope in his speech to the Catholic pilgrims from
3Germany. Also, during a talk with Pacelli, Bergen 
criticized the Pope for referring to the Catholic youth 
of Germany as persecuted. The harsh speech, Bergen re­
marked to the Cardinal, would certainly do nothing to
Quoted in The Times (London), April 3, 193^, p. 
10. Excerpts from the Pope's message are also printed 
in The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third 
Reich, pp. 2-3 ; and NeuhMusler, II, 294.
^The Times (London), April 6, 1934, p. 11. Ex­
cerpts from the Pope's speech are printed in The Persecu­
tion of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, p. 3> and 
NeuhMusler, II, 294-95.
B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  M i n istry, April 6 , 1934,
8I I5/ E58O56I.
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facilitate the forthcoming negotiations on the implemen­
tation of the Concordat. Pacelli refused to discuss the 
subject, however, and replied only that the Pope had the 
habit of improvising his speeches. Nevertheless, Bergen 
interpreted the speech as a sign of the Pope's increasing 
anger. If the next round of negotiations failed again, 
Bergen wrote Neurath, the Pope would probably make an­
other harsh announcement. Cardinal Pacelli not only left 
the impression he could not prevent the Pope from making 
certain decisions, but also appeared pessimistic regard­
ing future successes.^
Others at this time shared Pacelli's pessimism 
about the state of Reich-Vatican relations. Certainly, 
the opinions expressed by the correspondent for the 
London Times in Rome provided no basis for optimism.
"The Vatican is watching the latest stage in the con­
flict between the Nazis and the German Roman Catholics 
with a growing concern," the Times correspondent declared. 
As long as the "present intransigent spirit" persisted, 
the Concordat was a "dead letter." The current deadlock 
would end only if the Nazi leaders applied those rights 
expressly conceded to Catholic priests and institutions 
in the Concordat. Until the German authorities changed
^Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, April 6 , 1934,
8II5/E580562.
^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y  (For the R e i c h ­
m i n i s t e r )  , Apr i l  6, 1934, 8I I5/ E58057I -72.
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their attitude, the chance of any relaxation in the ten­
sion between the Vatican and Berlin appeared slight. On 
the contrary, he predicted, the Vatican would in all 
probability "harden" its attitude toward Germany.^
Also during April Vice-Chancellor Papen expressed 
his views on the religious situation in a lengthy letter 
to Bergen. While not assigned to any official position 
involving Reich-Vatican affairs after the conclusion of 
the Concordat, Papen had nevertheless managed to remain 
in close contact with the events. That he sometimes 
wielded considerable influence is obvious from the role 
he played in drafting the government's pro memoria of
nMarch l4, and from the frequent mention of his name in 
the notes exchanged between the Foreign Office and the 
German Embassy. As his letter of April 7 makes perfectly 
clear, Papen used this influence to reconcile the Catho­
lic forces to the Hitler government. Even his work in 
negotiating the Concordat, he frankly admitted, resulted 
largely from his desire to overcome the ideological dif­
ferences separating German Catholicism and National So­
cialism. The Reich Chancellor's willingness to build 
the Third Reich on Christian foundations, Papen believed, 
had to be supported by a "definite settlement" with the 
Catholic Church. "With a firm juristic basis to stand on,"
^The Times (London), April 4, 1934, p. 12. 
^See above, p. 206.
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both sides could reconcile their differences much more 
readily. On many points, Papen continued, the new order 
in Germany corresponded to what the Catholic Church had 
long proclaimed as the ideal social order. Tragically, 
efforts to disclose the similarity between Nazi doctrine 
and the Catholic conception of society had so far failed. 
Even the German Episcopate had erroneously identified 
the theses of Rosenberg's Myth with Nazi doctrine, al­
though the Reich Chancellor had never accepted the ideas 
of this book as an official part of the party program.
Not until the Fuehrer had established his authority "in 
fact" could the Reich government take "positive action 
to keep subordinate leaders from acting contrary to the 
views of the supreme leadership." Despite adverse criti­
cism, Papen declared, he had labored hard to overcome the 
difficulties between State and Church and to solve the 
controversial points of the Concordat. He had worked to 
"activate Catholicism" so that it would become a "positive 
element in the construction of the new Germany." Unfor­
tunately, the German Episcopate had not seen the necessity 
of supporting this work, and the situation would not im­
prove as long as Cardinal Bertram remained its leader.
In filling vacant bishoprics, Papen advised, appointments 
must go to younger men who were "aware of the needs of the 
times." It would be "tragic" if the Vatican allowed dif­
ficulties over the Concordat to bring about a break with
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the Reich government. Such a step could only strengthen 
the adversaries of Germany, and undermine the "historic 
mission" which Europe had assigned Germany. For this 
historic mission Germany required the "sympathetic under­
standing and the support of the Holy See." Both sides 
needed to exercise "extreme patience and farsightedness" 
in order to resolve the situation in the interest of the
gReich, the Church, and Europe in general.
Papen's efforts to bring about greater cooperation 
between the Church and the State did on occasion contrib­
ute to a softening of the position held by the Reich gov­
ernment. As a result of discussions held between Reich 
Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach and Papen on February 20, 
Schirach agreed to permit the members of the Catholic youth 
organizations simultaneous membership in the Hitler Youth. 
Although Schirach would have preferred to retain the ban 
on double membership in accordance with his order of
QJuly 3 0, 1933> he agreed to this concession after "some 
prodding by P a p e n . A t  the same time Schirach also af­
firmed the willingness of the Hitler Youth leadership to 
guarantee the Catholic youth "every opportunity for spir­
itual care by the Church," including sufficient time away
gVice-Chancellor Papen to Ambassador Bergen, April 7, 
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 383, pp. 714-22. In the margin 
Bergen wrote: "Note: Not suitable for communication to
the Cardinal Secretary of State." Footnote 1.
9 10See above, p. 120. Lewy, p. 120.
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from their regular duties to attend Sunday worship and to 
participate in religious education one afternoon a week.
The religious instruction would have to avoid the discus­
sion of political issues, however, and the Hitler Youth 
leader would have to be permitted to attend any of these 
lectures, regardless of his denomination. In essence, 
Schirach permitted the Catholic youth organizations the 
right to retain their separate identity provided they 
restricted their activities to a "purely religious area."^^
Further discussions on the fate of the Catholic 
youth organizations took place on March 29, this time in 
a conference attended by Hitler, Bergen, and Buttmann. 
Bergen informed the Reich Chancellor that in order to 
avert a clash with the Vatican, Buttmann should introduce 
some new proposals during his next round of talks with 
Pacelli. Hitler agreed, and he permitted Buttmann to make 
use of the concessions granted by Schirach in the exchange 
of views on the Catholic youth organizations. Hitler re­
fused, however, to grant any additional concessions to the
12other Catholic organizations.
While Church leaders undoubtedly believed they had 
obtained an important concession from the Reich govern­
ment in acquiring the right of double membership for
^^The German Youth Leader to the Vice-Chancellor,
February 20, 193^, DGFP, C, Vol. II, No. 272, p. 519. 
12Bergen to Neurath, M<
Vol. II, No. 370, pp. 692-93.
^ ^ a r c h  29, 1934, D G F P , C,
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Catholic youths, this certainly did nothing to prevent un­
ruly members of the Hitler Youth from disrupting meetings 
of the Catholic youth organizations. As an example, on 
March 25 some 200 members of the Hitler Youth charged 
through one wing of the assembled Catholic youths at Hen-
ningsdorf, seized their banners, and forced them to return 
13to Berlin. Such incidents naturally tended to increase 
the tension between the Holy See and the Reich government, 
as accounts of these events invariably reached Rome.
By the second week of April Buttmann had returned 
to Rome in order to resume the discussions with Pacelli 
on the implementation of the Concordat. This time, Butt­
mann expressed optimism over the course of the talks. In 
accordance with the instructions he received from Hitler 
on March 29, Buttmann informed Pacelli the Reich govern­
ment had agreed to the concessions made by Reich Youth 
Leader Schirach regarding the Catholic youth organizations. 
Buttmann also presented Pacelli with a copy of Schirach's 
letter to Papen, which spelled out the details of the plan. 
The Cardinal appeared quite satisfied with these proposals, 
but requested Buttmann to present them in an official note
to the Vatican in order that it might serve as a basis for
l4future negotiations.
^^The Times (London), April 3, 1934, p. 10, and 
April 4, 1934, p. 11. Also, see Wheaton, p. 337.
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, April l4, 1934, 8II5/
E580618-I9.
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The Vatican presented its suggestions for the 
regulation of the Catholic associations in the form of two 
prepared drafts, one dealing exclusively with the Catholic 
youth organizations and the other consisting of a general 
interpretation of Article Thirty-one. From the view­
point of the Reich government, the concessions made by the 
Vatican in these drafts were disappointing. According to 
Menshausen, the government had expected the Vatican to be 
more generous toward its wishes in view of the important 
concessions made by S c h i r a c h . T h e  government's wish to 
prohibit members of the Catholic youth organizations from 
wearing uniforms except to Church affairs had not even re­
ceived serious consideration. In view of this intransigent 
attitude on the part of the Vatican, Menshausen continued, 
an understanding seemed impossible. If an agreement should 
be reached, "both sides" would have to show a willingness 
to compromise. The Vatican especially desired to retain 
control of the confessional sports organizations, but Men­
shausen declared he could see no place for them in the new 
17Germany.
^^These drafts, both dated April l8, are enclosed 
in Menshausen's memorandum of May 5» 1934, 8II5/E580636-5O
^^Perhaps, as Lewy suggests, Schirach's reputation 
for being an "ardent follower of Rosenberg" made the Vati­
can suspicious and therefore less inclined to make conces­
sions. Lewy, p. 121.
Memorandum by Menshausen, May 5, 1934, 8115/ 
£580636-39* The Nuncio, Menshausen added, had hinted that
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Once again the failure to reach an agreement on 
Article Thirty-one brought about the suspension of the 
negotiations. On April 19 Buttmann left for Berlin where 
he planned to report on the course of the discussions or­
ally. In view of the tense situation, Bergen reported,
18he would not object to giving up his summer vacation.
On April 20 Pacelli wrote Cardinal Bertram that since the
talks had failed to make any headway, the Holy See saw no
reason why the German Episcopate should not undertake
direct negotiations with the Reich government. Pacelli
cautioned the bishops, however, to avoid making undue 
19concessions. The government had no objections to dis­
cussing the application of Article Thirty-one with repre­
sentatives of the Episcopate, although in a letter to Car­
dinal Bertram Reich Minister of Interior Frick did recom­
mend the discussion of other questions at the same time. 
Frick suggested the Episcopate should keep this in mind
20when choosing their representatives for the negotiations.
the Holy See would concede to the government's wish on the 
sports organizations during the course of the negotiations. 
Menshausen did not believe the Nuncio was well-informed on 
the talks, however, because he repeatedly asked questions 
about the progress of the negotiations. See also, Deuer- 
lein, pp. 151-52.
T ABergen to the Foreign Ministry, April 19, 1934,
8II5/E58062O.
19Lewy, p. 121.
POF r i c k  to Bertram, M a y  3, 1934, 8II5/ E58065I -52 .
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Despite Nazi assurance of their willingness to
reach an agreement with the Vatican, inside Germany the
pressure on the Catholic organizations increased steadily.
In a visit with Billow, Monsignor Orsenigo declared he had
received information the Gauleiter of Würzburg had issued
an order prohibiting Catholic youth organizations, and a
21similar situation had occurred in Schweinfurt. More
serious, on April 28 Robert Ley, head of the German Labor
Front, issued an order prohibiting simultaneous membership
in the Labor Front and the Catholic workers' or journey-
22men's associations. In other words. Ley's ruling banned 
double membership in the Nazi and Catholic labor organiza­
tions just as Schirach's order of the previous July had 
banned double membership in the Nazi and Catholic youth 
organizations. In effect, this meant the demise of the 
Catholic labor organizations, because membership in the
German Labor Front was rapidly becoming mandatory as a
23condition of employment.
The Church wasted little time in protesting this 
latest infringement of Catholic rights. On May 1 Bishop
Memorandum by Bülow, April 27, 193^» 324l/D7023?0. 
Bülow knew nothing about the matter but said he would in­
vestigate. See also The Times (London), May 5, 1934, p. 11, 
and May 7, 1934, p. 13 «
p PLey's order is printed in Müller, No. 135, pp. 271- 
72, with the erroneous date of April 27- Albrecht, No. 25, 
p. 119, footnote 1. See also NeuhMusler, II, 311*
^^Lewy, p. 121.
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Galen or Münster sent a telegram to Hitler requesting the 
Reich Chancellor to rescind the decree. This way, the 
Bishop reasoned, the many German men dedicated to the task 
of reconstruction would not be excluded from the German
ol̂community. A few days later the Vatican registered its 
protest to the decree. Through Ambassador Bergen, on 
May 8 Cardinal Pacelli sent a sharp note to the Reich 
government. The Holy See was astonished, Pacelli declared, 
to discover subordinate authorities had issued unauthorized 
decrees, especially when the negotiations were suspended 
and the Reich government possessed the official proposals 
of the Vatican. These decrees not only stood in opposition 
to the Concordat and to the recent negotiations, but they 
violated in the worst way the existence of the Catholic 
organizations as guaranteed in Article Thirty-one. As an 
example of such a decree, Pacelli cited the recent order 
by Ley. Furthermore, according to reliable reports the 
government planned to issue "work passes" exclusively to 
members of the Labor Front. Although they were essential 
to obtain employment, the members of the Catholic workers' 
associations would be unable to acquire them. These de­
crees and intentions, Pacelli concluded, were incompatible 
with the Concordat and the recent negotiations, and the
oLBishop Galen mentioned this telegram at the end 
of an address delivered to a group of Catholic workers at 
Werden on June 17, 1934. See Müller, No. l44, p. 288.
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Holy See urged the Reich government to carry out effective 
corrective measures.
If Pacelli's sharp language took the Reich authori­
ties by surprise, they received little satisfaction from 
the note which followed a few days later. On May l4 the 
Vatican replied to the German pro memoria of March l4 
with a lengthy pro memoria of its own. Bearing the seal 
of the Papal Secretary of State, the pro memoria covered 
virtually every issue of controversy between the Reich 
and the Vatican.
The opening comments of the pro memoria referred 
to the recent negotiations on the implementation of the 
Concordat. In effect, the interruptions had tended to 
lessen the value of the Reich government's assurance that 
it welcomed these discussions. It had become necessary to 
interrupt these discussions because the German government 
failed to send a representative with full authority.
As an important part of the German people, the pro 
memoria continued, Catholics deserved the right of equal 
treatment. They at least had the same rights as former 
members of the Marxist movement, who the Nazis not only
Pacelli to Bergen, May 8, 1934, enclosed in Ber­
gen's note of May 10 to the Foreign Ministry, 8ll5/E580654- 
56. Printed in Albrecht, No. 25, pp. 119-20.
^^Pro memoria of the Holy See to the German Govern­
ment, May l4, 1934, enclosed in Pacelli's note to Bergen, 
May 14, 1934, 8II5/E580676-749. Printed in Albrecht,
No. 29, pp. 124-64.
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permitted in the NSDAP but even offered them positions 
refused to Catholics. If Catholics refused to support 
movements under political disguises which pursued irreli­
gious goals, they did this not because they wished to be
disrespectful to the State, but because the Holy Scripture
27commanded them to "obey God more than man."
After the Reich Chancellor's speech of March 25, 
1953, the bishops were favorably disposed toward National 
Socialism. Now, however. Catholics in Germany would have 
to recognize with the "deepest sorrow" that their hopes 
had not been fulfilled. This had occurred because of 
persons in anti-clerical circles, who had shifted the 
positive course of Reich cultural policies away from the 
solemn declarations proclaimed by the Reich Chancellor in 
his speech of March 25. In view of the situation, the 
Holy See found it necessary to request the German govern­
ment to face this reality with a seriousness which com-
28plied with the spirit of the Concordat.
The pro memoria continued by citing examples of the
29material given to the leaders of the Landschul.jahr. A
^^Albrecht, No. 29, PP• 126-27*
28 ̂ Ibid., pp. 150-51.
29The "Land.jahr, " as it is usually designated, re­
fers to the year in which all boys raised in cities and 
industrial areas who did not continue their schooling 
after the compulsory eight years were removed from their 
parents and sent into the country for about nine months. 
Here they were brought together in rural camp homes, all
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few are worth quoting:
National Socialism is a religion . . . born from the
blood and soil of Nordic spirit and the Aryan soul.
The confessions which still exist, both Catholic and 
Protestant, must disappear. If they do not dissolve 
voluntarily, the State should eliminate them. Point 
24 of the party program was inserted only to serve 
as bait for Catholics of all shades. But only a com­
plete idiot would rely on this program and the Con­
cordat with Rome. Anyone with any intelligence knows 
that National Socialism and Christianity are deadly 
enemies.30
The school curriculum required every boy to participate 
in this training, the pro memoria continued, even though 
sincere Catholics could not accept Nazi doctrines. Further­
more, the authorities systematically trained the leaders of 
these schools in a heathenish manner. Their parents al­
lowed this only because they did not realize the nature of 
the instruction, which made atheism the leitmotiv. The 
Holy See could not help but ask, "were these instructions 
coming from central authorities?" The totalitarian demands 
of the State regarding education, the pro memoria declared.
managed by carefully selected Nazi leaders. The idea was 
to indoctrinate the youths with National Socialist theo­
ries and to make them more aware of the significance of 
land and nature, which the Nazis believed could be accom­
plished much more readily in a rural environment than 
amidst urban surroundings. In accordance with this goal, 
theoretical instruction at these camps played a secondary 
role to physical exercise and courses in folklore, art, 
German history, racial biology, folk dancing, etc. See 
Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, 
pp. 392-93; Mario Bendiscioli, Nazism versus Christianity, 
trans. by Gerald Griffin (London: Skeffington and Son,
1939)1 P» I9O; and H. J. Arnold, "Germany's New 'Rural 
Year' Plan," School and Society, XLI (January 3, 1935)i 
23-24.
^^^Albrecht, No. 291 p. 133-
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would eventually bring an end to the State itself as the 
welfare of the State and people could not be served prop­
erly "without religion." Without discipline and moral 
training, a physical power alone could only bring destruc­
tion. When the Church had learned the youth were being 
taught the false message of a new "materialism of the 
race," it had no alternative but to resist.
According to the Reich government, the German 
people regarded the Catholic organizations with hostility. 
If so, it had been brought about by Nazi propaganda. While 
the Reich government had assured the Holy See it was not 
attempting to create a new faith movement, it tolerated 
certain practices which cast doubt on the validity of these 
assurances. It was not just individual cases but the "reg­
ularity" of the attacks which caused the Holy See to pro­
test, for these attacks could occur only with the aid of a 
"central influence."
While the Holy See found the Myth unconvincing, 
more important than what the author of this book described 
was what he and others did with their anti-Christian ide­
ology. Unfortunately, Nazi authorities gave future teach­
ers intensive ideological instruction in the spirit of 
Rosenberg, and all teachers were expected to obtain a copy 
of the Myth. While the Reich government indicated in its 
pro memoria of March l4 that it wished to avoid a public
3 ^ I b i d . , p. 151.
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discussion of these issues, in reality the violations of
the Concordat had already made these discussions public 
32in Germany.
Clearly, the language of the pro memoria was 
strong, and may be considered a reflection of the 
increased tension between the Church and State inside 
Germany. The Holy See struck hard at the heathenish 
tendencies of the Nazis, especially the anti-Christian 
instruction given to German youths. Again, as in the 
case of its pro memoria of January 31, the Holy See 
implied the responsibility for the violations of Catho­
lic rights fell on the shoulders of a "central influ­
ence," and not just the local authorities. Everything 
considered, in the pro memoria of May l4 the Holy See 
had made its strongest protest up to this time.
Considering the sharp tone of the pro memoria, 
a warm reception on the part of the Reich government 
could hardly be expected. Although Ambassador Bergen 
admitted the document was thorough and carefully pre­
pared, he suggested an examination of its "harsh al­
legations, despite their length." Bergen also recom­
mended that the pro memoria be submitted to the Reich 
Chancellor. In Bergen's opinion. Hitler should see 
these "pedantic documents written in almost an
^^Ibid., p. 163.
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ultimatum-like vein" before the Holy See published them 
in a White Book.^^
In the same note to Neurath, Bergen made some other 
comments which are revealing about himself as well as for 
the light they shed on Reich-Vatican relations. In the 
Vatican, he remarked, many believed that without his serv­
ices, the Reich government and the Holy See would have 
broken off relations long ago. Bergen added he had not men­
tioned this matter in order to "glorify" himself, but only 
to "characterize the situation." It would be difficult, 
Bergen continued, to continue putting the Vatican off with 
"tactical maneuvers." Unless the Reich government decided 
to discharge the obligations it had assumed and to settle 
the various pending questions, a clash seemed "inevitable."
A public reproach by the Vatican would delight the "less 
amicably disposed powers, particularly France." A break 
with the Curia, Bergen continued, "might produce a sensi­
tive reaction in the Catholic countries and provoke un-
34pleasant manifestations," especially in the Saar.
On May 20 about 3000 German pilgrims and ten bish-
35ops, including Cardinal Faulhaber, gathered in Rome for
Bergen to Neurath, May 24, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II, 
No. 463, PP* 841-42. A marginal note in Neurath's hand­
writing and dated June 6 states the memorandum was pre­
sented to the Reich Chancellor. Footnote 1.
3^Ibid.
3 5According to The Times (London), May 22, 1934, 
p. 9, fourteen bishops were present rather than the ten 
reported by Bergen.
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the canonization of the Capuchin monk, Konrad von Parzham. 
During the evening the Pope received these pilgrims in a 
special audience and delivered a lengthy but moderate 
address. While the Pope expressed his sympathy for those 
who suffered for their religious beliefs in such "diffi­
cult times" and praised the faithful for their courageous 
fight, he refrained from making specific attacks upon the 
Reich government. The Pope did receive the bishops in­
dividually, however, and this prompted the London Times 
to write "with confidence" that the German prelates were 
profiting from this occasion to discuss the "peculiar 
circumstances" of the Catholic Church in Germany among
37themselves and with the representatives of the Holy See. 
Although Bergen never learned the exact content of these 
conversations, he did inform Berlin that "heated argu­
ments" supposedly took place between the "intransigeant 
Cardinal Faulhaber and the quiet, restrained" Archbishop 
Grdber of Freiburg. According to Bergen, GrtJber had not 
originally intended to come and did so only at the request 
of Prelate Kaas, who wanted the Archbishop in Rome so that 
he and "other moderate bishops" could form a "counterpoise"
Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, May 20, 1934, 
8II5/E580664-65. Although Bergen attributed the moderate 
tone of the Pope's address to "various parties" who exerted 
their influence upon the Pope, he did not say who these 
parties were. Bergen to the Foreign Ministry (For the 
Reichminister), May 20, 1934, 8II5/E580667-68.
^^The T i m e s  (London), M a y  22, 1934, p. 9-
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to Cardinal Faulhaber, Bishop Ehrenfried of Würzburg, and
38others.
In the past few days, Bergen wrote on May 20, the 
Vatican had outwardly exercised "remarkable caution" in 
its relations with the Reich government. In regard to 
future relations, however, Bergen was not very optimistic. 
The chairman of the Fulda bishops' conference, he reported, 
had recently compiled a series of documents on the execu­
tion of the Concordat, especially Article Thirty-one. All 
members of the Episcopate would receive copies of these 
documents to enable them to make decisions based upon a 
definite knowledge of the negotiations which had taken 
place. The strictest secrecy had been ordered, and the 
bishops could use them only for stated purposes. Appar­
ently, Bergen continued, the Pope planned to speak out 
strongly, although not to the point of bringing about a 
break between Germany and the Vatican. He reportedly 
would wait for the results of the forthcoming talks be­
tween the representatives of the Reich government and the
39Episcopate before making any "decisive resolutions."
Considering the tense state of Reich-Vatican rela­
tions at this time, it is no surprise that the efforts of 
the German government to bring about the dissolution of
^^Bergen to Neurath, May 24, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. II,
No. 463, pp. 841-42.
39B e r g e n  to t
mi nister). M a y  20, 1934, 8I I5/E580667-68.
he Foreign Ministry (For the Reich-
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the Bavarian Legation in Rome and the Papal Nunciature in 
Munich failed to proceed smoothly. Although the Holy See 
had already agreed to accept May 31 as the termination
4odate for the Bavarian Legation, Neurath learned Cardinal 
Pacelli had reportedly stated the Vatican still found the 
matter "distressing." If so, it had little effect on the 
Reich government, which remained adament on this issue. 
Neurath took the position that since no other country in 
the world maintained special diplomatic missions at the 
Vatican from districts within the State, it would be an 
expression of "unjustified distrust" in the German govern­
ment for the Holy See to insist upon retaining this
... 41privilege.
While reluctant to see the Bavarian Embassy in 
Rome terminated, the Vatican appeared even more unwilling 
to accept the dissolution of the Munich Nunciature. Ac­
cording to Bergen, Pacelli wished to show his friends in 
Bavaria, especially Cardinal Faulhaber, that he was exert­
ing every effort to maintain the Nunciature. Again, the 
Reich government insisted that the Nuncio to Bavaria, 
Alberto Vassallo di Torregrossa, would have to step down
from his post. Bergen even requested Kaas to try and
42persuade Pacelli to accept this fact, but by the middle
4oSee above, p. 198.
^^Neurath to Bergen, April 13, 1934, K2l40/K595636-
38.
A Q
B e r g e n  to Neurath, M a y  10, 1934, 8I I5/E58066O -62.
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of May the Foreign Office still had received no word the 
Vatican had issued any instructions regarding the dissolu­
tion of the Nunciature. Neurath attributed the delay to 
the fact the Vatican had recently gained the impression 
there was a disagreement between the Reich and the Bavarian 
government over this issue. In view of this, Neurath wrote 
Minister-President Ludwig Siebert of Bavaria, Monsignor 
Vassallo should be informed that his diplomatic mission in 
Bavaria would end on May 31, i.e., at the same time as the 
Bavarian Legation in Rome. If necessary, it should be 
pointed out to Vassallo that the Bavarian government would 
no longer have authority to continue its official relations 
with him after May 31 « If Vassallo wished to remain in 
Munich as a private individual until the Vatican appointed
him to a new assignment, the Reich government would make 
4 3no objections. Despite the firm stand of the government 
on this matter, the Vatican continued to hope the Nuncia-
44ture could be maintained. By the end of May, however, 
the Vatican had acquiesced on this issue, and Pacelli pro­
ceeded to inform Monsignor Vassallo the dissolution of the
45Nunciature would take place on the last day of the month.
Neurath to Siebert, May l6, 1934, K2l40/K59566l-63• 
On May 22 Bergen informed Neurath Monsignor Vassallo did 
wish to remain longer in Munich (K2l40/K595679-80).
^^Neurath to Gttring, May l8, 1934, K2140/K595664-66.
^^Neurath to Siebert, May 29, 1934, K2l40/K59568l-82. 
Neurath received this information from Bergen, who in turn 
had received it from Pacelli. A copy of Pacelli's note to 
Vassallo could not be located.
234
The final termination of the Vatican's special 
representation with Bavaria and Prussia was carried out 
without difficulty. On May l8 Neurath requested Gttring, 
Minister-President of Prussia, to notify the Vatican that 
Ambassador Bergen's authorization to act as the special 
envoy of Prussia to the Holy See would be terminated on
46May 31. Gttring carried out this request on May 28 in 
a letter to Pope Pius. He simply informed His Holiness 
that in accordance with the new Reich law of January 30, 
which transferred the sovereign powers of the states to 
the Reich government, the Prussian Legation to the Holy
4?See had ceased to exist. In a similar letter to the 
Pope, Minister-President Siebert severed Bavaria's rela­
tions with the Holy See by recalling the Bavarian envoy
48to the Vatican, Baron von Ritter.
During June, which culminated in the famous "Blood 
Purge," there was a noticeable decline in the number of 
protest notes exchanged between the Reich and the Vatican.
^^Neurath to Gttring, May I8 , 1934, K2l40/K595664-66.
^^Gttring to His Holiness the Pope, May 28, 1934,
enclosed in Gttring's note to Neurath, May 28, 1934, K2l40/ 
K595672-76. It should be added that at this time the au­
thority of Orsenigo to act as the papal envoy to Prussia 
was also withdrawn. Orsenigo had been performing these 
duties in addition to his regular duties as papal nuncio 
to the German government (K2140/K595664-66).
48Siebert to His Holiness, June [day not given], 
enclosed in Siebert's note to Neurath, June 12, 1934, 
K2140/K595685-86. Bergen wrote the Foreign Ministry on
July 3 that Ritter left Rome on June 28 (K2140/K595690).
See also Franz-Willing, pp. 247-49*
235
The most plausible explanation for this decline was the 
desire of both sides to avoid any increase in tension 
until after the negotiations on Article Thirty-one had 
taken place. There were, however, some significant in­
ternal religious developments during this month which 
directly affected Reich-Vatican relations.
On June 5 the German Episcopate met at Fulda for 
their annual plenary conference. One important item of 
business was to select their representatives for the 
negotiations with the Reich government later in the month. 
For this assignment the Episcopate chose Bishop Bares of 
Berlin, Bishop Berning of Osnabrück, and Archbishop GrOber 
of Freiburg. Since the Nazis regarded Grdber and Berning 
as friendly, the Episcopate probably selected them think­
ing they would have more success in the negotiations than
49bishops known to be hostile.
In general, the tone and content of the joint pas­
toral letter adopted on June 7 reveals the increased anx­
iety of the bishops concerning the spread of neopaganism 
in Germany. Nazi theories on race, the bishops declared, 
absolutely negated the doctrines and ethics of the Church. 
They referred to Rosenberg's Myth as a book "radical of 
expression," which made use of countless distortions in 
order to undermine faith in God, the Christian religion, 
and to destroy respect for the authority of Christ and the
49̂Lewy, p. 122.
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Church. No longer could they remain silent, the bish­
ops continued, when they saw persons with ’’vast influ­
ence and powers at their disposal numbered among the sup­
porters and propagators of neopagan i d e a s . D e s p i t e  
these strong statements, the bishops did place limits 
upon their criticism. For example, they refrained from 
identifying either the Myth or Rosenberg by name, nor 
did they attack the Nazi party and its teachings. Lewy 
suggests the bishops were forced to distinguish between 
the Nazi movement itself and the aberrations of the 
radical elements in order to continue their support of 
the Hitler regime. Also, Lewy believes, some of the 
bishops in 193^ still hoped for a break between Hitler 
and Rosenberg. In any case, in their public pronounce­
ments the bishops made it clear they directed their 
criticism at the neopaganism of certain party leaders 
and not at the State and movement itself.
In view of the pending negotiations between the 
representatives of the Episcopate and the Reich Ministry 
of Interior on the Concordat, the bishops decided to 
postpone the reading of the letter for fear it would 
hamper the talks. On June 27 Cardinal Bertram and 
Bishop Berning sent a joint telegram to all members of
^^The full text of the letter is printed in Müller, 
No. l42, pp. 276-86. Also, see Shuster, pp. 227-20.
5^Lewy, pp. 152-53 .
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the Episcopate informing them to delay the reading of 
5 2the letter. The Reich government was not impressed 
by this concession, however, as the letter had already 
been printed and distributed widely. Accordingly, the 
Gestapo quickly confiscated all unsold copies and pro­
hibited publication of the letter by the press and 
diocesan gazettes. While this obviously violated Article 
Four of the Concordat, the Nazis justified this step on
the grounds the letter jeopardized public order and dep-
5 3recated the authority of the State and movement. Car­
dinal Bertram vainly attempted to convince Reich Minister
of Interior Frick that the Episcopate had no intention of
54attacking the State or movement, but the Nazis regarded 
any criticism as intolerable, even when indirect.
On June 17 the Hitler government received another 
jolt, this time from Vice-Chancellor von Papen. Speaking 
at the University of Marburg, Papen openly called for an 
end to the Nazi revolution and Nazi terror, and he criti­
cized the government for its mishandling of propaganda. 
Some of his statements were amazingly bold. In referring 
to the talk of a second revolution Papen declared:
Printed in Müller, No. l48, p. 290 and No. 149, 
p. 291. On the same day, June 27, Cardinal Bertram ex­
plained the reasons for this action in a letter to the 
German bishops.
^^Lewy, p. 153.
54Bertram to the Reich Minister of Interior,
July 16, 1934, Müller, No. I5I, pp. 292-93-
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"Whoever toys irresponsibility with such ideas should not
forget that a second wave of revolution might be followed
by a third, and that he who threatens to employ the guil­
eslotine may be its first victim." Precisely what moti­
vated Papen to attack the Nazis at this time is not easy 
to determine, as he had previously worked hard at the task 
of consolidating Catholic support for the Hitler government. 
Possibly he had become unhappy with the Reich Chancellor 
for shoving him into the background after the conclusion 
of the Concordat in 1933. Or, as Shirer suggests, perhaps 
he was encouraged to attack the Nazi government by Presi­
dent Hindenburg, who still thought highly of von Papen. 
Whatever his reason, the speech made Hitler and other party 
leaders furious. But while the Reich government made every
effort to prevent knowledge of the speech from spreading,
57the text soon found its way around in pamphlet form.
Also, the crafty Papen had provided the diplomats and for-
m oeign correspondents in Berlin with advance texts. Con­
sidering the large number of important figures purged at 
the end of the month, it is clear the Marburg speech could 
easily have cost Papen his life. Fortunately for Papen,
55Excerpts from this speech are printed in Bullock, 
pp. 272-73; and The Times (London), June 19, 1934, p. l4. 
For the full text see TMWC, XL, 543-58.
^^Shirer, p. 218.
^^The Times (London), June 21, 1934, p. l4. 
^^Shirer, p. 218.
239
Hitler found further use for him in Vienna, where he con­
tinued to serve the Nazi regime faithfully by preparing 
the way for the Anschluss. Nevertheless, Papen deserves 
credit for the courage he displayed in the Marburg speech.
As Wheaton suggests, it was the "best thing Papen did dur-
59ing the Nazi era."
On June 25 the representatives of the Episcopate and 
the Reich government began the negotiations on Article 
Thirty-one in the Reich Ministry of Interior. Ministerial- 
direktor Buttmann, who acted as chairman, was backed up by 
a number of important German officials, including Schirach, 
Ley, and Herr D. von Detten, the "Leader of the Department 
of Cultural Peace of the NSDAP." On the other side. Bishops 
Berning, Grtiber, and Bares were assisted by Monsignor Or­
s e n i g o . A t  the outset of the conference the bishops sub­
mitted a list of prepared questions, which included a re­
quest for the government to clarify the position of the 
State toward Christianity, the Church, and the Concordat. 
According to Menshausen, the "highly confidential" negotia­
tions proceeded harmoniously as both sides appeared sincere 
in their desire to reach an agreement.
^^Wheaton, p. 489, footnote 221.
^^The Times (London), June 26, 1934, p. 13; and Lewy, 
p. 122. For other participants in the conference see 
Deuerlein, p. l60
^^Memorandum by Berning, GrOber, and Bares, June 25,
1934, 8II8/E581489.
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, June 30, 1934, DGFP, C, 
Vol. Ill, No. 50, pp. 109-11. Apparently the negotiations
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On June 27 Hitler received the representatives of 
the Episcopate for a discussion of the urgent religious 
problems. After thanking Hitler for granting the audi­
ence, Bishop Berning stated the bishops had accepted the 
new State but they were worried over the Concordat, which 
they feared the government would not fully execute. Hitler
replied that the Church would have to avoid all criticism
6 ̂of the State and party and remain aloof from politics.
He did, however, grant Berning's request to issue a public 
statement to the effect that both the government and the 
party were "favourably and helpfully disposed towards the 
activities of the Catholic Church in her own sphere and 
that neither would have anything to do with the so-called 
'third religion,' the German National Church and similar
64movements opposed to Christianity."
On June 29 the representatives of the Episcopate 
and the government reached an agreement on the controver­
sial Article Thirty-one, although it was still subject to 
the approval of higher government authorities, the German 
Episcopate, and the Vatican. The representatives agreed 
that those Catholic associations whose "sphere of work"
were not too "confidential," or at least the London Times 
had enough information to report correctly on both the 
question discussed and the progress of the negotiations. 
See The Times (London), June 30, p. 11.
6 ̂̂ Lewy, p. 122.
64Memorandum by Menshausen, June 30, 1934, DGFP, C, 
Vol. Ill, No. 50, pp. 109-10.
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overlapped the activities carried out by the national 
associations, such as the sports and labor associations, 
would not receive protection under Article Thirty-one.
The Church authorities could, however, incorporate these 
associations and their funds into Catholic Action, a lay 
organization instituted by Pope Pius XI in an effort to 
revive Catholic life and to spread Catholic teachings.
The associations, it was agreed, would have to limit 
their activities to purely religious, cultural, and 
charitable purposes. After the incorporation of these 
associations the Reich government would remove the ban 
on double membership, thus permitting Catholics to be­
long to both their own organizations and the national 
associations. The Catholic youth associations would 
continue to exist but only to the extent that they con­
fined their activities to the "religious and moral educa­
tion of their members." In order to prevent future
The expression, "Catholic Action," had long been 
used in Italy and elsewhere as a general term, but Pius XI 
gave it a more specific meaning and world-wide significance 
by defining it as the "participation and collaboration of 
the laity with the apostolic hierarchy." In essence, the 
Pope called upon Catholic laymen to become involved in 
solving the problems of society and not to leave every­
thing to the clergy. Although the Concordat had not spe­
cifically mentioned Catholic Action, according to Catholic 
interpretation it was protected under Articles One and 
Thirty-one as a non-political organization. Nevertheless, 
the Nazis regarded the organization as a disguised politi­
cal group intended to replace the dissolved Center Party. 
Lewy, p. 49; Micklem, pp. 55-57; and H. E. Westermeyer,
The Fall of the German Gods (Mountain View, Calif.:
Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1950), p « 138.
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disputes, the bishops -would "temporarily" prohibit the 
members of the Catholic youth associations from wear­
ing uniforms, although they could still wear badges and 
carry banners on special occasions. Furthermore, on the 
basis of these conditions Reich Youth Leader Schirach 
declared he would make certain the Hitler Youth main­
tained a friendly attitude toward the Catholic youth
. . 66 associations.
In addition to the above, the representatives of 
the German Episcopate and the Reich government reached a 
number of other agreements. The bishops promised Catho­
lic Action would serve completely non-political goals, 
while the State would reserve the right to examine the 
Catholic associations to determine whether their activi­
ties remained within the framework of Article Thirty-one. 
The State also guaranteed the possessions of the Catholic 
associations, subject to the usual legal restriction 
valid for the members of all organizations. Also, these 
associations would retain the right to solicit funds so 
long as they did not exceed the scope of their legitimate 
activities. The negotiators agreed that physical train­
ing should be under the control of the State. Finally, 
it was agreed that Schirach would appoint a "mediator" 
to the Catholic Church as soon as the Reich government
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, June 30, 1934, DGFP, 
C, Vol. Ill, No. 50, pp. 109-10; and Lewy, p. 123.
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and the Episcopate had reached an agreement on the Individ-
6 7ual to be selected.
Thus, after several months of controversy, the Reich 
government and the Church finally reached a tentative set­
tlement on the implementation of Article Thirty-one, While 
the representatives of the Episcopate had made a number of 
concessions in order to obtain this agreement, they ex­
pected no serious objections when they submitted the draft 
to Cardinal Bertram for his formal a p p r o v a l . E v e n t s  soon 
proved the bishops to be poor prognosticators, because 
Bertram considered the concessions too extensive and sent
a copy of the agreement to both the Vatican and the other
69members of the German hierarchy. Since the confiscation 
of the June pastoral letter had infuriated both the bishops 
and the Vatican, it did not appear likely these agreements 
would be quickly ratified. Whatever chance remained, how­
ever, was eliminated by the events of June 29-30--the time 
Hitler selected to carry out his famous "Roehm purge."
^^Draft of the Agreement on the Execution of Article 
Thirty-one, enclosed in Frick's note to the Foreign Minis­
try, July 7, 1934, 8115/E580759-67.
^^Memorandum by Menshausen, June 30, 1934, DGFP, C, 
Vol. Ill, No. 50, pp. 109-10.
6 9 Lewy, p. 124.
CHAPTER VIII
JULY 1 - SEPTEMBER 30: THE REICH GOVERNMENT
ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE CATHOLIC CONFIDENCE
During the early morning hours of June 30 a fast 
moving squad of cars bearing the Reich Chancellor and 
his party tore down the road from Munich to Bad Wiessee, 
where Ernst Roehm and his friends were still asleep in 
the Hanselbauer Hotel. While accounts of what followed 
vary in detail, the final results involve no mystery. 
Roehm was removed to the Stadelheim Prison in Munich 
where two SS officers later murdered him in his cell.
In Berlin, where GfJring and Himmler directed the execu­
tions, firing squads shot some I50 leaders of the SA at 
the Lichterfelde Cadet School. By no means limited to 
the SA, the purge also included a number of prominent 
Germans, such as the former Chancellor, General Kurt von 
Schleicher. On the morning of June 30 the SS murdered 
Schleicher as he answered the door of his villa on the 
outskirts of Berlin. Gregor Strasser, Hitler's one-time 
friend, was seized at his home in Berlin and shot a few 
hours later in his cell at the Prinz Albrechtstrasse 
Prison. The body of Gustav von Kahr, a former Prime
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Minister of Bavaria, was found in a swamp near Dachau,
hacked to pieces. And the slaughter continued, on through
the "Night of the Long Knives," and into the week-end.^
Since Gdring apparently ordered all the incriminat-
2ing documents destroyed, the precise number killed is not 
known. In his Reichstag speech of July 13 Hitler quoted a 
figure of seventy-seven, but the total was assuredly much
3higher. Neither are Hitler's motives easily determined,
especially since there is no evidence Roehm had planned
to carry out an SA insurrection during the last days of 
4June. There is reason to believe Roehm had set himself 
up as a rival to Hitler, however, and that the SA con­
sciously pursued its own course in defiance of the govern­
ment. Such a course led inevitably to a collision with 
Hitler, who was not about to tolerate insubordination re­
gardless of the past services which the SA had rendered 
to the Nazis. By 1934 the huge size of the SA made it 
difficult to control, and the Reichswehr as well as Hitler 
considered the organization a threat.^ In essence, the SA
^Bullock, pp. 275-77; Shirer, pp. 221-22; and 
Wheaton, pp. 443-44.
^Shirer, p. 217.
3Adolf Hitler, My New Order, pp. 276-77- Estimates 
on the number killed vary from a minimum of l44 to over 
400. See Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in 
the Nazi Party (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota
Press, 1967) , p. 135, footnote 56.
N y o m a r k a y ,  pp. 133 and 135; and Shirer, p. 224.
^Wheaton, pp. 436-37*
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had outlived its raison d'être, and secured by the bless­
ing of the Reichswehr, Hitler plucked up the courage to 
carry out the purge. At the same time he took advantage 
of the opportunity to settle old scores and to rid him­
self of anyone who had incurred his ill will.^
A number of prominent Catholics were included
among the victims. Dr. Erich Klausener, the head of
Catholic Action in Berlin since I928, was slain in his
office. Furthermore, the SS immediately cremated his
body without consulting his relatives, and officially
announced suicide as the cause of death. Edgar Jung,
who had played an important role in composing Papen’s
Marburg speech, was murdered in prison. Other prominent
Catholics purged included Dr. Friedrich Beck, leader of
the Catholic Action in Munich; Dr. Fritz Gerlich, former
editor of the anti-Nazi Der Gerade Weg; and Adalbert
Probst, a former deputy of the Bavarian People's Party
and the National Director of the Catholic Youth Sports 
7Association.
The most prominent Catholic of all, von Papen, 
surprisingly escaped harm, although he was in greater 
danger than he realized. Hitler had never forgiven him 
for the Marburg speech, and had Papen not received some
pp. 234-35
^Shirer, p. 223»
^Ibid., pp. 222-23; Wheaton, p. 444; and Shuster,
5.
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protection by virtue of his position as Vice-Chancellor 
and through his close ties with President Hindenburg, he
gtoo would likely have become a victim of the purge. As 
it was, he suffered only the indignity of house arrest 
for a few days, during which an SS detachment surrounded
9his home and severed his contact with the outside world.
Although the purge destroyed the last vestige of 
a quasi-independent power within the Nazi Party, the re­
sulting shock wave carried around the world. Despite 
Goebbel's best efforts to prevent knowledge of the purge 
from spreading, attacks on the Nazi regime increased both 
at home and abroad. Often Goebbel's futile attempts to 
conceal the news only led to an exaggeration of the 
rumors and an intensification of the feelings of horror 
and fear. Hitler revealed the story for the first time 
in his speech to the Reichstag on July 13, during which 
he placed the blame entirely on Roehm, who had forced him 
to act against his will.^^
Catholics generally responded to the murders of 
June 30 with shock and bitterness. The Catholic clergy 
especially resented the murder of Klausener and the cre­
mation of his body in defiance of Catholic doctrine. Ac­
cording to the London Times, the purge seriously jeopardized
oBullock, p. 276; and Dutch, pp. 217-18.
9]
Hitler, M y  N e w  O r d e r , pp. 253-78.
Papen, p. J I6 .
10
248
the agreement previously reached on Article Thirty-one.
The reaction of the Saar Catholics was especially strong,
and the requiem masses held for Klausener and Probst drew
12overflowing crowds throughout the area. In referring
to Klausener's death, the Catholic Saarbrücker Landes-
zeitung declared that German Catholics would "not have
one of their most meritorious leaders branded as a
traitor by fiat."^^ On July l4 the Avenire d'Italia
wrote that the death of Klausener had created the "deep-
14est sympathy" among the Austrian Catholics. The elimi­
nation of Klausener and Probst, the London Times wrote 
three days later, indicated a "calculated anti-Catholic 
move" on the part of the Reich government.
Despite the resentment which the murders created 
among Catholics all over the world, the German Episcopate 
remained silent. This failure to denounce the Hitler re­
gime for its barbarity at such a critical time has not 
gone unnoticed by historians. "The German Catholics and 
the world at large waited anxiously for the reaction of 
the Church," Lewy writes, "but none was to be forthcoming." 16
^^The Times (London), July 7, 1934, p. 12.
^^Lewy, p. 185.
^^Quoted in the New York Times, July 6, 1934, p. 2. 
l4Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, July 15, 1934,
K2255/K621942-43.
^^The Times (London), July 1 7 , 1934, p. l4.
^^Lewy, p. 170.
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Another historian, J. S. Conway, is even more critical:
It is a sad fact that the leaders of the Churches 
also acquiesced in this deplorable apostasy. The 
Catholic Hierarchy made no attempt to condemn the 
atrocities carried out despite Hitler's promises 
to the Bishops on 27 June.17
While the bishops made no joint effort to condemn the 
murders. Bishop Bares of Berlin did issue a warning to 
Hitler. In his letter of July 12, Bares denied the pos­
sibility Klausener had engaged in any subversive activity, 
and he warned the Reich Chancellor of the "disasterous
consequences" which his death could have for all Germans,
X 8especially in the Saar. The vast majority of the bish­
ops, however, remained silent.
Unfortunately, the Vatican also failed to speak 
out on the events of June 30, or at least there is no 
sign of a protest in the German archives. While access 
to the Vatican archives is necessary to explain this 
silence, it does appear the Vatican was deeply disturbed 
over the murders. On July 11 the New York Times reported 
the Vatican planned to take action in response to the 
death of Klausener, and that Cardinal Pacelli, who had 
consistently proposed compromise with the Hitler govern-
19ment, could lose his post as the Papal Secretary of State.
X7 Conway, p. 93* See also Wheaton, p. 36O.
1 OPrinted in Müller, No. 153a, pp. 295-96. Bares 
received an evasive reply to his letter from Hans hammers, 
State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery. See Zipfel, 
p. 65.
19N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s , J u l y  11, 1934, p. 1.
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The German archives, however, reveal nothing to either
support or refute this rumor. On July l8 Bergen informed
Neurath that the Vatican took a "critical view" of the
recent events in Germany, especially the shooting of
Klausener and the burning of the corpse. Bergen added
he had refused to discuss this matter with Vatican offi-
20cials on the grounds it concerned "internal" questions.
On the following day the London Times referred to a recent 
article in the Osservatore Romano as a sign Probst's mur­
der had caused "deep indignation" in Vatican circles. 
According to the Osservatore Romano, neither Probst nor 
Klausener had taken part in any alleged military revolt,
nor was Probst shot while attempting to escape as the
21government had claimed. Finally, at the end of the 
month Bergen again reported that the shooting of Klausener,
Probst, and the cremation of Catholics had "deeply upset"
22the Pope.
Although no one seriously doubts that the atroci­
ties of June 30 disturbed the Church authorities, the 
fact remains that both the Vatican and the Episcopate 
failed to publicly condemn the murders or to send a
20Bergen to Neurath, July l8, 193^i 6153/E460996-99•
2TThe Times (London), July 19, 1934, p. 13-
22 Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, July 31, 1934,
6153/E461000. At the same time Bergen reported that the 
abortive Nazi putsch on July 25, which resulted in the 
murder of the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, 
also disturbed the Pope.
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formal note of protest to the Reich government. Since 
this silence on the part of the Catholic leadership 
lessened the criticism at a time when the Hitler govern­
ment was already under heavy attack, it unquestionably 
worked to the advantage of the Nazis. Hitler realized 
that the patience of the Church was not without limits, 
however, and that he could not forever depend upon Catho­
lics remaining silent if he persisted in playing the role 
of hatchet man. The Roehm purge had already increased 
criticism of the government, and an open conflict with
2 3the Church at this time could have serious consequences. 
Hitler understood this, and therefore it is no surprise 
that the Nazis applied considerably less pressure on the 
Church in the second half of 193^ than in the first six 
months. Nazi goals remained the same, but for the time 
being Hitler wished to mitigate the campaign against the 
jChurch in order to restore Catholic confidence in the 
respectability of the Reich government. As a result of 
Hitler's efforts to placate the Church, a kind of "super­
ficial" lull in the Church conflict took place, both in­
side Germany and in the government's relations with the 
Holy See. In no way, however, did these efforts remove 
Catholic distrust of the Nazis or ease the tension between 
the Reich and the Vatican.
23Heinrich Fraenkel, The German People versus 
Hitler (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1940), p . l4?,
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Hitler had still another reason for wishing to 
restore Catholic good will during the second half of 
1934--the Saar plebiscite. On January 13, 1935, the 
inhabitants of the Saar would go to the polls to deter­
mine whether the territory would return to Germany, go 
to France, or remain under the control of the League of 
Nations, which had administered the area since World 
War I. Because of the great industrial importance of 
this region and the psychological advantage which a 
positive vote would give Germany, Hitler considered a 
victory essential. Since the population was overwhelm­
ingly German and desired to return to the Reich, it would
appear Hitler had no serious problem. Unfortunately for
24Hitler the population was also predominately Catholic, 
and this meant that the official position of the Church 
in the Saar would be of great importance in determining 
the outcome of the plebiscite. It also meant the course 
of Church-State relations in Germany would have a direct 
relationship to the plebiscite, because both the Saar 
clergy and laity watched these events with keen interest.
In his effort to secure the vo^e of the Saar Catho­
lics Hitler did have one important advantage; both Bishop 
Bornewasser of Trier and Bishop Ludwig Sebastian of Speyer
24According to the census of 1927, Catholics ac­
counted for 72.6 per cent of the population. Sarah Wam- 
baugh. The Saar Plebiscite; With a Collection of Official 
Documents (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1940), p. 15.
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were ardent German nationalists. The Saar fell under
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of these bishops, and
they did not hesitate to use their authority to work
25toward the Saar's reunion with Germany. The French 
naturally resented the pro-German influence of the two 
bishops, and attempted to eliminate their authority in 
the Saar. Together with the Commission for the League 
of Nations, the French repeatedly requested the Vatican 
to establish a separate bishopric for the Saar, The 
Vatican refused to grant the request, however, and the 
two bishops continued to actively propagate pro-German 
sentiments among the Saar Catholic's. During the fall of 
1933 the French complained to the Vatican that the activ­
ities of the Saar clergy and the Nazi propagandists seri­
ously threatened a free vote. As a result, in November 
of the same year the Pope appointed Monsignor Gustavo 
Testa as his confidential emissary to the Saar.^^ The 
Pope assigned to Monsignor Testa the task of keeping the 
Vatican informed about complaints and general conditions 
in the Saar.^^
Until the Nazis came to power in January of 1933> 
most observers had assumed the predominantly German
^^Lewy, p. 182.
^^Report of the Bishop of Trier on His Negotiations 
Concerning the Saar Territory, November 20, 1933> DGFP, C, 
Vol. II, No. 96, pp. 167-7!"
^^Ibid., p. 168; and Lewy, pp. 183-84.
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population of the Saar would vote overwhelmingly for 
reunion with the Reich. The presence of Hitler as Reich 
Chancellor, however, had made many Saar inhabitants ponder 
the wisdom of this course, and their numbers grew as the 
Nazi government increased its harassment of the Catholic 
Church in Germany during the first half of 1934. To many 
Saar Catholics it seemed wiser to postpone an immediate 
return to Germany by voting for the status quo, and in 
this way help bring about the downfall of the Hitler gov­
ernment. These Catholics received an unexpected boost 
from the Roehm purge, which was known immediately in the
28Saar by virtue of its free press. The recently founded
Catholic Neue Saar Post, which strongly opposed reunion
with Germany as long as the Nazis ruled, now gained many
29new supporters. Sentiment grew among Saar Catholics
that the plebiscite should be postponed, or if this proved
impossible, a second and final plebiscite should take
30place after the collapse of the Hitler government. The 
purge so altered the situation in the Saar that some ob­
servers believed the Reich might lose the Saar indefinitely 
unless Hitler succeeded in placating the Church and reha­
bilitating himself, or unless a new German government re-
31placed the Nazis. On July 29 the Saar Catholics mani­
fested both their massive strength and their hostility
28 2Q _Wambaugh, p. 207. Lewy, p. 185.
30I O 1Wambaugh, p. 207. Lewy, p. I85.
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toward the Nazis at a meeting of the Catholic youth or­
ganization in Saarbrücken. Although about $0,000 young 
people marched in the orderly procession, they carried no
swastikas and failed to mention Hitler when they gave a
32silent tribute to the murdered Adalbert Probst. No 
longer could Hitler safely assume the Saar Catholics 
would vote for reunion with Germany on January 13*
Hitler clearly needed to restore Catholic confi­
dence in the government before the plebiscite. Conse­
quently, shortly after the Roehm purge he made a serious 
effort to finalize the agreements reached during the June 
conference on the implementation of Article Thirty-one.
In keeping with the promise made to the bishops at this 
3 3time. Hitler prepared to issue a public declaration
clarifying the government's position toward the Catholic
34Church and Christianity in general. On July 7 Reich 
Minister of Interior Frick submitted a draft to Hitler,
Wambaugh, p. 208. Despite the large number in­
volved in the procession, the Bishops of Trier and Speyer 
remained firm in their pro-German sentiments. In a tele­
gram to President Hindenburg, they even went so far as to 
use the occasion to express the "unwavering fidelity" of 
the Catholic youths to the "Supreme Head of the German 
Reich." See also The Times (London), August iB, 1934, 
p. 9 •
^^See above, p. 240.
^^See Frick to the Foreign Ministry, July 7, 1934, 
8II5/E580759-6I. Two days later Kdpke wrote the Embassy 
to the Holy See to avoid letting anyone know the content 
of the proposed declaration, including the Vatican (8125/ 
E$81957)* See also hammers's note to Frick, July I6 , 
1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 91, pp. 175-76.
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who approved the declaration after the inclusion of a 
few minor changes. Because the Vatican rejected the 
agreements reached during the June conference, the 
Reich government never published this declaration. 
Nevertheless, it is worth quoting as an indication of 
how far Hitler would go at this time to strengthen his 
position with the Church:
Now that the differences, formerly frequent, 
between the State and the Catholic Church have 
been composed by means of exhaustive negotia­
tions, I am making it incumbent upon all State 
and Party administrative offices to refrain 
from making any kind of disparaging remarks 
either about the Church's religious and moral 
doctrines or about ecclesiastical institutions 
and persons. Where there appears to be cause 
for intervention, this will be solely a matter 
for the competent State authorities. It is 
inadmissible and hereby strictly prohibited to 
take any kind of individual action.
The National Socialist State and the NSDAP 
are opposed to any interference in religious 
controversies. All State and Party adminis­
trative offices shall, in particular, refrain 
from proselytizing on behalf of any kind of 
religious movement.35
Unlike some of his nebulous statements of the 
past, this time Hitler made specific promises which 
he could not easily circumvent without leaving himself 
wide open to the charge of deceit. The Church would 
have especially derived satisfaction from the last 
paragraph, which in essence warned State and party 
officials against participating in the various neopagan
^^Frick to hammers, August 4, 1934, DGFP, C, 
Vol. Ill, No. l4?, pp. 291-92, including footnote 3«
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movements then current in Germany, such as Dr. Jacob Hauer's 
German Faith Movement (Deutsche G1aubensbewegung).
Despite the apparent improvement in Hitler's atti­
tude toward the Church, the Vatican remained in an adament 
and unconciliatory mood. Neither did this mood improve 
when the Vatican learned the full story of the June con­
ference from the minutes forwarded by Cardinal Bertram.
On July 18 Bergen reported to Neurath on the Vatican's 
response to these minutes, basing his information on con­
fidential reports and his talks with Cardinal Pacelli. 
According to Bergen, the Pope had believed the Reich gov­
ernment would insist upon conducting the negotiations it­
self, and would refuse to allow party authorities such as 
Pfeffer and Detton to participate in the discussions. Be­
cause of the statements made by these party representatives, 
the Vatican would have to question the value of any final 
agreement concluded with the Reich government. According 
to the minutes, Bergen continued, Pfeffer had contended 
that agreements made by representatives of the State did 
not necessarily bind the NSDAP. Hence, if the Episcopate 
negotiated only with the State, the party organizations 
had no obligation to abide by these agreements. The Holy 
See, Pacelli informed Bergen, could not possibly accept 
these conditions. In the Cardinal's mind, Bergen wrote.
For a discussion of the neopagan movements during 
the Third Reich see Westermeyer, The Fall of the German 
Gods, chap. v.
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37only the "Reich government" existed. The perceptive 
Pacelli obviously realized that an agreement which 
failed to bind the NSDAP was of little value.
Pacelli had raised a vital question, and Neurath 
knew it. On August 2 Neurath wrote Hess that the re­
fusal of the NSDAP to abide by agreements concluded 
with the Reich government had made the Vatican "ex­
tremely upset." In order to avoid future difficulties, 
Neurath requested Hess to inform the responsible party 
authorities to recognize only the Reich government, 
which had negotiated the treaty with the Holy See and 
other sovereign powers, and to make certain party of­
ficials did not violate the obligations accepted by
o Qthe government in the Concordat.
In addition to its difficulties with the Vatican, 
the Reich government soon discovered that the members of 
the German Episcopate were also reluctant to approve the 
June agreements. On July 26 Pfundtner wrote the Foreign 
Office that the bishops who had participated in the June 
conference had still not obtained the agreement of the 
rest of the clerical authorities, even though the Reich
^^Bergen to Neurath, July l8, 1934, 6153/E460996-
99.
Q  O Neurath to the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Reichmin- 
ister Hess, August 2, 1934, 6153/E461001-02. Hess's 
reply could not be located in the files. More than 
likely he never wrote one.
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government had proved by these negotiations just how much
39it desired "true peace between the Church and State."
Although both the Vatican and the German Episco­
pate wished to postpone the decision on the June agree­
ments, the delay did not appear to disturb the Reich gov­
ernment. On August 8 State Secretary Billow informed the 
Ministry of Interior that since the Reich government had 
revealed its willingness to conclude an agreement during 
the June negotiations, the Curia would have to decide 
whether it wished to approve or disapprove the results. 
Nor should the government urge the Holy See to expedite 
matters, as this would probably lead to an intensifica­
tion of the existing tensions. It would be wiser, Bülow 
concluded, to leave the matter in the hands of the Curia, 
which would then have to assume responsibility for any
4ofurther prolongation of the final settlement.
Early in September the Vatican finally informed 
the Reich government it could not approve the June agree­
ments. After studying the bishops' report of the nego-
4ltiations. Cardinal Pacelli wrote Klee on September 2, 
the Holy See had concluded that the concessions made by
^^Pfundtner to the Foreign Ministry, July 26, 1934,
8II5/E58O782-83.
^^The State Secretary [Bülow] to the Reich Ministry 
of Interior, August 8, 1934, 8ll5/E580799-01.
4l A m b a s s a d o r  B e r g e n  w a s  o n  vacation.
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the Reich government in "various essential matters" were 
"below the degree of religious freedom guaranteed by the 
text of the Concordat." In the judgement of both the 
Holy See and the German hierarchy, Pacelli continued, 
these concessions did not represent a "true interpreta­
tion of the Concordat itself." For this reason, the Reich 
government and the representatives of the hierarchy would 
have to agree upon the necessary modifications in future
, . 42conversations.
Cardinal Pacelli discussed the specific points 
which required modification in considerable detail. The 
ban on dual membership in the Catholic and State organi­
zations, Pacelli declared, would have to be lifted by the 
Reich government, and not by separate agreements concluded 
between the hierarchy and the organizations concerned.
Nor could the Holy See agree to the disbandment of the 
Catholic occupational organizations. Moreover, in order 
that Article Thirty-one could become effective, the Holy 
See desired a clarification of the statements made during 
the June conference by the representatives of the NSDAP, 
who maintained the party was not bound to agreements con­
cluded by the Reich government. The Holy See, Pacelli 
continued, could acknowledge "none other than the highest
4 2Pacelli to the Charge d'Affaires [Klee], Septem­
ber 2, 1934, enclosed in Klee's note to the Foreign Min­
istry, September 6 , 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 193, 
pp. 386-90. Printed in Albrecht, No. 4l, pp. 184-88.
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responsible representative of Government authority" as a 
negotiator. The vxews expressed by the party representa­
tives during the June talks deprived "all agreements of 
their intrinsic value," and in order to bring an end to 
such views the Holy See believed the "highest State au­
thority" would have to issue a statement pointing out the 
"binding legal nature" of the Concordat. Furthermore, 
neopagan propaganda had grown steadily more intense since 
the Nazis came into office, and the frequent restrictions 
placed upon the Church's freedom to defend itself made 
this situation "all the more intolerable." If the Reich 
Chancellor, as had been reported, intended to make an 
official proclamation in order to bring these "intoler­
able conditions" to an end, he would have to make it 
"absolutely clear" that both the State authorities and 
the members of the Nazi party were forbidden to foster 
anti-Christian propaganda. With a view to submitting a 
draft revised in accordance with the proposals set forth 
by the bishops and the Holy See, Pacelli concluded, the
representatives of the hierarchy intended to "resume con-
43tact with the Reich government without delay."
Cardinal Pacelli strongly implied that the Holy 
See rejected the June agreements solely on the basis of 
over-generous concessions made by the bishops and the re­
fusal of the party representatives to recognize the
43 r-Ibid. See also Lewy, pp. 125-26.
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Concordat as valid for the NSDAP. The evidence indicates 
that the Roehm purge also played a role in this decision, 
however, despite the fact that Pacelli did not even men­
tion this subject in his note. Bergen reported that the 
shooting of prominent Catholics and the subsequent murder 
of Dollfuss had so disturbed the Pope he no longer wished 
to negotiate with the Reich government. In all probabil­
ity, Bergen predicted, the Pope would refuse to accept
the agreements made during the June talks in toto. Ber­
gen even suggested that the Reich government wait until 
the momentary "psychosis" of the Pope had vanished before
44attempting to deal with him further. Clearly, the June 
murders had increased Vatican fears as to the intentions 
of the Hitler government, which in turn created an atmos­
phere of suspicion hostile to a final settlement. Also, 
the Vatican hesitated to ratify the June agreements be­
cause it would have enhanced the prestige of the Nazis,
and this would have been incomprehensible to Catholics so
45soon after the purge.
Despite the continued tension, the summer of 1934 
saw no new pro memories and few sharp notes exchanged be­
tween the Reich government and the Vatican. Only one new 
controversy emerged of any significance--the school
44Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, July 31, 1934, 
6153/E481000.
45Gurian, H i t l e r  and the C hristians, p. l44.
263
question. While the most serious conflict over the con­
trol of the schools took place in the years ahead, the 
difficulties of 1934 clearly anticipated this struggle.
Like any revolutionary movement, the Nazis strived 
to gain control of the educational system. They considered 
this essential in order to capture the minds and souls of 
the new generation, and thus rally all German youths to 
their cause. Instead of emphasizing the acquisition of 
knowledge, which was out of tune with the pronounced anti- 
intellectualism of Hitler and the movement as a whole, the 
Nazis stressed "character building." They did not apply 
the term in the usual sense, however, i.e., the develop­
ment of one's self-reliance and independence. On the con­
trary, the Nazis interpreted character building to mean 
the cultivation of a sense of community, and the "steeling 
of oneself for service and obedience in the name of the
46Volk and the Führer." In practical terms, this meant 
less emphasis upon traditional classical subjects and more 
on new courses, such as racial biology, which inculcated 
the student with the proper attitude regarding the State, 
Volk, and race. Since the Nazis could easily adapt physi­
cal training to the pursuance of these goals, they made 
it a subject of prime importance. Book learning always
46George L. Mosse, ed., Nazi Culture: Intellectual,
Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich, trans. by 
Salvator Attanasio and others (New York: Grosset & Dunlap,
1966) , p. 265.
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came second to physical training in the educational system
47of Nazi Germany.
Consistent with the policy of Gleichschaltung, 
Hitler desired to saturate the German schools with Nazi 
principles and coordinate them into a unified educational 
system. To accomplish this goal, he sought to convert 
the confessional schools (Konfessionsschule or Bekenntis- 
schulen) into interdenominational or community schools 
(Simultanschulen or Gemeinschaftsschulen), but at this 
point he ran into opposition from the Catholic Church. 
Article Twenty-three of the Concordat not only guaranteed 
the maintenance of the existing Catholic schools but even 
provided for the establishment of new ones when requested 
by parents. Also, according to Article Twenty-one, the 
German schools would provide Catholic religious instruc­
tion as a "regular subject." While the Church had already 
obtained these privileges in parts of Germany, the Concor-
48dat extended them to the entire Reich.
Despite these concessions, the Nazis considered the 
education of the youth far too important to be left in the 
hands of the Church. Even the existence of the Concordat 
did not prevent the Reich government from taking steps 
calculated to ultimately bring an end to the confessional
47 Ibid., pp. 263 and 265.
48For a discussion of the schools in Germany during 
the first two years of Hitler's rule see Helmreich, chap. x
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schools. While the Nazis did not campaign openly against 
the confessional schools until after the Saar plebiscite, 
they began to exert pressure much earlier. In a note to 
Bergen shortly after the Roehm purge, Cardinal Pacelli 
complained about the methods used by the Nazis in their 
efforts to convert the confessional schools into community 
schools. Pacelli specifically called attention to the 
school vote in Darmstadt, which did not take place in ac­
cordance with the elementary school laws of Hesse. On 
one occasion, Pacelli declared, a Catholic teacher voted 
in favor of the community school solely out of fear of 
losing his position. Without such pressure, which clearly
contradicted the Concordat, the vote would have favored
49the confessional rather than the community school. Ber­
gen delayed his reply until well after the Saar plebiscite, 
at which time he refuted Pacelli's arguments by claiming 
that the Cardinal both lacked knowledge of the school laws 
of Hesse and failed to base his criticism on facts.
By the late summer and fall of 1934, Hitler began 
personally to take steps to placate Catholic fears in 
preparation for the Saar plebiscite. Increasingly, his 
speeches re-affirmed the Reich government’s good intentions
^9pacelli to Bergen, July l8, 1934, 8ll5/E580793-97•
Printed in Albrecht, No. 39i PP- I76-78.
5°Be 
pp. 239-43.
^ ^ r g e n  to Pacelli, June 6, 1935» Albrecht, No. 58 ,
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toward the Christian churches. Hitler's Hamburg speech
of August 17 serves as a good example:
The National Socialist State professes its alle­
giance to positive Christianity. It will be its 
honest endeavour to protect both the great Chris­
tian Confessions in their rights, to secure them 
from interference with their doctrines, and in 
their duties to constitute a harmony with the 
views and the exigencies of the State of to-day.51
Hitler continued to speak in a conciliatory tone on Au­
gust 26 at Koblenz, where he addressed about 300,000 per­
sons, half of whom had arrived from the Saar in special 
5 2trains. The National Socialist movement, he declared,
neither opposed the Church nor was anti-religious, but
5 3stood on the foundation of a "real Christianity." A 
few days later. Hitler asserted in a proclamation read 
at the Nuremberg party rally that the Reich government 
was endeavoring to "establish a sincere and satisfactory 
relationship" with the Catholic Church. If lapses had 
occurred on both sides due to the memory of past strug­
gles, Hitler declared, "we still do not doubt that in
54the end success will crown the work of the past year."
At the same party rally Schirach and other Nazi leaders 
made statements aimed at moderating the overly-exuberant
^^Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, I, 385-86 
^^The Times (London), August 2?, 1934, p. 10. 
^^Hitler, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, I, 386-87 
^^The Times (London), September 6 , 1934, p. 12.
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activities of the Hitler Youth. According to the London 
Times, these Nazi officials admonished the Hitler Youth 
to make all their actions "exemplary in order that German 
parents should voluntarily send their youths to the Hitler 
organizations."^^
On September l4 the same negotiating teams that 
had participated in the June conference resumed the dis­
cussions on Article Thirty-one in Berlin. Three days 
later Bishops Bares and Berning presented Buttmann with 
a draft of the proposed changes to Article Thirty-one 
agreed upon by the Vatican and the German hierarchy (sub­
sequently referred to as the "September draft").^^ For 
the most part these changes reflected the Vatican's
57wishes as expressed in Pacelli's note of September 2. 
Buttmann requested von Detten, one of the negotiators, 
to obtain from the leaders of the party organizations 
concerned the views of the proposed changes, especially 
the Labor Front and the Hitler Youth. As soon as pos­
sible, Detten was to inform Reich Minister of Interior 
Frick on the outcome of these talks, and if necessary, 
Frick would ask Hitler for a decision on the changes.
^^Ibid., September 4, 1934, p. 11.
^^Amended Draft of the Agreement Concerning the 
Execution of Article Thirty-one, received in the Foreign 
Ministry on September 19, 1934, 8II5/E58082O-3O .
^ ^ S e e  above, pp. 259-61 .
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In view of the Saar plebiscite, Menshausen recorded, all 
agreed the Reich government should reach an agreement 
with the bishops before Cardinal Pacelli left for the 
Eucharistie Congress at Buenos Aires on September 23« 
Otherwise, the "unpleasant state of suspense" would be 
prolonged until after Pacelli's return from South America 
on November 12.^^
The Hitler government had never revealed a greater 
willingness to cooperate with the Vatican. On Septem­
ber 21 Ktipke instructed the German Embassy to inform 
Cardinal Pacelli orally that the Reich government had 
entered the new discussions in order to furnish "fresh 
proof" of its "sincere desire for an understanding," even
though it had considered the agreements reached with the
59representatives of the Episcopate final. On Septem­
ber 20, the last day of the discussions, Buttmann in­
formed the three representatives of the Episcopate that 
while Hitler had "on the whole approved the agreements 
reached during the June conference, he had rejected the 
proposed amendments pertaining to sports in the Catholic 
youth organizations and the incorporation of the
Minutes by an Official of Department 11 (Men­
shausen) , September l8, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 212, 
pp. 4x6-17. On the same day Kttpke informed hammers of 
these developments (8II5/E58O831), and Neurath informed 
Hess (8II5/E580832).
59K 8 p k e  to the E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See, S e p t e m ­
ber 21, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 215, pp. 422-23.
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occupational associations into Catholic A c t i o n . A c ­
cording to Cecil von Renthe-Fink, Deputy Directory of 
Department II, Hitler described the demands made in these 
amendments as "too extensive." Hitler did make one im­
portant concession; he declared the Nazi party as well 
as the State would be bound to the Concordat and the 
provisions for its application. Furthermore, as soon 
as the Reich government and the Vatican approved the 
final agreement. Hitler agreed to issue a public state­
ment as he had promised the representatives of the Epis­
copate on June 27»^^ Since Hitler intended to leave for 
a vacation, Renthe-Fink believed it would be impossible 
to resume the discussions with the bishops until the 
middle of October. Meanwhile, the Reich government 
would prepare a new draft of Article Thirty-one which 
took Hitler's objections into consideration.^^
Apparently Hitler disliked the idea of distin­
guishing between physical education and organized sports, 
which came under the supervision of the State, and such 
recreational activities as gymnastics, swimming, and 
hiking, which would remain within the sphere of the 
Catholic youth organizations. The occupational asso­
ciations proposed for incorporation into the Catholic 
Action included associations of workers, officials, 
merchants, and domestic servants. Kdpke to the Embassy 
to the Holy See, September 21, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, 
No. 215, p. 423, footnote 3»
^^See above, p. 240.
^^The Deputy Director of Department II (Renthe- 
Fink) to the Embassy to the Holy See, September 21, 1934, 
DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 216, pp. 423-24.
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Despite the expressed desire of both sides to 
reach an agreement, once again the negotiations on the 
implementation of the Concordat came to a halt. While 
it seems clear that Hitler must bear a large share of 
the responsibility for the suspension of the negotia­
tions, this was not generally realized at the time. 
Bergen reported that certain foreign newspapers, which 
he did not name, blamed the Vatican more than the Nazis 
for the failure to reach a final settlement. These 
papers, Bergen wrote, maintained the Vatican had pro­
longed the negotiations because it anticipated an early 
fall of the Nazi regime. They even implied the Vatican 
could be working toward this goal. Bergen brought the 
matter up with Pacelli shortly before the latter left 
for Buenos Aires. The Cardinal dismissed the reports 
as "completely unfounded," and reiterated the Vatican's 
wish to live in friendship with Germany and avoid a 
break in relations.
Although the Reich and the Vatican frequently ex­
pressed their good intentions, the feeling of distrust 
remained. According to Bergen, this feeling especially 
applied to the Pope, who believed the Nazis posed a 
threat to the Catholic Church in Germany which exceeded 
that of the Reformation. In the Pope's opinion, the
^ ^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, S e p t e m b e r  27,
1934, 8 i i 6/ E 5 8 1 2 4 6 - 4 7 .
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Hitler government not only intended to bring about a 
separation from Rome but also to destroy the Christian 
religion itself. The forceful methods used against the
64Evangelical Church, Bergen continued, had increased 
the fear in the Vatican that the Nazis would use the 
same methods against the Catholic Church. Many Vatican 
authorities considered the assurances of the Reich gov­
ernment to respect the freedom and rights of the Church 
as nothing more than a "sleeping potion." Although Bergen 
believed the situation to be serious, he admitted a settle­
ment of the suspended negotiations would ease the tension 
considerably. In order to obtain a more favorable final 
settlement, Bergen advised the government to wait until 
Pacelli returned before resuming the negotiations. This 
way the Pope would not have the opportunity to make hasty
64While the conflict between the Nazis and the 
Protestants is beyond the scope of this study, a few re­
marks are in order. Soon after taking over the govern­
ment Hitler began waging a vigorous campaign to coordi­
nate and unify the Protestant churches into a single 
Reich Church headed by a Reich Bishop. Hitler's choice 
for this position fell upon one of his most devoted fol­
lowers, Ludwig Müller, a pliable man who had spent the 
greatest part of his career as a military chaplain. In 
the fall of 1934 the Nazis went all out to destroy the 
independence of the Evangelical Church, and the comments 
of some of the pro-Nazi Protestant Church leaders caused 
concern in Catholic circles. As an example, in a tactless 
speech made at Hanover on September 19, Reich Bishop Mül­
ler declared: "Whoever is not willing to cooperate in the
construction of this church and whoever will not take his 
place in the Third Reich must be still or retire. . . .
Our final purpose is one State, one people, one Church." 
Quoted in the New York Times, September 20, 1934, p. 1.
For surveys of the conflict between the Nazis and the 
Protestants see Wheaton, chap. xx; and Conway, et passim.
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decisions without considering the advice of the Cardinal 
Secretary of State, who was "politically realistic and 
constantly attempting to find a compromise."
In this atmosphere of tension and distrust, a 
rumor circulated in Vatican circles that the Holy See 
planned to place an "interdict" on Germany. Although 
Bergen did not believe the rumor, he informed Monsignor 
Pizzardo it would be certain to create anxiety among 
German Catholics. Pizzardo replied he had not heard the 
rumor and had no idea how it started. The use of the 
interdict, he declared, had become obsolete in the last 
two centuries. To support this statement, Pizzardo re­
ferred to the Vatican's refusal to take this step against 
Russia, Mexico, and Spain.
One final event of September should be noted. In 
a note to Gôring at the end of the month, Neurath enclosed 
a copy of a letter from Heydrich to the Commandant of the 
concentration camp at Lichtenburg. Monsignor Orsenigo, 
Neurath wrote, had "lodged a most vigorous protest against 
the contents of this letter," which concerned the spiritual 
care of the guards at the State concentration camps and the 
persons in protective custody at these camps. Orsenigo 
directed his complaints against three points contained in
^^Bergen to KOpke, September 27, 1934, 8II5/ 
E580858-6O.
^ ^ B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Mi n i s t r y ,  S e p t e m b e r  28,
1934, 8I I6/ E58125O.
273
the letter: (1) the prohibition against auricular con­
fession for Catholic prisoners; (2) the refusal to per­
mit Church services more than once every two weeks; and 
(3) the closing sentence of the letter, which the Nuncio 
interpreted as a mockery of Church institutions and cus­
toms. It reads as follows:
The spiritual care is to be administered by the 
pastors, with whom you should communicate direct 
with a view to their undertaking to provide this 
care, in an honorary capacity, that is to say, 
without any special remunerations; the churches 
are supranatural institutions of Divine Love and 
will gladly bear the costs t h e m s e l v e s .^7
To insure a satisfactory reply to Orsenigo, Neurath 
asked Gtiring to give his "personal attention" to this 
matter. In the interest of preserving peace, and since 
the complaints seemed "only too well justified," Neurath 
declared, he would gladly cooperate with the Nuncio as 
far as possible. At all times, Neurath concluded, Mon­
signor Orsenigo had endeavored to "compose our differ­
ences," and he made complaints only in "really serious 
68matters." GOring replied to Neurath nearly one month 
later, at which time he agreed to permit a weekly Church 
service. He postponed the decision on auricular confession
Heydrich to the Camp Command of the State Concen­
tration Camp in Lichtenburg, July 24, 1934, enclosed in 
Neurath's note to Gttring, September 29, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. 
Ill, No. 225, pp. 444-46. The film number is erroneously 
printed as 8II5/E580583 rather than 8II5/E580853.
r o
N e u r a t h  to G8r i n g , S e p t e m b e r  29, 1934, D G F P , C,
Vol. Ill, No. 225, pp. 444-45.
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on the grounds that "special security reasons" might have 
led to the ban. In regard to the closing sentence of 
Heydrich's letter, GOring wrote Neurath he saw no reason 
why the State Secret Police should apologize because he 
did not believe the statement contained an insult to the
69Church.
^ ^ G O r i n g  to Neurath, O c t o b e r  26, 1934, D G F P , C,
Vol. Ill, No. 275, p. 536.
CHAPTER IX
OCTOBER 1, 1934 - JANUARY 13, 1935:
TO THE SAAR PLEBISCITE
The last quarter of 1934 saw the Reich government 
continue and intensify its efforts to placate the Catho­
lic Church in preparation for the Saar plebiscite. For­
merly the good behavior exhibited by the Nazis at this 
time would have made a favorable impression on Church 
authorities, and Reich-Vatican relations would have un­
doubtedly improved as a result. By the autumn of 1934, 
however, the Catholic leadership seemed to realize the 
lessening of pressure on the Church represented only a 
change in political tactics and not a change in Nazi 
goals toward religion. Nor did the Church authorities 
have high hopes for the resumption of cordial relations 
in the near future. Once the Saar had been returned to 
Germany, the New York Times wrote on October 1, Catholics 
feared the Reich government would take "no steps whatever" 
to check the party's attacks on Catholic organizations.^ 
Two days later the London Times echoed this pessimistic
^New York Times, October 1, 1934, p. 8.
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view by stating that "neither side now has much faith in
a useful resumption of the Concordat negotiations before
2the Saar plebiscite." On October 11 the Times again com­
mented on the religious difficulties in Germany, this time 
referring to the Protestants as well as Catholics:
Past experience has taught them to see in every 
move, especially an apparent retreat, only a tacti­
cal manoeuvre. They are becoming daily more thor­
oughly convinced that the final goal of influential 
leaders in the new Germany is a German National 
Church strongly imbued with the Germanic race and 
blood mysticism, a Church from which certain funda­
mental Christian principles would be e l i m i n a t e d . 3
Having experienced so many broken promises on the part of 
the Nazis, Church authorities both in Germany and in the 
Vatican understood fully the real purpose behind the gov­
ernment's curtailment of assaults on the Catholic Church.
As a result they continued and even stepped up the pace 
of their own offensive against the Nazis. Thus, the 
Reich government's relations with the Church and the Vati­
can still remained tense.
During the month of October, the focal point of 
the conflict centered on ideological differences. More 
vigorously than ever before. Church leaders defended 
Catholic doctrine against the neopagan propaganda promoted 
by the Nazis. As an example of what the London Times re­
ferred to as a "Roman Catholic offensive," Bishop Maximilian
^ The T i m e s  (London), October 3, 1934, p. 11.
^ I b i d . , O c t o b e r  11, 1934, p. 13*
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Kaller of Ermland quoted passages in a sermon from the
confiscated June pastoral letter, which had attacked the
4pagan beliefs expressed in Rosenberg's Myth. Because 
many Catholic clergymen considered this book responsible 
for the rapid spread of paganism in Germany, they made it 
their primary target. A group of Catholic scholars, who 
remained anonymous, exposed the fallacies of the Myth in 
a critique entitled Studies in the Myth of the Twentieth 
Century.̂  Sponsored by Bishop Galen, the publication ap­
peared as a supplement to the October issue of the diocesan 
gazette of Münster. Although the Gestapo confiscated the 
pamphlet in places, it still reached a wide audience.
The scholars were severe in their criticism of Rosenberg, 
not only for his over-evaluation of the Nordic race but 
also for his numerous errors of fact and insults to the 
Pope. In Rosenberg's opinion, the authors asserted, the 
Nordic man must reject the Old Testament because it was
Ibid., October 3» 193^, p. 11. For a brief summary 
of the pastoral letter see above, pp. 235-36. See also the 
New York Times, October 23, 1934, p. 4.
^Excerpts from the Studien zum Mythus des XX. Jahr- 
hunderts may be found in Rosenberg's Positive Christianity, 
By German Catholic Scholars of the Archdiocese of Cologne, 
No. 27 of the "Friends of Europe" Publications (London: 
Friends of Europe, 1935). In the early part of 1935, 
Rosenberg attempted to refute his critics by publishing 
An die Dunkelmflnner unserer Zeit: Eine Antwort auf die
Angriffe gegen den Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts (Munich: 
Hoheneichen Verlag, 1935). The Vatican responded by 
placing this book on the Index along with his Myth. See 
also Lewy, pp. 153-54.
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purely a Jewish work. In portraying the Old Testament 
God, Rosenberg presented a "totally distorted" picture 
which had little to do with authentic sources. Further­
more, Rosenberg constructed his conception of Christ 
around a few sources arbitrarily selected to fit his 
thesis. In attaching himself to what he called "posi­
tive Christianity," Rosenberg actually accepted a belief 
that rejected the Holy Scriptures and denied the divin­
ity of Christ.^
On October 11 Pope Pius received Ambassador Bergen 
in a traditional autumn audience. In reporting to the 
Foreign Ministry on the results of the audience, Bergen 
made it clear the remarks of the Pope had not pleased him. 
After a few friendly words, Bergen declared, the Pope pur­
posely turned the conversation to Germany, where "all 
sorts of events" in recent months had given him cause for 
"serious anxiety." To the Pope, it appeared Germany 
wished to bring about a schism by establishing a National 
Catholic Church, which would conduct services in the Ger­
man language and admit Protestants. Moreover, he could 
not conceal his "great dissatisfaction over the slow and 
unsatisfactory progress" of the negotiations on the Con­
cordat, and he was beginning to doubt the good will of 
the German government. In the long run, the Pope
^Rosenberg's Positive Christianity, pp. l4, 20,
and 24.
279
concluded, it would not be possible for him to continue 
showing the restraint which he had so frequently demon­
strated in the past. Bergen refuted the Pope's accusa­
tions by asserting that the Reich government "had no 
intention whatever of establishing a National Catholic 
Church." Bergen further expressed the hope that with 
the good will which he "assumed existed on both sides," 
the negotiations would be successfully concluded soon 
after the return of Cardinal Pacelli. At the end of 
his note Bergen requested the Foreign Ministry to pro­
long the negotiations until after Pacelli's arrival in 
Rome, despite the need to expedite the negotiations.
The danger of the Pope making "disastrous decisions," 
Bergen wrote, would increase considerably without the
7Cardinal's "moderating influence."
Apparently the strong language used by the Pope 
caught Bergen off guard. Because of his remarks, Bergen 
visited Pizzardo later in the day. He informed Pizzardo 
the Pope's anxiety had taken him by surprise, especially 
since he thought he had noticed a slight relaxation of 
tension in recent weeks. Pizzardo replied he too had 
observed the same anxiety in his talks with the Pope, 
which he believed the latest reports from Germany had 
brought about. The Vatican considered the ruthless
7
B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, O ctober 12, 1934,
DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 245, pp. 4?7-78.
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attacks against the Protestant churches incomprehen­
sible, and feared the Nazis would later use the same 
forceful methods against the Catholic Church. Also, 
Pizzardo continued, the Vatican had received reports 
the Reich government intended to postpone the negotia­
tions on Article Thirty-one until after the Saar plebi­
scite. If the vote should be unfavorable, the govern­
ment would then blame the Vatican. In reply, Bergen 
labeled as "crazy" the report which maintained the 
Reich government intended to carry out a persecution 
of the Catholic Church. On this issue, Bergen stated,
gthe Vatican's fears were "completely unfounded."
Bergen's comments regarding his audience with 
the Pope and the unfavorable reaction the Nazi viola­
tions of Catholic rights were creating in Vatican cir­
cles apparently had considerable effect on KOpke in the 
German Foreign Ministry. On October 13 KOpke sent a 
note to Frick, Hess, and Goebbels, with a copy of Ber­
gen's report on the audience enclosed. At the conclu­
sion of the note KOpke "urgently recommended" that the 
Reich government take the appropriate steps to halt the 
reports appearing in the press, which created new anx­
ieties in the Vatican and could have an unfavorable 
effect on the suspended negotiations. The forthcoming
g
B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Min i s t r y ,  O c t o b e r  12, 1934,
8I I5/ E58O868-7O.
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Saar plebiscite, Küpke declared, made this especially
9important.
Despite Kdpke's efforts, relations between the 
Reich and the Vatican remained tense. In a visit with 
Bülow on October 17, Monsignor Orsenigo registered a 
protest against those party authorities who demanded the 
unification of the two Christian confessions. In partic­
ular, Orsenigo complained about the speech made in Danzig 
by Hans Schemm, the Bavarian Minister of Culture. Accord­
ing to Orsenigo, Schemm had asserted the Nazi State re­
garded the two confessions as an intermediate stage 
rather than a final end. Also, Schemm stated that in 
the attempt to reach God, Germans should not oppose as 
"atheistic" the beliefs of Germany's pre-Christian ances­
tors. Orsenigo expressed the hope Hitler would publicly 
correct these views.
^Ktipke to the Reichminister of Interior [Frick], 
to Reichminister Hess, the Deputy of the Führer and NSDAP, 
and to the Reichminister of Popular Enlightenment and 
Propaganda [Goebbels], October 13, 1934, 8II5/E58O865-67•
^^Bülow to the Reichminister [Neurath], October 17, 
1934, 8II5/E580874-76. hammers discussed Orsenigo's com­
plaints with the Reich Chancellor, although no mention is 
made of how Hitler reacted. Menshausen to the State Secre­
tary [probably Bülow], October 29, 1934, 8II5/E58088I-82. 
In this same note Menshausen also stated that Hess was 
carrying out an investigation of the financial subsidies 
which the Vatican alledgedly had made to Roehm. It seems 
far-fetched to believe that the Vatican would have sub­
sidized Roehm to bring about the downfall of Hitler, how­
ever, especially since both the Pope and Cardinal Pacelli 
believed strongly in a regenerated Germany as a bulwark 
against Communism. Perhaps the Nazis believed the inves­
tigation would have propaganda value.
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Meanwhile, as the date of the plebiscite grew 
nearer, both the Reich government and the Church increas­
ingly turned their attention to the Saar. The Roehm 
purge and the repeated assaults on the Church in the 
Reich had deeply disturbed the Saar Catholics, and many 
opposed an immediate return of the Saar to a "Hitler" 
Germany. In their opinion it would be better to vote 
for the status quo, and thousands intended to do so.
The Nazis responded to this fact with extreme sensitivity, 
and any Catholic clergymen who advocated a vote for the 
status quo quickly found himself charged with "political 
Catholicism." According to Josef Bürckel, an ardent Nazi 
whom Hitler had appointed Saar Plenipotentiary on July 26, 
the Reich government must insist that the Church carry 
out her duty of exhorting Christians to remain loyal to 
the national community. At the same time Bürckel labeled 
as "intolerable for the Reich" the efforts of the Church 
to prevent the clergy from supporting Germany on the 
grounds of neutrality while permitting clergymen to work 
for the status quo. Even the Vatican, Bürckel maintained, 
did not have the right to demand neutrality, which in es­
sence meant the clergy should "refrain from openly and 
publicly professing allegiance to their own people.
Bürckel to Neurath, October 1?, 1934, DGFP, C, 
Vol. Ill, No. 244, pp. 495-98 and 498, footnote 4. The 
Foreign Ministry sent a copy of this letter to the Embassy 
to the Holy See, suggesting at the same time that the 
Embassy make use of these arguments in its oral communica­
tions with the Curia.
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Regardless of Bürckel's opinion, the Vatican had 
adopted an official policy of neutrality toward the Saar 
plebiscite. In order that the Vatican could be assured 
the Church in the Saar also maintained neutrality and per­
mitted all Catholics to vote in full liberty of conscience, 
the Pope had sent Monsignor Gustavo Testa to the Saar as 
his confidential emissary. On September 11 the Pope re­
placed Testa with Monsignor Giovanni Panico, formerly the
12charge d'affaires of the Apostolic Nunciature at Prague. 
Monsignor Panico's political outlook, however, was decid­
edly pro-German, and this made him a poor choice as a
neutral observer. On one occasion he even went so far as
13to personally wish success for Hitler. For that matter, 
the attitude of the Vatican toward the plebiscite also 
tended to favor Germany, despite its official policy of 
neutrality. While the Holy See certainly had no wish to 
contribute to the prestige of the Hitler regime, it never­
theless took the position unofficially that the Saar was 
German territory which rightfully belonged to the Reich. 
According to Bergen, who based his opinion on conversa­
tions held in the Papal Secretariat, the Vatican consid­
ered the Saar's return to Germany "not only natural and 
legitimate but even obligatory." The Vatican insisted
12The Pope made Monsignor Testa a bishop and ap­
pointed him the Apostolic Delegate to Egypt and Palestine 
Wambaugh, p. 210, footnote 43-
^^Lewy, pp. 187-88.
284
upon a policy of neutrality, Bergen reported, primarily 
because the French would make counter-claims at the 
"smallest measure" which they could construe as favorit­
ism toward Germany. For this reason, Bergen did not be-
14lieve the Vatican would change its attitude.
Regardless of the Vatican's wish to see the Saar 
returned to Germany, it consistently adhered to its of­
ficial policy of neutrality. The Nazis did not find 
neutrality to their liking, because they wished to obtain 
the Curia's active support in silencing those members of 
the Saar clergy who defended the status quo. Consequently, 
on November 7 three members of the Deutsche Front, led 
by Bürckel's assistant. Max Müller, visited Cardinal Pa­
celli at the Vatican. Müller explained to Pacelli that 
he had unsuccessfully attempted to get Bishop Bornewasser 
of Trier and Bishop Sebastian of Speyer to issue instruc­
tions which in effect would silence those clergymen who 
supported the status quo. Pacelli replied that the Vatican 
had imposed no restrictions on the German bishops and 
clergy, who had complete freedom of a c t i o n . Müller re­
turned from Rome eager to make use of Pacelli's statement.
^^Bergen to Kdpke, October 31, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. 
Ill, No. 286, pp. 552-54.
^^An organization formally established by the Saar 
Nazi Party in July of 1933 to direct the efforts of all 
groups and individuals working for the Saar's return to 
Germany. Wambaugh, p. 124.
^^Lewy, p. 189.
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and immediately attempted to see the two bishops. Borne­
wasser at first refused to see Müller, but finally con­
sented when Müller informed him he had news from Hitler 
as well as from the Vatican. Perhaps, as Lewy suggests, 
the Bishops wished to spare themselves the embarrassment 
of acting under orders, because prior to their meeting 
with Müller on November 17 they issued instructions to 
their clergy which accorded perfectly with Nazi wishes.
In an order dated November 12, the two Bishops forbade 
the clergy of their respective dioceses to speak at public 
political meetings held in the Saar, and cautioned them to 
exercise restraint in the pulpit and in meetings of Catho­
lic associations. Furthermore, priests were forbidden to 
recommend newspapers, periodicals, and books from the 
pulpit. The order concluded with a reminder to the clergy 
that love of one's national ancestors and loyalty to the
Fatherland was a "moral duty," and the Church considered
17the fulfillment of these duties a moral virtue. The 
Nazis themselves could hardly have written a more pro- 
German document.
During this same month of November, the Reich and 
the Vatican resumed the negotiations on Article Thirty-one 
in Berlin, which had been purposely delayed until after 
the return of Cardinal Pacelli from South America. On
^^Ibid., pp. 189-90. For the German text see 
Müller, No. 163, p . 3l4.
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November 7 Buttmann presented an amended draft of
Article Thirty-one to the three representatives of
iBthe Episcopate--Bares, Berning, and Grüber. Presum­
ably, the new draft took into account the wishes ex­
pressed by the hierarchy ana the Vatican since the con­
clusion of the June 29 agreement. In reality, the text 
of the new draft differed little from the June draft 
except for the inclusion of certain additions. The 
representatives of the Episcopate reacted unfavorably 
to the amended text, which in consideration of the 
Vatican's rejection of the June draft could have been 
expected. In their opinion the new proposals were 
still inadequate, but they admitted they were "bound 
by the instructions of the Holy See" and could not 
make definitive statements. Buttmann informed the
Bishops he would take up direct negotiations with 
19Pacelli. The Cardinal appeared eager to renew the 
talks but could not see Buttmann between November l8 
and 271 when he and the Pope would participate in 
prayers and devotionals. Consequently, Menshausen sug­
gested to the Reich Ministry of Interior that Buttmann
18Amended Draft of the Agreement Concerning Ar­
ticle Thirty-one, Received in the Foreign Ministry on 
November 8, 1934, 8ll5/E580899-9O4. See also 8115/ 
E580917-36, which has the June 29 agreement printed 
side by side with the changes proposed by the Reich 
government.
19K ü p k e  to the E m b a s s y  to the H o l y  See, N o v e m ­
b e r  8, 1934, 8II5/E58O9O7-O8.
28?
20should plan to arrive in Rome before the eighteenth.
Since the Curia expected a final settlement of all the
unresolved questions concerning the Concordat, Bergen
wrote, the Reich government should provide Buttmann with
21the "appropriate authority."
Despite the willingness of both sides to resume 
the negotiations, at no time did the preparation for the 
talks progress smoothly. On November l6 Bergen informed 
the Foreign Office he had learned confidentially that 
Pacelli feared a collapse of the discussions would lead 
to an intensification of the existing tension. Within 
the limits of his authority, Bergen continued, Pacelli 
would strive for peace, but the danger was growing that 
the Pope would abandon the restraint he had so unwill­
ingly maintained in the past and make a public announce­
ment concerning the threat to the Christian faith in 
22Germany. Bergen also reported that the Vatican gen­
erally viewed the new draft of Article Thirty-one, which 
the Reich government had submitted on November 7» as no 
more than a slightly improved version of the June draft, 
which it had already rejected. The Vatican found a
20Menshausen to the Reich Ministry of Interior, 
November 10, 1934, 8II5/E580912.
21Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, November 10,
1934, 8II5/E58O9I3.
22B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  M i n istry, N o v e m b e r  I6 ,
1934, 8I I5/E58095O . B e r g e n  r e q u e s t e d  the F o r e i g n  M i n ­
i s t r y  to pass this i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  to Buttmann.
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number of objections in the new draft, including the 
following: (l) the unclear regulations concerning double
membership in the Catholic organizations; (2) the rein­
statement of the words "completely unpolitical" ("vdllig
unpolitisch"), a concept which was virtually unusable; and
23(3) the activities of the Catholic youth associations.
On the following day the Nuncio confirmed Bergen's 
report when he stated the Reich government's new draft 
took the Vatican's wishes into account only on "unimpor­
tant points"; otherwise it adhered to the text of the 
June draft. Therefore, Orsenigo continued, it seemed 
"premature and inadvisable" to send Buttmann to Rome for 
the purpose of resuming the negotiations. In response to 
an inquiry, Orsenigo stated he could give no information 
as to the action the Reich government should take except 
to resume contact with Bishop Berning. Apparently this 
was sufficient to convince Menshausen the government had 
done everything possible to obtain a settlement:
By notifying the Vatican of their intention to 
send Ministerialdirektor Buttmann as soon as possible, 
the Reich Government have given fresh proof of their 
readiness to come to an understanding. They are now 
leaving the initiative to the Holy See and will, for 
the moment, await the further action which . . .  the 
Nuncio may be expected to take.24
o QBergen to the Foreign Ministry, November l6,
1934, 8II5/E580952.
24M e n s h a u s e n  to the E m b a s s y  to the Hol y  See,
N o v e m b e r  19, 1934, D G F P , C, Vol. Ill, No. 338, PP* 645-46.
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A few days later Orsenigo had better information 
on the recommended course of action for the Reich govern­
ment. In a conversation with Neurath on November 24, 
Orsenigo declared the Vatican had instructed him to obtain 
information on the remaining disputed points of Article 
Thirty-one "before" Buttmann journeyed to Rome. The Vati­
can considered it expedient, Orsenigo continued, to make 
another effort to reach an agreement in Berlin because an 
unsuccessful mission would only make the situation more 
difficult. While Orsenigo had no special authority to 
conduct the negotiations himself, the Vatican had in­
structed him to reach a "further elucidation and rap-
proachement" on the different points of view through con-
25versations with Buttmann.
Why the Vatican reversed its position after Cardi­
nal Pacelli had apparently agreed to resume the negotia­
tions with Buttmann in Rome is not clear. Possibly the 
Pope intervened at this point. In any case, the Reich 
government made no fuss over the matter. After consulting 
Buttmann, Menshausen informed Orsenigo the Reich govern­
ment was pleased to learn the Nuncio and Buttmann planned 
to discuss the state of the negotiations in Berlin. It 
would be several days, however, before Buttmann could find 
time in hi,.i busy schedule to begin the talks. Orsenigo
^ ^ M e m o r a n d u m  b y  the F o r e i g n  Minister, N o v e m b e r  24,
1934, D G F P , C, Vol. Ill, No. 353, p. 672.
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answered he had in no way wished to prevent Buttmann from 
going to Rome, but the Vatican had instructed him to ex­
plain that the visit would be unsuccessful unless Buttmann 
had something to offer other than the proposals submitted 
by the Reich government on November 7* In reply to a 
remark made by the Nuncio a few days earlier regarding 
the government's failure to respond to Pacelli's note of 
September 2,^^ Menshausen stated the matter was not then 
under consideration. Whether the Reich government would 
ever answer the note depended "entirely on the progress 
of the negotiations," which, if successful, could make a 
reply unnecessary. Orsenigo then spoke of how much it 
would "clear the tense atmosphere" if the Reich Chancellor 
would issue a public statement regarding neopaganism. 
Menshausen replied Hitler had promised such a statement, 
and it could be expected after the satisfactory conclu­
sion of the negotiations. Because of the seriousness of 
the foreign political problems, such as the Saar plebiscite,
Menshausen believed Hitler should make the declaration soon,
27irrespective of how the negotiations progressed.
On December 4 the discussions between Buttmann and 
Orsenigo commenced in Berlin. According to Menshausen, the
On November 24 Orsenigo informed Neurath the Vati­
can was still waiting for a reply to Pacelli's note. Neu­
rath promised he would look into the matter. Memorandum 
by Neurath, November 24, 1934, 8II9/E98096I.
27M e m o r a n d u m  b y  M e n s h a u s e n ,  N o v e m b e r  2 9 1 1934, D G F P ,
c. Vol. Ill, No. 361, pp. 686-88.
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Nuncio had little to say other than to list the reasons 
why the Vatican considered Buttmann's trip to Rome as 
impractical and premature. He emphasized that the Reich 
government should view the September draft as a "minimum
28demand" on the part of the Church. When Buttmann di­
gressed into other areas the Nuncio would evade the sub­
ject and urge the Reich government to renew its contact 
with the representatives of the Episcopate. Buttmann re­
plied that this would serve no meaningful purpose because 
the representatives had declared on November 7 they could 
not negotiate on the essential points, but must stay 
strictly within the limits of the September draft. In 
response to Orsenigo's inquiry, Buttmann stated he could 
not possibly make the trip to Rome until the end of Janu­
ary because until then he would be busy with the Saar 
plebiscite.
A few days later, after receiving instructions
from the Vatican, Orsenigo informed Buttmann he wished to
continue the talks. He did ask that the "strictest se-
30crecy" be maintained, even toward the bishops. On 
December I8 , the date agreed upon for the resumption of 
the discussions, Buttmann and Orsenigo met in the office
p ftSee above, p. 267.
29Menshausen to the Embassy to the Holy See, Decem­
ber 5 , 1934, 8II5/E580979-8O.
30B u t t m a n n  to Me n s h a u s e n ,  D e c e m b e r  20, 1934,
8II5/ E58I O O I - O3 .
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of the Nuncio. Walter Konrad of the Reich Ministry of 
Interior also participated in the talks. Orsenigo again 
requested that the results of these discussions be with­
held from the public, as he especially wished to keep the 
meetings secret from the German bishops. The negotiators 
quickly agreed they would not attempt to reach a settle­
ment but try only to diminish the problems standing in 
the way of the negotiations in Rome. The conversation 
centered largely around the Catholic organizations and 
the interpretation of those terms particularly subject 
to controversy. The talks were friendly, and Buttmann
31and Orsenigo agreed to resume them on January 3»
On December l8 the Foreign Ministry forwarded
"the draft of a note to the German Embassy, with instruc-
32tions to send it on to Cardinal Pacelli. According to 
the draft, which Bergen passed on to Pacelli with only 
minor changes, the Reich government had not replied to 
Pacelli*s notes of May l4 and September 2 because it con­
sidered oral discussions a more practical way of clarify­
ing and composing existing differences. In June it
31Buttmann to Menshausen, December 20, 1934, 
8II5/E58IOOI-O3.
32According to Menshausen, the reasons for this 
action on the part of the Foreign Ministry included the 
need to stifle criticism for its failure to reply to 
Pacelli’s note of September 2, the possibility of the 
Vatican publishing a White Book, and the forthcoming 
Christmas allocution by the Pope. Memorandum by Men­
shausen, December 17, 1934, 8II5/E580988.
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appeared the representatives of the Episcopate and the 
government had reached an agreement, but "contrary to all 
expectations," the draft agreement was submitted to the 
bishops for their opinions. Since then the bishops, in 
agreement with the Holy See, had submitted a new draft 
(the September draft), which the government had scruti­
nized in a most "conciliatory spirit." When the Reich 
government made a "few minor counter proposals" in reply 
to this draft on November 7, the representatives of the 
Episcopate replied they had no authority to "enter into 
negotiations" on these proposals. The Reich government 
hoped the confidential exchange of views between Buttmann 
and the Nuncio would clarify the outstanding questions, 
and thereby allow the final negotiations in Rome to take 
place at the earliest possible date. The government was 
convinced that when the final agreement had been reached 
the ensuing instructions issued to the State and party 
authorities would "dispel the fears expressed in the Note 
of September 2, and provide the Holy See with a compre­
hensive guarantee that the agreements reached would be
3 3put into operation." The apologetic tone of the draft 
clearly indicated the Reich government's strong desire to 
placate Catholic fears prior to the Saar plebiscite.
33The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy to the Holy 
See, December l8, 1934, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 394, pp. 
745-46. See also Bergen to Pacelli, December 21, 1934, 
8II5/E58IOI3-I5 ; or Albrecht, No. 45, pp. 193-95» for the note in its final form.
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On December 24 Pope Pius delivered his traditional
Christmas allocution to the Sacred College of Cardinals.
The Nazis feared the Pope would make some harsh statements
about conditions in Germany, and the moderate tone of the
address came as a surprise. While the Pope did refer to
the spread of "moral paganism, social paganism and State
paganism" as "horrible things," he did not specifically
34mention Germany by name. Ambassador Bergen was obvi­
ously pleased with the Pope's address. "Much to the dis­
appointment of the disseminators of poison," Bergen re­
ported, the Pope refrained from making hostile remarks
35toward Germany. Even the efforts of the French and 
other foreign newspapers to interpret the address as a 
condemnation of National Socialism Bergen regarded as 
"erroneously biased." Somehow Bergen managed to con­
vince himself that the Pope's remarks on paganism did 
not apply to the Reich, although Germany was the only 
country making an effort to revive pagan forms of worship. 
The fact that the Pope delivered his speech extemporane­
ously and did not have it carried on the radio, Bergen
wrote, indicated he did not intend it as a political
 ̂ 36 announc ement.
^^New York Times, December 25, 1934, p. 1.
^^Bergen to Neurath, December 29, 1934, 3241/ 
D702410-11.
og
B e r g e n  to the F o r e i g n  Ministry, D e c e m b e r  28,
1934, K 2255/ K621985.
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The London Times linked the Pope's Christmas 
address to an article on church-state relations by 
Mussolini which the Osservatore Romano reprinted on 
December 19. According to Mussolini, in fighting reli­
gion the state fought against the spirit, and its weap­
ons were useless in this kind of struggle. The Duce 
rejected the idea of establishing a state religion, and 
expressed the view religion must be absolutely free and 
independent in its own house. It was not the duty of 
the state to overthrow old dieties and replace them with 
new ones established on race, blood, and Nordic faith.
The Times believed it possible that Mussolini's article 
and the Pope's address were both "designed to convey 
indirectly a warning to those influential quarters in 
Germany," which had been working toward the seculariza­
tion of public life and the separation of church and 
37state. Unfortunately, the German archives are silent 
on this matter.
In the final days of the year Pope Pius received 
Ambassador Bergen in a special audience. Bergen reported 
the Pope refrained from temperamental attacks and tried 
to assume a certain degree of moderation. Despite his 
emphasis upon the need for peaceful cooperation, the 
Pope also asserted that the whole world looked toward 
Germany with "increasing nervousness." In reply Bergen
^^The Times (London), D e c e m b e r  29, 1934, p. 9.
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stated the alarming reports on Germany whicn had recently 
appeared in the Italian press were reprints from the 
French newspapers, and these had been fabricated to bring 
about unrest in the Saar. No one, Bergen tcld the Pope, 
desired peace more "honestly and convincingly than the
o QFuehrer and Reich Chancellor."
Following the guidelines set by the Pope, the 
Osservatore Romano avoided a sharp condemnation of Nazi 
Germany in its summary of the year. For the most part 
it directed its attention to broad issues, such as the 
failure of the disarmament plans, the intensification of 
nationalism, and the spread of Communism. It expressed 
particular concern over the admittance of Soviet Russia 
into the League of Nations without serious opposition.
The Osservatore Romano did refer to one highly sensitive 
question in Germany, the Roehm purge, which it cited as
39an example of a crisis in the administration of justice.
During the final weeks of 1934 and the early part 
of 1935) attention centered on the Saar plebiscite as the 
various individuals and organizations increased their ac­
tivities in behalf of their own particular interests.
While the Vatican continued to adhere to its official 
policy of neutrality, in reality it favored the Saar’s
^^Bergen to Neurath, December 29) 1934, 3241/ 
D702410-11.
39Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, January 9,
1935) K 2255/K621999-2OOI.
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return to Germany. Not only did the Vatican consider
the Saar a natural part of the Reich, but it also feared
the Hitler government would blame Catholics for a defeat
and use this as a pretext for fresh reprisals against the
Church in Germany. As the date grew nearer, the Nazis
intensified their efforts to secure the active support
of the Catholic clergy. In December the assistant to
Saar Plenipotentiary Bürckel, Max Müller, proposed that
the entire German Episcopate issue a public declaration
which would make it clear the bishops did not aim their
criticism of neopaganism in Germany at National Social- 
41ism. While the bishops declined to accept Müller's 
proposal, they did issue a pronouncement of their own. 
Inspired by Bishop Galen and Cardinal Schulte, on Decem­
ber 26 the six bishops of the Church province of Cologne 
issued a proclamation to be read in all churches of the 
dioceses on January 6 , one week before the plebiscite. 
With the exception of one lone dissenter, whose identity
42is not known, the entire German Episcopate agreed to
the publication of the declaration. It reads as follows :
On Sunday, January 13, a plebiscite will be held 
in the Saar Territory on the question whether this 
German land and its people shall remain under the 
separation from the German Reich forced upon them 
by the dictated peace of Versailles [Versailler 
Gewaltfrieden]. This decision, to be made in a
^^New York Times, December 9, 1934, p. 1.
4l 42Lewy, pp. 191-92. Ibid., p. 193»
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few days at the Saar and fraught with fateful conse­
quences for the future of our fatherland, no true 
German can face with indifference. As German Catho­
lics we are duty bound to stand up for the greatness, 
welfare, and peace of our fatherland. Our most ef­
fective help is prayer. We, therefore, order that 
on said Sunday in all churches three Lord's Prayers 
and Ave Marias be recited with the faithful after 
the general prayer in order to implore for a result 
of the Saar plebiscite that will bring blessings for 
our German people.^3
As to the meaning of this declaration there could be no 
mistake--the bishops supported the immediate union of the 
Saar to the Reich. Quite correctly the London Times re­
ported that German Catholics had "made it clear" they would 
not allow internal problems to affect their "deep and in­
stinctive devotion to their Fatherland" on a "patriotic
44issue" like the return of the Saar to Germany.
Despite the pressure exerted by the bishops, some 
Saar Catholics still considered the status quo more attrac­
tive than reunion to a Hitler Germany. They naturally op­
posed the bishops' prayer declaration because it restricted 
the rights of Catholics to cast a free vote. As the heated 
campaign reached a climax, the pro status quo Neue Saar
Post became distinctly more aggressive. On January 9 it
45reported that the Deutscher Volksbund had informed Pacelli
43Quoted in ibid., p. 192. The German text is 
printed in Wambaugh, p. 288; and Müller, No. l68, p. 328.
44The Times (London), January 1, 1935> P» l4.
45Deutscher Volksbund für Christlich-soziale 
Gemeinschaft (German People's League for Christian-social 
Community), the long discussed Catholic party for the
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of the use the Nazis were making of the prayer declaration, 
and had requested the Cardinal to take immediate steps to
46remove the moral constraint threatening a free vote.
Also, Bergen wrote the Foreign Ministry that the French
had sent a protest against the prayer declaration to the 
47Vatican. On January 5 the Plebiscite Commission com­
plained about the declaration and the pro-German activi­
ties of some of the Saar clergy in a letter addressed to
48the Bishops of Trier and Speyer. The Bishops chose to 
ignore the protest, however, and on January 6 the reading 
of the proclamation from the pulpits took place as sched­
uled. According to Lewy, Bishops Bornewasser and Sebastian
were "heartened in their stand by the absence of any action
..49on the part of the Vatican."
On January 7-8 the Osservatore Romano ran an edi­
torial which again emphasized the neutrality of the Vati­
can. In closing, the editorial asserted the Holy See 
wished "only that every faithful son of the Church should 
follow the rules of his Catholic conscience. This
status quo which was launched on November 30. Reportedly, 
there were over seventy Catholic priests among its founders 
Wambaugh, p. 271.
46Lewy, p. 195* The exact date of this telegram is 
no t known.
^^Ibid., pp. 195-96.
48Ibid., p. 196; and Wambaugh, pp. 289-90.
49 ,Lewy, p. 196.
^ ^ Q u o t e d  in W a m b a u g h ,  p. 292.
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statement pleased the Neue Saar Post, which on January 9 
jubilantly carried the headlines: "The Holy Father Pro­
claims Freedom of Conscience for Saar Catholics ! To 
the majority of Catholics, however, the sentence implied 
a duty to follow the leadership of their bishops. As a 
result the efforts of the Vatican to insure freedom of
conscience for the Catholic voters played directly into
5 2the hands of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer.
Since most Catholics went to the polls on Janu­
ary 13 believing both their Bishops and the Pope sup­
ported an immédiat s- return of the Saar to Germany, the 
outcome could hardly be in doubt. The results showed
that over 90 per cent of the Saar inhabitants had voted
53for union with Germany:
Registered voters....................... 539,5^1
Votes cast................................ 528,105
For union with Germany................... 477,119
For the status q u o ..............................46,613
For union with France..................... 2,124
Invalid ballots .........................  905
Blank ballots..............................1,292
Unquestionably, the vote represented a major triumph for 
the Nazis, and Hitler had reason to be elated. On Janu­
ary 15, just after the Plebiscite Commission had announced 
the results of the vote. Hitler went on the air and hailed
^^Ibid. "Der HI. Vater proklamiert Gewissenfreiheit 
der Saarkatholiken!"
^^Lewy, pp. 196-97; and Wambaugh, p. 292.
^^Wambaugh, p. 304.
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the event as a great German victory. "The whole German
nation rejoices at the return of our comrades," Hitler
declared, and in a few hours bells will ring throughout
the Reich as an "external expression of our pride and 
54joy." Bishops Bornewasser and Sebastian were no less
enthusiastic, and ordered special services of thanks to
be held throughout their dioceses on the first Sunday
following the plebiscite. On January 26 Bishop Sebastian
asserted in a sermon that the results of the plebiscite
indicated God himself had spoken and dealt a devastating
reply to those who did not believe Catholics were reliable 
55patriots. The Reich bishops were also jubilant, and 
undoubtedly relieved that so few Catholics had voted for 
the status quo. This way the Nazis would have no sound 
basis for reviving the charge that Catholics were not 
politically reliable. On March 1, when the Saar offi­
cially returned to Germany, the Catholic clergy showed 
their appreciation by ringing Church bells, displaying 
flags, and offering special prayers of thanks.
Although the Nazis attempted to minimize the assist­
ance rendered by the Catholic bishops in the campaign, it 
seems clear they played a crucial role in securing the 
overwhelming pro-German vote. Lewy puts it this way:
^^Hitler, My New Order, p. 296.
^^Lewy, p. 198.
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The fact that the Saar remained part of the German 
Church and thus under the influence of a German 
clergy was an important reason for the prevalence 
of a strong pro-German sentiment. There was a 
time in 1934, moreover, when the fate of the Saar 
hung in the balance. After the Blood Purge of 
June 30 sentiment for deferring a return to Ger­
many was strong and an anti-Nazi Church might well 
have made the difference. Had the Bishops of Trier 
and Speyer not curbed the status quo movement with 
their disciplinary measures, it is possible that 
the outcome on January 13 might have been differentindeed.56
The Vatican, of course, could have exerted pressure on the 
Bishops of Trier and Speyer to administer their dioceses 
in a more impartial manner, but it chose not to do so.
Like the bishops, the Vatican also believed the Saar was
57historically German and rightfully belonged to the Reich.
In retrospect, it is unfortunate the Vatican and the 
Episcopate did not oppose the immediate return of the Saar 
to Germany, as together they could probably have exerted 
sufficient influence to swing the vote in favor of the 
status quo. This would have denied Hitler both the pres­
tige that accompanied the victory and the acquisition of 
a rich industrial area which greatly enhanced Germany's 
capacity to build a war machine. It is perhaps too much 
to say that the Catholic Church, by denying the Saar to 
Germany, could have stopped Hitler at this point, but it
^^Ibid., p. 199.
^^Ibid., p. 196. Reportedly, the Pope did criti­
cize the German bishops for the prayer declaration in an 
audience granted to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval. 
There appears to be no evidence to support this rumor, 
however, and Lewy suggests it was falsified.
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would have been a serious setback for the Nazis. Never 
again would the Church have a similar opportunity to 
thwart the consolidation of power by Hitler. What Hitler 
would have done if the majority of Saar inhabitants had 
voted for the status quo is anybody's guess. In his anger 
Hitler could have conceivably unleashed his fury on Catho­
lics as the perpetrators of the deed, and initiated a per­
secution of the Church which would have greatly exceeded 
the Kulturkampf in severity. But an open persecution did 
not correspond to Hitler's preferred technique for deal­
ing with such problems, and if implemented could have in­
spired an anti-Nazi reaction that even he could not handle. 
Perhaps the greatest surprise is the failure of the bishops 
to demand concessions from the Reich in exchange for their 
support on the plebiscite. In their eagerness to prove 
the patriotism of Catholics, they rendered valuable service 
to the Nazis while the Church received nothing in return.
Unfortunately, Catholics were forced to face the 
realities of the situation in a matter of days. As early 
as January l8 the Osservatore Romano expressed disappoint­
ment that Hitler had given no assurance he would remedy 
the grievances of the Church in his speech of January 15. 
Since the Saar Catholics had demonstrated proof of their 
patriotism, the Osservatore Romano continued, some such 
assurances were d e s e r v e d . N o t  only did Hitler fail to
^^T h e  Tim e s  (London), J a n u a r y  19, 1933, P- 11.
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give these assurances, but his next moves clearly revealed 
the deceit behind the Nazi campaign in the Saar. In accord­
ance with Hitler's instructions, Buttmann informed Orsenigo
on January 28 that the Reich government "could make no fur-
59ther concessions on important points." This meant the 
formal collapse of the discussions between Buttmann and 
Orsenigo, and while the government and the Vatican later 
resumed negotiations on Article Thirty-one, the results 
were equally fruitless.Furthermore, with the plebiscite 
over the Nazis quickly abandoned their efforts to placate 
Catholics and systematically set about to destroy the in­
fluence of the Church throughout the Reich. In the Saar 
the situation became especially deplorable, perhaps because 
the Reich government refused to recognize the validity of 
the Concordat in this area. Ironically, by the spring of 
1935 Bishop Sebastian of Speyer had already complained to 
the Vatican about the difficulties the Church was experi­
encing in the Saar.^^ He should not have been surprised, 
because the Nazis were only executing a pattern already 
well established. Like the great majority of the German 
Catholics, Bishop Sebastian had gambled the Nazis would 
reward the Church for its patriotic stand--and lost.
59Kdpke to the Embassy to the Holy See, January 311 
1935, DGFP, C, Vol. Ill, No. 470, pp. 889-90.
G°Lewy, p. 130. ^^Ibid., p. 200.
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS
If Reich-Vatican relations were strained between 
1933 and 19355 the years ahead gave no cause for optimism. 
After the Saar plebiscite the Hitler government stepped up 
its efforts to destroy the influence of the Catholic Church 
in Germany. During 1935 the Nazis increased their pressure 
on the Catholic organizations and press, and followed with 
a campaign of vilification against the religious orders 
for violation of the foreign currency laws. The following 
year the Nazis carried out a systematic campaign against 
the confessional schools, and attempted to undermine the 
moral character of the Catholic clergy by instituting the 
so-called "immorality trials." These trials charged the 
members of the religious orders with sexual perversity, 
which the Nazi press covered in every lurid detail. Faced 
with such repeated and flagrant violations of Catholic 
rights, Reich-Vatican relations could only deteriorate.
The continued Nazi excesses finally drove Pope 
Pius XI to publicize the grievances of the Church before 
the world. On March 21, 1937» the papal encyclical. Mit 
brennender Sorge, was read from every Catholic pulpit in
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Germany. In the encyclical, which young clerics had 
smuggled into the Reich, the Pope attacked the neopagan- 
ir,m and the denial of religious freedom in Germany, and 
called upon the faithful to resist the perversion of 
Christian doctrines and morality. Although the encycli­
cal caught the Reich government off guard it came too 
late to intimidate the Nazis. A furious Hitler not only 
initiated new attacks on the Church but even considered 
renouncing the Concordat, and once again Reich-Vatican 
relations took a turn for the worse.
Although Hitler did not involve himself in the 
routine relations between the Reich and the Vatican, the 
evidence indicates that he did make the major decisions. 
Repeatedly in this study, important officials found it 
necessary to consult with the Reich Chancellor on matters 
of importance before issuing instructions to their sub­
ordinates. It is also clear that Hitler had extraordinary 
success in dealing with both the Vatican and the Catholic 
Church in Germany, regardless of how much one may wish to 
condemn him. He accurately judged the limits of Catholic 
patience, and his technique of alternating terror with 
promises of concessions served the Nazi cause well. If 
he had carried out the more violent methods advocated by 
the party extremists. Catholic resistance would have 
stiffened, and the Vatican might have broken off relations 
with the Reich government. Hitler's tactics not only
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prevented such a break, but Hitler even managed to evade 
a papal bull of excoramunication--all while the Nazis 
carried out some of the most barbaric crimes in history.
In the execution of his decisions, Hitler generally 
found the German Foreign Ministry to be a pliable tool.
The aristocrats of the Foreign Ministry may have held the 
Nazi leaders in contempt, but they still proved willing 
enough to carry out Hitler's instructions. If on occasion 
certain officials, such as Bergen and Menshausen, expressed 
the need for a softer policy toward the Vatican, they care­
fully voiced their opinions in muted tones. Even if they 
had been more vociferous in their criticism it is unlikely 
they would have had much effect, because Neurath was not 
inclined to pass their views on to Hitler. In general, 
the Foreign Ministry performed its function of preventing 
a break in Reich-Vatican relations superbly, and in this 
sense served Hitler well. Nevertheless, Hitler still pre­
ferred to work through the Reich Ministry of Interior, 
which had at its head the loyal and trustworthy Frick.
Since the Fuehrer considered the Ministry of Interior more 
reliable than the Foreign Office, it assumed more authority. 
On numerous occasions the diplomats found it advisable to 
check with Buttmann before making a decision, or were rel­
egated to the less significant role of polishing drafts 
prepared initially in the Ministry of Interior.
The frequent Nazi violations of the Concordat only 
confirms the fact that Hitler never intended to take the
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document seriously. Hitler found it useful at the time 
because it provided the new government with a degree of 
respectability, and nothing more. Faced with these con­
ditions, the Concordat could not possibly have provided 
an adequate defense for Catholic rights. Nevertheless, 
it would be going too far to write the Concordat off as 
totally useless to the Church, despite the arguments of 
some that it tended to weaken Church resistance by lull­
ing Catholics into a false sense of security. In areas 
where the Concordat did not apply, such as Austria and 
the Saar, the Nazi persecution of the Church was even 
more severe than in Germany. This suggests that the Con­
cordat did provide some degree of protection for Catholic 
rights, however limited it may have been. Also, to re­
gard the Concordat as a total failure is to ignore Hit­
ler’s strong desire and threats to abolish the agreement.
If the Church received no benefit from the Concordat, it 
seems strange that Hitler would have been so eager to see 
it terminated.
The comments of Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Pacelli 
definitely indicate they considered Communism a more 
serious threat to civilization than National Socialism, 
and this goes far to explain the willingness of the 
Vatican to cooperate with the Nazis. The Reich govern­
ment naturally exploited the Vatican's fear of Communism 
whenever possible. On a number of occasions the government
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reminded the Vatican of the common interest both had in 
thwarting the spread of Communism. During 1936, when 
the Spanish Civil War broke out, even more attention was 
devoted to the Communist menace as a basis for German- 
Vatican collaboration.
For the defenders of Cardinal Pacelli, this study 
is not especially comforting. The evidence submitted 
clearly indicates that the Nazis found Pacelli a more com­
promising and an easier man to work with than the Pope.
On several occasions Pacelli promised to use his influence 
in the attempt to moderate the Pope's position toward the 
Nazis. To what extent he was successful cannot be answered 
on the basis of the German archives alone, but it is clear 
the Germans preferred Pacelli to the Pope. Neither is it 
intended here to imply that Pacelli allowed his pro-German 
sentiments to prevent him from speaking out against the 
mass murder of the Jews during the Second World War. This 
is another question, which this study has not resolved.
In retrospect, it is easy to criticize the Vatican 
for its failure to stand up more firmly against the Nazis. 
It must be remembered, however, that to a great extent the 
Vatican had responded to the wishes of the German Episco­
pate, which earnestly sought to remain loyal to the new 
government. Also, for the Vatican to have encouraged the 
clergy to resist would not have accorded well with the 
teachings of the Church, which has always taught obedience
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to the state, not rebellion. Nevertheless, on certain 
points the Vatican did leave itself open to criticism. 
First, although the Vatican made numerous protests, it 
often failed to mention some of the most important issues 
of the day. For example, the Vatican frequently pointed 
out the infringement of Catholic rights as guaranteed in 
the Concordat, but remained silent on the flagrant viola­
tions of justice committed by the Nazis. Apparently the 
Vatican believed an open protest on so sensitive an issue 
would bring about an abrogation of the Concordat and a 
break in relations with Germany, which it wished to avoid. 
Secondly, when the Vatican did protest, too often it 
weakened its protest by referring to the Reich Chancellor 
in complimentary tones, or by assigning the responsibility 
for the violations to subordinate authorities. Hitler, 
the most important single source of the difficulties, re­
mained virtually immune from Vatican attacks. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most serious, the Vatican tended to limit its 
sphere too much to "Catholic" interests, which was neither 
the humanitarian approach nor in accord with Christian 
principles. To illustrate, the Vatican seldom mentioned 
the persecution of the Protestants in its protests, al­
though they suffered quite as much as the Catholics. On 
one occasion the Vatican referred to the persecution of 
the Protestants only because it feared the Nazis would 
use the same methods against the Catholic Church. Again,
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when protesting the dismissal of Catholic officials of 
Jewish descent, the Vatican did not say a word about the 
thousands of unconverted Jews who were dismissed. When 
the Nazis murdered hundreds during the Roehm purge, the 
Pope mentioned only the shooting of prominent Catholics. 
Unfortunately, the Vatican appears to have been more con­
cerned with the mere survival of the institution of the 
Church than the survival of justice and morality. The 
Church did survive, but only at the price of submitting 
to Hitler's tyranny. True, there were many brave Catho­
lic priests and laymen who chose to fight and die rather 
than to carry out orders contrary to their beliefs and 
conscience, but they received no encouragement from 
their bishops or the Vatican.
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APPENDIX
Concordat Between the Holy See and the German Reich
His Holiness Pope Pius XI and the President of the 
German Reich, moved by the common desire to consolidate 
and promote the friendly relations existing between the 
Holy See and the German Reich, and wishing to regulate 
lastingly, in a manner satisfying to both parties, the 
relations between the Catholic Church and the State for 
the entire territory of the German Reich, have decided 
to conclude a solemn agreement supplementing the concor­
dats concluded with individual German States and also 
accuring for the remaining states a fundamentally uni­
form treatment of the questions to which it pertains.
For this purpose:
His Holiness Pope Pius XI has appointed as his 
Plenipotentiary His Eminence the Most Reverend Cardinal 
Eugenio Pacelli, his Secretary of State.
The President of the German Reich has appointed as 
Plenipotentiary the Vice Chancellor of the German Reich,
Herr Franz von Papen.
Who, having exchanged their respective credentials 
and found them to be in good and proper form, have agreed 
on the following articles :
Article 1--The German Reich guarantees the freedom of 
the profession and public practice of the Catholic reli­
gion.
It recognizes the right of the Catholic Church, within 
the limits of the law that applies to all, to regulate and 
administer her own affairs independently, and, within the 
framework of her competence, to publish laws and ordinances 
binding on her members.
Article 2--The concordats concluded with Bavaria (1924), 
Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932) remain in force, and the 
rights and liberties of the Catholic Church recognized in 
them remain unchanged within the territories of the respec­
tive states. For the other states the agreements reached 
in the present Concordat apply in their entirety. The
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latter are also binding for the three States named above 
in so far as they deal with matters not regulated by the 
State Concordats or supplement the regulations previously 
adopted.
In the future, the conclusion of concordats with in­
dividual States shall be effected only in accord with the 
Government of the Reich.
Article 3--In order to foster good relations between 
the Holy See and the German Reich, an Apostolic Nuncio 
will as heretofore reside in the capital of the German 
Reich and an Ambassador of the German Reich at the Holy 
See.
Article 4--In its relations and correspondence with 
the bishops, the clergy and other members of the Catholic 
Church in Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom. The 
same applies to the bishops and other diocesan officials 
in their relations with the faithful in all matters per­
taining to their pastoral office.
Instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, official 
diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the 
spiritual guidance of the faithful issued by the ecclesi­
astical authorities within the framework of their com­
petence (article 1, paragraph 2) may be published without 
hindrance and brought to the notice of the faithful in 
the forms hitherto usual.
Article 5--In the exercise of their spiritual activity 
the clergy, in the same manner as the officials of the 
State, enjoy the protection of the State. The latter will 
proceed in accordance with the general laws of the State 
against offences to their persons or their character as 
clergy, as well as against interference with the carrying 
out of their official duties; and in case of need will 
provide official protection.
Article 6--The clergy and members of Orders are exempt 
from the obligation of taking public offices and such 
duties as are incompatible, under the prescriptions of 
Canon Law, with the clerical status or membership in an 
Order. This applies particularly to the office of juror 
[Schflffen und Geschworenen] , member of tax boards or of 
the finance courts.
Article 7--In order to accept employment or an office 
of the State, or with a corporation under public law de­
pendent on the State, clergy must have the nihil obstat 
of their diocesan Ordinarius, as well as that of the 
Ordinarius of the seat of the corporation under public 
law. The nihil obstat may be revoked at any time for 
important reasons of ecclesiastical interest.
Article 8--The official income of the clergy is ex­
empt from attachment, as are the official salaries of 
officials of the Reich and State.
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Article 9--The clergy may not be required by judi­
cial and other authorities to give information concern­
ing facts that have been confided to them while exer­
cising their pastoral duties and therefore come under 
the pastoral obligation to preserve secrecy.
Article 10--The wearing of the dress of the clergy 
or of the Orders by laymen, or by clergy or members of 
the Orders who have been legally forbidden by the com­
petent ecclesiastical authorities to wear them, by order 
officially communicated to the authorities of the State, 
is subject to the same penalties by the State as the mis­
use of the military uniform.
Article ll--The present organization and demarcation 
of dioceses of the Catholic Church in the German Reich 
is to remain in force. Establishment of a new bishopric 
or province of the Church or other changes in the de­
marcation of the dioceses which may seem advisable in 
the future, in so far as new arrangements within the 
boundaries of a German Land are involved, remain subject 
to agreement with the competent Land Government. New 
arrangements or changes extending beyond the boundaries 
of a German Land require agreement with the Reich Govern­
ment, to whom it is to be left to obtain the consent of 
the LMnder Governments in question. The same applies to 
the establishment of new provinces of the Church or 
changes in existing provinces, in the event that several 
German LMnder are concerned. The foregoing conditions do 
not apply to changes in ecclesiastical boundaries which 
are made solely in the interest of local pastoral work.
In the event of reorganization within the German 
Reich, the Reich Government will communicate with the 
Holy See for the purpose of changing the organization 
and demarcation of dioceses.
Article 12--Without prejudice to the provisions of 
article 11, ecclesiastical offices may be freely estab­
lished and changed, provided expenditures of state funds 
are not required. Governmental cooperation in the es­
tablishment and alteration of parishes is to take place 
in accordance with principles agreed upon with which the 
diocesan bishops, and the Reich Government will try to 
influence the LMnder Governments to make them as uniform 
as possible.
Article 13--Catholic parishes, parish and diocesan 
associations. Episcopal Sees, bishoprics and chapters, 
religious orders and congregations, as well as institu­
tions, foundations, and property which are under the 
administration of ecclesiastical authority, shall retain 
or acquire legal competence in the civil domain according 
to the general prescriptions of the law of the State.
They shall remain corporations under public law in so far
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as they have been such hitherto; the others may be 
granted the same rights under the law that applies to 
all.
Article l4--In principle the Church has the right to 
make appointments freely to all Church offices and bene­
fices without the participation of the State or the civil 
communities, in so far as other arrangements have not 
been made through the Concordats mentioned in article 2. 
With respect to the filling of Episcopal Sees, the regu­
lation applying to the Metropolitan See of Freiburg 
(ecclesiastical province of Upper Rhine) shall be simi­
larly applicable to the two suffragan bishoprics of 
Rottenburg and Mainz, as well as to the bishopric of 
Meissen. The same applies, in the two suffragan bish­
oprics named, to appointments to the Cathedral Chapter 
and the regulation of the right of patronage.
Furthermore, there is agreement on the following 
points :
1. Catholic clergy who hold an ecclesiastical office 
in Germany or who exercise pastoral or educational func­
tions must:
(a) be German citizens,
(b) have obtained a diploma entitling them to study 
at a German higher institution of learning,
(c) have finished at least 3 years of philosophical 
and theological study at a German state university, a 
German ecclesiastical academic institution or a pontifi­
cal institution of higher learning in Rome.
2. The bull for the nomination of archbishops, bish­
ops, of a co-adjutor cum .jure successionis, or of a 
praelatus nullius, will only then be drawn up after the 
name of the person selected has been communicated to the 
Reichsstatthalter in the appropriate Land, and after it 
has been confirmed that there are no objections of a 
general political nature against the person.
In case of the consent of Church and State, the re­
quirements listed in paragraph 2, figure 7, (a), (b), and
(c) may be waived.
Article 15--0rders and religious associations are sub­
ject to no special restrictions on the part of the State, 
with regard to their foundation, establishment, the num­
ber and--subject to article 15, paragraph 2--the charac­
teristics of their members, their activity in pastoral 
work, in education, in nursing and charitable work, in 
the ordering of their affairs and the administration of 
their property.
Superiors of Orders who have their official residence 
in the German Reich must have German citizenship. Super­
iors of provinces and of Orders, whose residence is outside
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the territory of the German Reich, have the right of visi­
tation with respect to their establishments in Germany.
The Holy See will endeavor to ensure that the provin­
cial organization is so arranged for the establishments 
of the Orders within the German Reich that the subordina­
tion of German establishments to foreign provincial Su­
periors is eliminated as much as is feasible. Exceptions 
to this may be permitted in agreement with the Reich Gov­
ernment particularly in cases where the small number of 
establishments makes the creation of a German province 
impracticable, or where there are special reasons why a 
provincial organization that has become historic and 
proved efficient should be retained.
Article l6--Before the bishops take possession of 
their dioceses they shall take an oath of allegiance 
either before the Reichsstatthalter of the appropriate 
province, or the Reich President as follows:
"I swear and promise before God and on the Holy 
Gospel, as befits a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich 
and to the province of . . . .  I swear and promise to 
respect, and to have my clergy to respect, the consti­
tutionally constituted government. In dutiful., solici­
tude for the welfare and interest of the German State,
I shall try, in the exercise of the spiritual office 
entrusted to me, to prevent any injury that might 
threaten it."
Article 17--The rights of ownership and other rights 
of the corporations under public law, institutions, foun­
dations, and associations of the Catholic Church in their 
property are guaranteed according to the general laws of 
the State.
Buildings used for religious services may not be 
destroyed for any reason whatsoever without the previous 
agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities concerned.
Article l8--In case those payments to the Catholic 
Church by the State which are based on law, treaty, or 
special legal titles should be commuted, a friendly 
agreement will be reached in good time between the Holy 
See and the Reich before the working out of the princi­
ples to be laid down for the commutation.
Usage based on law is numbered among the special 
legal titles.
The commutation must accord to the party entitled to 
commutation appropriate compensation for the loss of pre­
vious government payments.
Article 19--Catholic theological faculties in State 
institutions of higher learning are to be retained. Their 
relation to the ecclesiastical authorities is to be based 
on the stipulations set forth in the pertinent Concordats
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and the Supplementary Protocols appended to them, with 
due regard to the relevant ecclesiastical regulations.
The Reich Government will interest itself in assuring 
a uniform practice"7 fh accordance with all the pertinent 
regulations, for all Catholic faculties of Germany in 
question.
Article 20--The Church has the right, in so far as 
other agreements do not exist, to establish for the 
training of the clergy, philosophical, and theological 
institutions entirely dependent on the ecclesiastical 
authorities, provided no State subsidies are requested.
The establishment, direction, and administration of 
the seminaries for priests and as well as of the church- 
maintained hostels shall, within the limits of the law 
that applies to all, be left exclusively to the ecclesi­
astical authorities.
Article 21--Catholic religious instruction in the 
primary schools, vocational schools, secondary schools, 
and higher educational institutions is a regular sub­
ject of instruction and is to be taught in accordance 
with the principles of the Catholic Church. In reli­
gious instruction, special emphasis is to be placed on 
the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense 
of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral 
law, just as is done in all other instruction. The 
subject matter of instruction and the selection of 
textbooks for religious instruction are to be deter­
mined in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.
The ecclesiastical authorities are to have an opportun­
ity, together with the school authorities, to examine 
whether the students are receiving religious instruction 
in accordance with the tenets and requirements of the 
Church.
Article 22--In the appointment of Catholic teachers 
of religion, agreement is to be reached between the bishop 
and the Land Government. Teachers who have been declared 
by the bishop unsuited for further teaching of religion, 
because of their teachings or moral conduct, may not be 
employed as teachers of religion as long as this obstacle 
exists.
Article 23--The retention of Catholic denominational 
schools and the establishment of new ones, is guaranteed 
as heretofore. In all parishes in which parents or 
guardians request it. Catholic elementary schools shall 
be established, if, with due regard for local conditions 
of school organization, the number of pupils allows a 
regular school operation, in accordance with the stand­
ards prescribed by the State, to appear feasible.
Article 24--In all Catholic primary schools only such 
teachers are to be employed as belong to the Catholic
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Church, and guarantee to fulfill the special requirements 
of the Catholic denominational school.
Within the framework of the general professional 
training of teachers, arrangements will be made which will 
secure the training of Catholic teachers in accordance with 
the special requirements of the Catholic denominational 
school.
Article 25--0rders and religious congregations are en­
titled to establish and conduct private schools, within 
the framework of the general laws and conditions fixed by­
law. These private schools confer the same rights as the 
State schools in so far as they meet the requirements in 
effect for the latter with respect to the curriculum.
With respect to the admission of members of Orders 
or religious associations to the teaching profession, 
and their appointment to elementary, secondary, or senior 
schools, the general requirements are applicable.
Article 26--Sub.ject to more comprehensive regulation 
later on of questions of marriage law, it is agreed that 
in addition to the case of a critical illness of a be­
trothed person admitting of no delay, also in case of 
serious moral emergency, the existence of which must be 
confirmed by the appropriate episcopal authority, the 
consecration of the marriage by the Church may precede 
the civil wedding. The pastor is obliged in such cases 
to notify the Registry Office without delay.
Article 27--The German Reichswehr is granted an ex­
empted pastoral care for the Catholic officers, officials, 
and enlisted men belonging to it, as well as for their 
families.
The Army Bishop is responsible for the direction of 
the military pastoral care. His ecclesiastical appoint­
ment is made by the Holy See after the latter has put 
itself in touch with the Reich Government in order to 
designate in agreement with it a suitable candidate.
The ecclesiastical appointment of the chaplains and 
other military clergy is made by the Army Bishop after 
prior agreement with the competent authorities of the 
Reich. The Army Bishop may appoint only such clergy as 
have received from their competent diocesan bishop per­
mission to enter upon military pastoral work, and an 
appropriate certificate of qualification. The military 
clergy are to have pastoral rights with respect to the 
troops and members of the Army assigned to them.
More detailed regulations concerning the organization 
of the Catholic pastoral work in the Army are to be set 
forth in an Apostolic Brief. The regulation of the rela­
tionship as it applies to the Civil Service is to be done 
by the Government of the Reich.
Article 28--In hospitals, penal institutions, and 
other public establishments the Church is permitted to
333
make pastoral visits and hold divine services, subject 
to the general rules of these institutions. If regular 
pastoral care is established in such institutions, and 
if clergy must be engaged as State or other public of­
ficials for this purpose, this is to be done in agree­
ment with the ecclesiastical authorities.
Article 29--In matters concerning the use of their 
mother tongue in divine services, religious instruction, 
and church organizations, the Catholic members of a non- 
German national minority residing within the German Reich 
will be placed in no less favorable a position than that 
which corresponds to the legal and actual position of 
individuals of German descent and language within the 
territory of the foreign state in question.
Article 30--On. Sundays and religious holidays, a 
prayer is to be offered up for the welfare of the Ger­
man Reich and nation in the Episcopal churches, chapels, 
and abbey churches of the German Reich following the 
main service, in accordance with the precepts of the 
Church liturgy.
Article 31--Those Catholic organizations and socie­
ties which serve exclusively religious, purely cultural 
and charitable purposes, and, as such, are subordinate 
to the ecclesiastical authorities, will be protected in 
their establishments and their activity.
Those Catholic organizations which, in addition to 
their religious, cultural and charitable purposes, also 
serve other purposes, such as social or professional 
interests, will without prejudice to a possible future 
inclusion in State associations, enjoy the protection 
of article 31, paragraph 1, provided they guarantee to 
carry on their activity outside any political party.
It is reserved to the Government of the Reich and 
the German Episcopate, to determine by joint agreement 
which organizations and associations come within the 
scope of this article.
In so far as the Reich and LMnder have in their 
charge sports and other youth organizations, care will 
be taken that the members of the same are enabled regu­
larly to perform their church duties on Sundays and 
holidays, and that they will not be required to do any­
thing irreconcilable with their religious and moral 
convictions and obligations. 1 ...Article 32--On the basis of the special conditions 
existing in Germany, and in view of the guarantees 
created by the stipulations of this Concordat of legis­
lation protecting the rights and freedoms of the Catho­
lic Church in the Reich and its LMnder, the Holy See 
will publish stipulations which exclude the clergy and
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members of Orders from membership in political parties, 
and activity for such parties.
Article 33--The matters pertaining to ecclesiastical 
persons or ecclesiastical affairs, which have not been 
dealt with in the foregoing articles, will be regulated 
for the ecclesiastical sphere in accordance with appli­
cable Canon Law.
Should any difference of opinion occur in future 
regarding the interpretation of application of a stipu­
lation of this Concordat, the Holy See and the German 
Reich will effect a friendly solution by mutual agreement.
Article 34--This Concordat, whose German and Italian 
texts have equal force, is to be ratified, and the instru­
ments of ratification are to be exchanged, as soon as pos­
sible. It enters into force on the day of their exchange.
In witness hereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed 
this Concordat.
Signed in two original texts, in the Vatican City,
July 20, 1933.
EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI 
FRANZ VON PAPEN
Final Protocol
At the signing of the Concordat concluded today between 
the Holy See and the German Reich, the duly empowered Sig­
natories made the following identical statements, which 
form an integral part of the Concordat itself.
To Article 3--The Apostolic Nuncio to the German Reich, 
in accordance with the exchange of notes between the Apos­
tolic Nunciature in Berlin and the Foreign Ministry on 
March 11 and March 271 1930, is Doyen of the Diplomatic 
Corps accredited there.
To Article 13--It is agreed that the right of the 
Church to levy taxes remains guaranteed.
To Article l4, paragraph 2, section 2--It is agreed 
that if objections of a general political nature exist, 
they will be put forward in the shortest possible time.
If after 20 days no such statement has been made, the 
Holy See will be justified in assuming that there are 
no objections to the candidates. The name of the person 
in question will be kept in strict confidence until the 
announcement of the nomination.
This is not to establish the basis for the right of 
veto by the State.
To Article 17--Buildings or properties of the State 
devoted to purposes of the Church are to remain in use 
as before, subject to existing contracts.
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To Article 19, paragraph 2--At the time of signature 
of this Concordat, the basis is provided especially by 
the Apostolic Constitution, Deus Scientiarum Dominus of 
May 24, 1931, and the Instruction of July 7, 1932.
To Article 20--The hostels under the direction of 
the Church in institutions of higher learning and gym­
nasia are to be regarded, with respect to the tax laws, 
as essential ecclesiastical institutions in the true 
sense of the word and as integral parts of the diocesan 
organization.
To Article 24--Existing institutions of the Orders 
and Congregations will also be given due consideration 
in the accordance of recognition [bei ihrer Zulassung], 
in so far as private institutions are in the position 
to meet the State requirements generally in effect after 
the reorganization of the system for the training of 
teachers.
To Article 26--A serious moral emergency exists when 
there are insuperable or disproportionately difficult ob­
stacles impeding the procuring of documents necessary for 
the marriage at the time.
To Article 2?, paragraph l--Catholic officers, offi­
cials and enlisted men, as well as their families, do 
not belong to local parishes, and are not to contribute 
to their maintenance.
Paragraph 4--Issuance of the Apostolic Brief takes 
place after agreement has been reached with the Govern­
ment of the Reich.
To Article 28--In urgent cases entry of the clergy is 
guaranteed at any time.
To Article 29--Since the Government of the Reich has 
indicated its readiness to be accommodating in the matter 
of non-German minorities, the Holy See declares that, in 
confirmation of the principles it has always upheld re­
garding the right to the use of the mother tongue in pas­
toral work, in religious instruction, and the conduct of 
Catholic societies, it will take into consideration when 
making arrangements for concordats with other countries 
in the future the inclusion of an equivalent provision 
protecting the rights of the German minorities.
To Article 31, paragraph 4--The principles established 
in article 3 1 , paragraph 4 , apply also to the Labor Service,
To Article 32--It is understood that similar regula­
tions regarding activity in party politics will be intro­
duced by the Reich with regard to the non-Catholic 
denominations.
The conduct which has been made obligatory for the 
clergy and members of Orders in Germany in virtue of
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article 32 does not involve any sort of limitation of the 
preaching and interpretation of the dogmatic and moral 
teachings and principles of the Church in accordance with 
their duty.
At the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.
EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI 
FRANZ VON PAPEN
Annex
(The High Contracting Parties Agree to Maintain 
Secrecy Concerning the Annex)
In the event of a reorganization of the present German 
military system by the introduction of general military 
service, the induction of priests and other members of the 
secular and regular clergy for the performance of military 
service will be regulated in agreement with the Holy See, 
in accordance with the following basic principles:
(a) The students of philosophy and theology who are in 
Church institutions preparing for the priesthood are ex­
empt from military service and the related preparatory 
training, except in the event of general mobilization.
(b) In the event of general mobilization, the clergy 
who are engaged in diocesan administration or in pastoral 
work are exempt from reporting for service. This applies 
to the bishops, the members of the diocesan courts, prin­
cipals of seminaries and ecclesiastical hostels, profes­
sors in seminaries, the parish priests, curates, rectors, 
coadjutors, and the clergy who permanently preside over a 
church of public worship.
(c) The other clergy, in case they are declared fit, 
enter the armed forces of the State in order, under the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Army Bishop, to devote 
themselves to pastoral work with the troops, unless they 
are inducted into the medical service.
(d) The remaining clerics sacris or in the Orders, 
who are not yet priests, are to be assigned to the medical 
service. The same is to be done, so far as possible with 
the candidates for the office of priest mentioned under 
(a), who have not yet taken the higher Orders.
At the V a t i c a n  City, J u l y  20, 1933.
EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI 
FRANZ VON PAPEN
